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a 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

A  STUDY  IN  DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 

AND 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


BY 


CLAIR  FRANCIS  LITTBLL,  A.  B. 

Instructor  in  European  History  and  International  Law 

in  Allegheny  College 

Sometime  Carnegie  Endowment  Fellow  in  International  Law 

in  Columbia  University 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMETS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

IN  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


MEADVILLE,   PA. 
1920 


8156     IP 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

A  STUDY  IN  DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 

AND 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


BY 


CLAIR  FRANCIS  LITTELL,  A.  B. 

Instructor  in  European   History  and  International  Law 

in  Allegheny   College 

Sometime  Carnegie  Endowment  Fellow  in  International  Law 

in  Colum^hia  University 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMETS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

IN  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


MEADVILLE,   PA. 
1920 


Copyright  1921 

by 

C.  F.  Littell 


Kj 


11287 


*  •  »    -•  « 

•  I  • « •   •  ,• '. 


PREFACE 

The  purpose  of  this  monograph  is  to  present  the  histori- 
cal development  of  the  institution  known  as  Permanent  Neu- 
trality as  applied  to  states,  together  with  the  chief  problems 
which  have  arisen  for  solution  in  the  states  which  have 
been  placed  under  that  regime ;  and  to  show  how  such  prob- 
lems have  been  handled.  Permanent  Neutrality  though  fre- 
C|uently  regarded  of  but  slight  importance,  has,  in  reality, 
played  a  very  important  part  in  European  history.  An 
understanding  of  its  principles  and  interpretation  is  abso- 
lutely essential  for  an  appreciation  of  the  history  of  Swit- 
zerland, of  Belgium,  and  of  Luxemburg;  and  these  small 
states  have  played  in  European  affairs  a  part  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  their  size. 

The  field  was  suggested  to  the  author  when  investigating 

®  an  allied  subject.     He  was  surprised  to  find  that  Perma- 

c  nent  Neutrality,  although  the  subject  of  a  careful  study  by 

■§  Piccioni  in  French  and  by  Richter  in  German,  had  appar- 

j2  ently  never  been  written  up  in  the  English  language.     The 

subject  seemed  particularly  opportune  because  of  the  marked 

increase  in  interest  in  America  in  Belgium  and  her  history, 

but  this  item  played  no  part  in  determining  its  selection. 

The  author  wishes  to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to 
Professor  John  Bassett  Moore,  Hamilton  Fis'  Professor  of 
International  Law  and  Diplomacy  in  Columbia  University, 
for  invaluable  advice  both  on  the  subject  matter  and  the  ar- 
rangement of  the  dissertation.  His  suggestions  on  the  sec- 
tion dealing  with  Samoan  affairs  were  especially  helpful. 
His  gratitude  is  also  due  to  Professor  Munroe  Smith,  and 
to  Mr.  Henry  Eraser  Munro,  under  whose  inspiring  leader- 
ship he  was  privileged  to  work  during  his  stay  at  Columbia ; 
and  to  his  friend,  Professor  Harry  James  Carman,  of  Co- 
lumbia College,  for  his  interest  and  constant  encouragement. 
Meadville.  Pa.,  Dec.  1,  1920. 


201683 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     THE  OiRIGINS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY   .      .  9 

1.  Simple  neutrality   and   permanent   neutrality     .  9 

2.  Development  of  respect  for  neutral  rights     .      .  10 

3.  Proposal  for  a  Joint  Guarantee  of  Poland,  1791  13 

4.  College    of    Free    Cities 15 

5-     Proposed   neutralization  of  Malta,  1802     ...  16 

6.     Traditional   policy  of  the  Swiss  people     ...  19 

II.     THE   CREATION  OF   THE   PERMANENT   NEUTRAL- 
ITY   OF    SWITZERLAND 27 

1.  International  position  of  Switzerland  in  1814     .  27 

2.  Switzerland  neutralized  by  the  Powers  for  their 
own  advantage 31 

3.  Neutrality  violated  during  the  Hundred  Days     .  32 

4.  Again  guaranteed,   November   20,   1815      ...  33 

5.  Is  Swiss  Neutrality  guaranteed? 34 

III.  THE   CREATION   OF  THE    PERMANENT   NEUTRAL- 

ITY OF  BELGIUM 36 

1.  Characteristics  of  the  Belgian  people     ....  36 

2.  Early  suggestions  for  a  neutralized   Belgium     .  37 

3.  Union  of  Holland  and  Belgium.  1815     ....  39 

4.  Revolt  of  Belgium,   1830 40 

5.  The  Conference  of  London,   1831 41 

6.  Reconvened,  1839 44 

IV.  THE    CREATION   OF    THE    PERMANENT    NEUTRAL- 

ITY OF  LUXEMBURG 46 

1.  Early  history  of  Luxemburg 46 

2.  Arrangements   of   1839 47 

3-     Luxemburg  a  member  of  the  Zollverein     ...  48 

4.  Sought  by  both  France  and  Prussia     ....  49 

5.  Proposal  of  a  Conference  to  avoid  war     ...  50 

6.  The  Conference  of  London,  1867 51 

V.  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  PERMANENT  NEUTRAL- 
ITY OF  THE  CONGO  FREE  STATE 54 

1.  Description   of  the  river  and  adjacent  territory  54 

2.  Claims  of  European   Powers 55 

3.  Explorations  of  Henry  M.  Stanley 56 

5 


o 


TABLE  OF  COXTEXTS 


(  IIAITKK  I'AGK 

4.  Artiun  of  thf   Institute  of   International   Law      .  59 

5.  Unexpected  action  of  the  United  States     ...  60 

6.  Conference  of  Berlin  on  African  Affairs,  1885     .  62 
VI.     MISCELLANEOUS   NEUTRALITIES 68 

1.  The  Republic  of  Cracow 68 

2.  The  neutralization  of  Savoy 72 

3      The  neutralization  of  the  Ionian  Islands   ...  73 

4.     The  Sanioan  Islands 74 

VII.  SOME  GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  OF  PERMA- 
NENT NEUTRALITY 84 

1.  Definition 84 

2.  Influence   of  geography 85 

3.  Has  its  basis  in  Law 87 

4.  Should    be   freely   accepted 88 

5.  May  not  wage  offensive  war 89 

6.  May  conclude  treaties  of  a  peaceful  character     .  91 

7.  Will  be  successful  only  for  small  states  with  no 
"Unredeemed  Territory" 92 

8.  Unilaterally  declared  is  not  valid  in  Law  ...  92 

9.  Two  classes  of  permanent  neutralities.      ...  94 
VIII.     THE  EFFECT  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  UPON 

THE  SOVEREIGNTY  OF  A  STATE 95 

1.  No  general  agreement  among  the  authorities     .  95 

2.  Cause   of  the  confusion 97 

3.  Absolutist  conception  of  sovereignty     ....  98 

4.  A  working  conception  of  sovereignty     ....  105 
IX.     PERMANENT   NEUTRALITY   AND    INTERNAL   SOV- 
EREIGNTY        106 

1.  General   rule 106 

2.  Permanent  neutral  manages  its  own  military  af- 
fairs   107 

3.  Neuchatel    Affair "...  110 

4.  Switzerland  refuses  to  sign  Hague  Convention  re- 

lating to  Wars  on  Land.   1900 110 

5.  Question  of  the  Belgian  fortresses m 

6.  Belgian    neutrality    during    the    Franco-Prussian 
War 114 

7.  Luxemburg  an  exception  to  the  general  rule.      .  115 

8.  Luxemburg  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War     .  116 

9.  May  a  neighboring  state  fortify   its  side  of  the 
neutral    border? Hg 

10.     Constitutional    changes 117 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  y 

CHAPTKR  PAGK 

11.  Dynastic  changes 119 

12.  Question   of   internment  of   refugees     ....  120 

13.  Wohlgemuth   Affair 122 

14.  Constitutional    liberties 125 

15.  Proposed  Jesuit  College  at  Luxemburg     .      .      .  126 
X.     PBRMAXENT  NEUTRALITY  AND   INTERNATIONAL 

RELATIONS 127 

1.  General    rule 127 

2.  Question   of  a   customs   union 128 

3.  Luxemburg  again  an  exception 129 

4.  Question  of  colonies 131 

5.  Question  of  defensive  alliances 132 

6-     Proposed  alliance  between  Holland  and  Belgium  135 

7.  "Federative    Neutrality"     of    the     Scandivanian 
States 138 

8.  May  a  permanent  neutral  send  troops  abroad?     .  141 

9.  Annexation  of  the  Congo  by  Belgium     ....  144 
XI.     THE  GUARANTEE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE    .      .  152 

1.  Reservations  in  principle 152 

2.  Historical  development  of  the  guarantee   .      .      .  152 

3.  Comparison  of  the  guarantees  given  Belgium  and 
Luxemburg 154 

4.  Fallacy  of  the  Derby  Doctrine 157 

5.  Mistake  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  1914     ....  159 

6.  Hall's  warning  against  dishonesty  in  diplomacy  160 

7.  Purpose  of  Great  Britain's  policy  in  1870  .      .      .  161 

8.  Great  Britain's  policy  toward  Belgium,  1870-1914  162 

9.  Outbreak  of  the  European  War  involves  violation 

of  neutrality  of  both  Belgium  and  Luxemburg     .  163 
10.     Strength   of   Great    Britain's    position   when   her 
government    made    its    appeal    for    International 

Justice  and  Honor 167 

XII.     CONCLUSION 168 

BIBLIOGRAPHY          171 

TOPICAL    INDEX 177 

VITA 181 


ABBREVIATIONS 

I\.   D.   I.   P.   =  Revue    generale    de    droit    interna- 
tional public. 
Ji.    D.   I.  =   Revue    de    droit    international    et    de 

legislation  comparee. 
R.  H.  D.  =   Revue  d'histoire  diplomatique. 
R.  D.  M.  =  Revue  des  deux  mondes. 
P.    8.    Q.  —  Political   Science  Quarterlv. 
Fort.    Rev-    =  Fortnightly  Review. 
C.  M.  H.  =  Cambridge  Modern  History. 
B.  B.  B.  =  British   Blue  Book. 
B.   G.  B.  =  Belgian  Grey  Book. 
F.   Y.  B.  =  French  Yellow  Book. 
State  Papers  =  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  ORIGIN   OF    PERMANENT    NEUTRALITY 

Simple  neutrality  is  the  status  in  which  all  powers  other 
than  those  taking  part  as  combatants  find  themselves  upon 
the  outbreak  of  war.  A  neutral  may  not.  without  losing 
this  status,  take  any  part  whatever  in  the  conflict ;  and  such 
favors  as  it  may  legally  show  must  be  conferred  upon  all  bel- 
ligerents without  partiality/  On  the  other  hand,  neutral 
states  are  entitled  to  privileges  of  inviolability  of  soil,  and  to 
commercial  rights  which  may  not  be  infringed  upon  by  the 
belligerents.  It  is  in  the  development  of  respect  for  these 
so-called  neutral  rights  that  we  find  the  germ  of  the  idea  of 
permanent  neutralization. 

The  permanently  neutral  state  occupies  a  position  which 
differs  to  some  extent  from  that  of  the  state  which  has 
merely  assumed  a  position  of  neutrality.  Simple  neutrality 
exists  only  in  time  of  war,  anci  is  assumed  by  deliberate 
choice  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state  con- 
cerned ;  but  permanent  neutrality  exists  alike  in  times  of  war 
and  of  peace,  and  is  not  necessarily  the  result  of  deliberate 
choice  on  the  part  of  the  state  concerned,  but  may  be  im- 
posed upon  it  by  joint  action  of  other  powers."  The  perma- 
nently neutralized  state  can  not.  without  compromising  its 
position,  engage  in  any  warfare  other  than  of  a  strictly  de- 
fensive nature;  nor  can  it.  in  time  of  peace,  join  in  any  inter- 
national agreement,  or  engage  in  any  international  relations, 

1  Phillimore,  R..  Commentaries  on  International  Law,  (4  vols., 
3rd  ed.     London,  1879).     Ill,  225. 

-  Morand,  M.,  Les  origincs  de  la  neutralitc  j)erpetuelle,  R.  D.  I.  P. 
I.,    (1894),  523. 

9 


lO  THE  NEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  1<ITATES 

which  niav  be  hal)lc  Id  iiuohc  il  in  foreign  wars.'  In  re- 
turn for  this  sin-render  of  a  pari  of  its  scnereignty,"  the  per- 
manently neiitraHzed  state  receives,  npon  its  adoption  of 
this  status,  a  guarantee  from  the  powers  most  immediately 
concernetl  that  they  will  respect,  and  cause  to  be  respected, 
the  neutrality  which  has  been  established.  Hence,  in  time 
of  war.  which  is  tlie  only  time  when  the  neutralized  state  can 
be  concei\'ed  of  as  in  jeopardy,  it  is  entitled  to  all  the  priv- 
ileges of  other  neutrals,  and  is  doubly  protected  by  this  guar- 
antee of  the  powers.  The  conception  of  neutrality  itself  is 
the  same  in  both  cases,  and  is  merely  given  a  special  appli- 
cation in  the  case  of  permanent  neutralization. 

Neutrality  as  a  legal  status  is  a  comparatively  modern 
concept  ion.  ■'  The  Bible  describes  the  great  Hebrew  ]irophet 
.urging  his  peojile  to  avoid  "entangling  alliances"  with  their 
powerful  neighbors.  Egypt  and  Assyria;*  but  the  fact  that 
Judea  was  able  to  maintain  its  independence  and  national 
integrity  for  a  long  time  was  not  due  to  any  respect  on  the 
])art  of  its  neighbors  for  neutral  rights.  Nor  yet  did  Im- 
perial Rome  know  such  a  thing  as  neutrals.  All  were  either 
for  her  or  against  her.''  During  the  time  of  the  barbarian 
invasions,  and  the  period  of  chaos  following,  there  was  little 
opportunity  for  ftuMher  acceptance  of  the  rights  of  neutrals. 
It  was  in  the  renlm  of  commerce  that  organized  law  in  an 
international  sense  tirst  came  into  existence.  During  the 
])erio(l  of  transition  between  the  13th  and  14th  centuries 
there  appeared  at  liarcelona.  in  Spain,  a  system  of  maritime 

'  Funck-Brentano  et  Sorel.  Precis  du  droit  des  gens.  (3rd  ed. 
Paris.  1900).  1.53. 

-  Miloranowitcli.  .M..  Lrs  traitrs  dr  (;unranfir  au  XIXc  siicle, 
(Paris,   1888),   144. 

•■•■  There  is  an  excellent  ^history  of  the  development  of  respect  for 
the  rights  of  neutrals  in  the  introduction  to  Kleen,  R.,  Lois  et  usages 
<lr  la  ncutnilitr,   (2  vols.,  Paris,  1898),  I. 

••  Isaiah,  XXX.  1-5;    XXXI,   1-3. 

•  Rivier,  A.,  Principes  du  droit  des  gens,  (2  vols.,  Paris,  1896), 
II.  210. 


ORIGINS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  n 

laws  known  as  the  Consolato  del  Marc}  The  purpose  of 
this  law  was  to  regulate  commerce  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea, 
in  peace  as  well  as  war.  It  was  adopted,  to  a  large  extent, 
by  all  sea-faring  peoples  of  the  time.  A  little  later  the 
Hanseatic  League  was  formed,  to  protect  the  trade  of  the 
cities  of  Northern  Europe,  and  a  rough  working  code  was 
developed  to  govern  the  land  trade  between  them.  But 
when  the  discovery  of  new  continents  aroused  the  desire  of 
the  nations  for  conquest,  and  caused  both  commerce  and  war 
to  be  conducted  on  a  much  larger  scale  than  before,  what 
little  international  law  there  was  at  the  time  broke  down. 
The  maritime  states  engaged  in  preying  on  each  other's  com- 
merce in  far-away  seas,  and  a  system  of  "buccaneering" 
w^as  developed,  which  lacked  but  little  of  piracy.  In  their 
effort  to  alleviate  this  deplorable  condition  of  affairs,  the 
nations  of  Europe  resorted  to  a  network  of  international 
agreements  which  weakened  the  legal  status  of  neutrality  by 
giving  the  impression  that  neutral  rights  could  be  only  ol> 
tained  by  treaty.' 

In  Dc  Jure  Belli  ac  Pads  Grotius,  although  he  devoted  but 
a  few  pages  to  the  rights  of  neutrals,  whom  he  describes  by 
the  Latin  phrase  Hi  sunt  medii  in  Belli,}  again  raised  neu- 
trality to  the  dignity  of  a  legal  status.  Other  writers  on  in- 
ternational law  made  substantial  contributions  to  the  theory 
of  neutral  rights,  until  by  the  close  of  the  17th  century  it 
was  fairly  well  worked  out ;  but  here,  as  in  all  international 
relations,  theory  was  far  in  advance  of  practice,  and  the 
laws  of  neutrality  lay  as  a  dead  letter  during  the  great  wars 
of  that  and  the  succeeding  century.  During  the  Napoleonic 
Wars,  recriminations  reached  their  climax  in  the  famous 
Continental  System  of  Bonaparte,  and  the  decrees  of  Milan 

1  Kleen,  1,  5. 

-Kleen,  I,  11-12. 

"Emmanuel  Descamps,  L'etate  neutre  a  titre  permaneyit.  (Brussels 
and  Paris,  1912).  wittily  translates  this,  "Those  who  are  between 
two  fires."  13. 


J  ,  Tilt:  XEi'TRALl/.ATloX   (U'  STATEii 

and  Berlin,  with  their  0)unteri)aris.  the  lirilish  Orders  in 
Council.' 

So  conslanlly  had  neutral  commerce  been  the  prey  of  the 
warrinj^  lK)\vers  that  in  1780  several  northern  nations  under- 
took the  novel  experiment  of  uniting  to  enforce  by  arms 
their  right  to  sail  the  sea  as  neutrals.  This  -was  the  famous 
Armed  Xeutraliiy.  originated  1)\  the  energetic  Catharine  II 
of  Russia,  and  joined  in  by  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  after 
Some  delav,  bv  Prussia."  Thus  it  became  evident  by  the 
close  of  the  i8th  century,  that  the  conception  of  neutral 
rights  had  become  so  definite  that  neutral  states  were  ready 
to  go  to  war  rather  than  submit  to  their  infringement  by 
belligerents.  Powerful  as  was  the  influence  of  the  Armed 
Neutralities  f)f  Eiu'ope  in  bringing  al)out  this  result,  it  may 
justly  be  said  that  the  conduct  of  the  new  American  Republic 
had  not  less  to  do  with  the  exaltation  of  neutral  rights."'  In 
1798  the  United  States,  while  attempting  to  maintain  neu- 
trality in  the  struggle  that  was  going  on  between  England 
and  I'rance.  was  forced  into  a  state  of  limited  war  with  the 
lalteT,  aiKJ  this  con(h'liiin  lasted  for  two  years;'*  and  in  1812, 
during  the  great  World  War  then  raging,  rather  than  sul)- 
mit  to  the  constant  violation  of  her  rights  as  a  neutral,  she 
went  to  war  with  Creat  Britain.^ 

This,  then,  is  the  jxjint  to  which  respect  for  neutral  rights 
bad  develo|)e(l  at  the  time  when  the  first  experiments  in  per- 
manent neutralization  were  made.  We  shall  now  give  o.ir 
attention  to  certain  international  arr.angements  which  bear 
some  resemblance  to  tlie  regime  of  ])ermanent  neutrality, 
and  which  may  have  i)a\ed  ihe  way.  U)  some  extent,  for  the 

1  Cnmhruhjr   Modern    History.    (13   vols.,   New  York  and   London, 
1903).  IX,  361ff. 

2  C.  M.  If-,  IX,  42ff. 

3  Hall    W.  E..  A  Treatise  on  International  Law,   (6th  ed.  London 

•■""'   •^'"^^'  Vork.   1909).  r,87. 

'  .Moore,  J.  B.,  The  Prineiples  of  Amcriean  Diiilomaey,   (New  York 
and   London.  1918),  59. 
■•  Ihiil..  61. 


ORIGIXS   OF  PERMANENT   NEUTRALITY  j  -. 

acceptance  of  that  status  in  its  entirety  by  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  in  1815.  ^^'e  shall  discuss  briefly  (i)  the  negotia- 
tions directed  toward  a  joint  guarantee  of  Poland,  in  1791  ; 

(2)  the  formation  of  the  College  of  Free  Cities  within  the 
Empire,    by    the    Recess    of   the    Imperial    Diet,    of    1803; 

(3)  the  attempt  to  effect  the  permanent  neutralization  of 
Malta,  by  the  Treaty  of  Amiens,  in  1802;  and,  (4)  the  tra- 
ditional neutral  policy  of  the  Swiss  people. 

The  phenomenal  growth  of  the  power  of  Prussia  during 
the  latter  half  of  the  i8th  century  threatened  to  eclipse  the 
glory  of  the  House  of  Habsburg.  When,  after  a  revolution 
in  Poland  had  overturned  the  constitution  which  had  been 
guaranteed  by  the  neighboring  powers,  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment began  to  urge  a  second  division  of  that  unfortunate 
country,  Leopold  II  of  Austria,  becoming  convinced  that  this 
division  would  not  be  as  favorable  to  himself  as  to  Prussia, 
resolved  to  trv  an  experiment  in  diplomacy.  He  proposed 
to  the  Empress  Catharine,  of  Russia,  a  policy  which  might 
be  followed  by  those  two  states  to  the  exclusion  of  Prussia.' 
The  integrity  of  Poland  should  be  guaranteed,  in  order  that 
this  power  might  furnish  a  check  to  Prussian  aggression ; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  lest  their  ward  itself  should  become 
powerful  enough  to  be  a  menace  to  the  welfare  of  its  guar- 
dians, the  constitution  of  Poland  was  to  be  guaranteed  by  the 
courts  of  Austria  and  Russia,  thus  making  impossible  those 
internal  reforms  by  ^^;hich  alone  it  could  be  rejuvenated. 
Catharine,  who  undoubtedly  had  her  own  plans  as  to  the 
future  of  Poland,  refused  to  commit  herself. 

Leopold  then  turned  to  Prussia,  and  succeeded  in  con- 
cluding a  treaty,  signed  July  25,  1791,  by  a  secret  article  of 
which  it  was  agreed  to  guarantee  the  integrity  and  the  main- 
tenance of  the  free  constitution  of  Poland."     It  was  also 

1  Martens,  F.  de,  Recueil  des  priticipaux  traites  ct  conventions  con- 
clus  iKir  In  Russie  avec  les  puissances  ctrangers,  (St.  Peteri>burg, 
1874),  II,  195. 

-  Martens,  G.  F.  de,  Recueil  des  principimx  traites  d'alUance,  etc., 
cojiclus  par  les  puissances  dc  VEurope,  (Gottingen,  1st  ed.  1795.  2nd 
ed.  1831).     1st  ed.  V.  7. 


THE  \EUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

stpulatcW  llial  Russia  >li<)ul(l  be  iiniled  to  accede  to  the 
treaty,  and  Leopold  now  hoped  that  the  terms  of  the  con- 
vention woiikl  he  acceptahle  to  the  Kmi)ress.  Catharine  was. 
ho\ve\er.  merely  waitin,^-  fi  r  a  fayorahle  opportunity  to 
carry  out  her  own  ])lans.  She  had  nol  Ions;-  lo  wait,  lor  the 
outhreak  of  the  l'"rench  Kevolutiou  remoyed  for  a  time  trom 
the  sphere  of  international  actiyities  the  one  power  which 
mi^ht  ha\e  supported  Austria  in  her  effort  to  maintain  the 
national  integrity  of  Toland.'  At  the  same  time,  the  death 
of  Leopold  II  hrougiit  h'rancis  II.  the  last  of  the  Emperors, 
to  the  throne.  Isolated  in  Tun-opean  affairs,  and  constantly 
threatened  hy  war  w  ith  the  Repuhlicans  of  France,  the  new- 
Emperor  entered  into  an  alliance  with  Russia  hy  which  Po- 
land was  sacrificed,  and  the  second  dismemherment  was  per- 
petrated. 

W'liat  has  the  treaty  of  T791  in  common  \yith  the  later 
system  of  permanent  neutralization?  Certainly  but  little; 
.so  little  that  it,  is  seldom  nt)ticed  by  \yriters  on  the  sitbject. 
Vet  it  \yas  an  effort  to  assure  the  political  independence  of  a 
weak  nation  1)\-  a  coalition  of  its  powerful  neighbors,  and 
was  designed  by  tiie  proposing  party  to  keep  that  Ayeak  na- 
tion from  destructic/n.  The  benefits  of  the  transaction  were 
to  be  mutual ;  for,  according  to  the  secret  article,  along  witii 
the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  Poland  went  also  "the 
interests  and  tran(|uillity  of  the  neighboring  powers."  The 
proposition  was  "to  destroy  all  jealousy  or  ap[)rehension  of 
preponderance:"  how  could  better  1^  expressed  the  motive 
which  prompted  the  neutraliA'Uion  nf  lielgium  in  1S30.  i>r  of 
Luxemburg  in  iSOj?  The  proposal  carried  with  it  an  in- 
ternational guarantee,  an  indispensable  element  of  a  treaty 
of  ])ermanent  neutralization.  It  was  a  i)roposal  for  a  joint 
guarantee  of  the  political  constitution  and  the  independence 
of  a  weak  power  by  its  strong  neighbors.      But  it  stoj^ijecl 

1  Martens,  F.  de,  II,  197. 


ORIGIXS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  j  - 

short  of  a  guarantee  of  neutralization;  in  fact,  it  is  doubtful 
is  such  a  status  as  guaranteed  neutrality  had,  at  tlie  time, 
been  thought  of.  On  the  other  hand,  by  guaranteeing  the 
political  constitution  of  the  Polish  state,  it  went  farther  than 
is  now  accepted  as  the  sphere  of  the  guarantor  in  treaties 
creating  a  permanent  neutrality,  since  to  guarantee  the  politi- 
cal constitution  of  a  state  is  the  equivalent  of  establishing  a 
protectorate  over  it. 


The  Decree  of  the  Diet  of  Ratisbon,  of  February  25.  1803, 
had  for  its  object  the  territorial  reorganization  of  Germany, 
at  the  time  when  Bonaparte's  triumph  on  the  Continent 
seemed  complete.  Conformably  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaties  of  Campo-Formio  and  Luneville,  the  French  state 
was  extended  to  include  all  of  the  territory  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine ;  and  the  Imperial  Princes  w' ho  were  thus  de- 
spoiled of  their  lands  were,  by  the  decisions  of  the  Congress 
of  Rastadt,  to  be  indemnified  through  the  secularization  of 
ecclesiastical  property  in  Germany.^  The  management  of 
this  readjustment  was  left  to  a  special  commission,  but  its 
workings  were  so  dilatory  that  Bonaparte  became  impatient 
and  interfered  as  mediator.  Wishing  to  have  the  prestige 
of  another  power  associated  with  him,  he  appealed  to  an  old 
treaty  between  France  and  Russia  in  1779,  and.  by  master- 
ful diplomacy  and  unlimited  flattery,  he  influenced  the  Czar 
to  act  as  co-mediator." 

On  June  3,  1802,  a  project  for  the  management  of  the 
territorial  changes  was  drawn  up,  and  this  received  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  Diet,  forming  in  substance  the  Imperial  Recess 
of  February  25,  1803.  It  provided  for  a  "College  of  Free 
Cities",  the  members  of  which  should  take  no  part  in  the 
future  wars  of  the  Empire,  and  should  be  perpetually  free 
from  all  military  contributions.  The  Empire  assured  their 
neutrality,  as  long  as  it  should  be  respected  by  other  belli- 

1  C.  M.  H.,  IX,  92. 
2 /bid.,  93. 


j(-  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

jrerents.'  In  historv  this  recess  is  important  as  a  step  toward 
the  consoHdation  of  ("lerniany,  for  by  it  the  numljer  of  free 
cities  was  rechiced  frnm  50  to  6".  Although  these  six  were 
placed  in  a  state  <>f  permanent  neutrality,  their  status  was 
not  a  matter  of  internatiiMial  i^iiarantce,  unless  the  guarantee 
of  the  numerous  parts  of  winch  the  l^npire  was  at  the  time 
ci imposed  mit^lit  be  construed  as  an  niicrnalional  guarantee; 
but  this  can  hardly  be  admitted.  IJeing,  in  law.  the  unilater- 
al work  of  tlu'  representatives  of  tlie  Holy  Roman  Empire, 
it  can  not  be  classified  other  tlian  as  an  act  of  internal  ad- 
ministration, and  it  had  efficiency  only  as  such,  and  among 
the  members  of  the  German  Confederation.  Although 
guaranteed  permanent  neutrality  so  far  as  the  neighboring 
states  of  the  Empire  were  concerned,  the  Free  Cities  had  no 
surety  as  to  the  conduct  of  outside  pow'ers.  in  case  the  Em- 
])ire  should  be  involved  in  war;  and  the  Empire  itself  was 
bound  to  observe  this  neutrality  onlv  so  long  as  it  was  re- 
spected by  other  belligerents.  Morand  is  right  in  declar- 
ing, "This  neutrality  has  with  permanent  neutrality  only  the 
naiue  in  common"."'' 


The  first  complete  plan  U  v  llie  establishment  of  a  formal 
permanent  neutrality  was  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of 
Amiens,  in  1802.  and  h.-id  its  origin  in  tlic  mutual  distrust 
of  France  and  I-lngiand.  the  parties  to  that  treaty.  The 
Island  of  Malta,  where  the  experiment  was  to  be  tried,  had 
had  a  long  and  romantic  history.  It  had  been  given,  about 
the  middle  of  the  i^th  century,  to  the  semi-religious  order 
of  the  Knights  of  St.  John,  by  Charles  V,  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many.''    It  remained   in   their  hands  for  two  hundred  and 

'  Martens,  F.  do,  II,  396;  Garden,  G.  de,  Histoire  g('n<^rale  des 
tntitrs  de  imix.  rt  autre  transuttlons  princiiHiux  cnire  ioiites  les 
iniissavces  de  I'Euroiw  dcimis  le  paix  de  Westphalie,  (Paris,  1848- 
18.-59),   VII.   369. 

-C.  M.  II..  IX.  94. 

•-•  Morand.  528. 

'  Ballon,  M.  M..  Thr  Story  of  Malta.  (Boston  and  New  York,  1893), 
271. 


ORIGINS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  jy 

sixty-eight  years;  but,  in  1798,  it  was  wrested  from  tlieni 
by  the  French,  and.  by  an  order  of  Napoleon,  issued  in  June 
of  that  year,  the  Knights  were  diseprsed  from  MaUa/  Four 
years  later  the  British  succeeded  in  "capturing  the  island,  and 
in  the  territorial  readjustments  incidental  to  the  proposed 
peace,  they  felt  that  they  could  not  return  the  island  to 
France  without  endangering  their  own  position  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. In  their  mutual  distrust,  both  France  and  En- 
gland sought  to  obtain  the  independence  of  Alalta  under  the 
guarantee  of  a  third  power.  England  proposed  placing  it 
under  the  control  of  Russia,  whose  career  of  concjuest  to  the 
south  had  then  hardly  begun,  so  that  the  British  policy  of 
checking  Russian  advances  toward  the  Mediterranean  was 
as  yet  unthought  of.  France,  for  obvious  reasons,  wished  the 
island  under  the  protection  of  the  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies. 
In  the  preliminary  treaty  of  peace,  signed  at  London,  Octo- 
ber I,  1 80 1,  it  was  stipulated  that  Malta  should  be  placed 
under  the  guarantee  and  protection  of  a  third  power,  which 
was  to  be  designated  by  the  definitive  treaty."  The  dead- 
lock as  to  what  power  this  should  be  continued.  It  was 
then  proposed  by  the  French  that  the  fortress  be  dismantled, 
and  the  island  virtually  internationalized ;  but  the  rocky 
coast  is  in  itself  a  mighty  fortification,  and  the  British 
thought  that  this  step  would  be  insufficient  protection  from 
French  aggrandizement  to  warrant  them  in  surrendering  a 
stronghold  already  in  their  own  possession."  Bonaparte's 
next  suggestion  w'as  that  the  island  be  neutralized  vmder  the 
guarantee  of  all  the  powers  interested  in  maintaining  the 
Order  of  the  Knights  of  St.  John,  and  this  suggestion  was 
adopted  in  the  Treaty  of  Amiens. 

After  provisions  were  made  for  the  retrocession  of  Malta 

1  Hardman,  W.,  The  History  of  Malta  during  the  Period  of  the 
French  and  English   Oecuimtions,   (London,  1909),  371f. 

-  Clerq,  A.  J.  de,  Recueil  des  traites  de  la  France,  ('Paris,  1880 
et  seq.),  I,  464. 

3  Morand,  532. 


l8  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

to  the  OrdtT.  fnr  the  return  of  the  Knights,  for  the  removal 
1)1  l-'rench  and  British  inthience.  for  ]')ritish  evacnation  with- 
in three  months  after  ratification,  and  fen"  the  protection  of 
the  interests  of  the  natf\e  Maltese,  the  entire  arrangement 
\vas  placed  nnder  the  protection  and  gnarantee  of  Cireat 
Britain.  I'rance.  Austria,  Russia.  Spain,  and  Prussia.'  The 
perpetual  neulralit\'  of  the  ( )rdcr  and  the  island  was  then 
declared,  and  its  ports  were  thrown  open  to  the  commerce 
and  navigation  ol'  all  nations.  Inasmuch  as  the  Knights 
had  swi.rn  eternal  enmity  to  all  Mohammedans,  the  Barbary 
States  were  excepted  from  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  until 
the  system  of  hostilities  then  existing  should  be  terminated. 
The  fortresses  of  the  island  were  to  be  garrisoned  by  Sicilian 
troops,  but  tliese  forces  were  to  be  removed  after  a  period  of 
one  year.  pro\ided  that  the  Knights  had.  bv  that  time,  raised 
a  sufficient  force  to  take  their  place. 

It  is  doubtful  if  either  France  or  luigland  was  sincere  in 
making  this  arrangement.  j\n  unwillingness  on  the  part  of 
the  British  to  evacuate  was  encouraged  by  the  entreaties  of 
the  nati\e  Maltese,  whd  went  so  far  as  to  send  a  deputation 
to  England  to  ])rotest  against  the  retrocession  of  the  island 
to  the  Knights."  The  powers  hesitated  to  accept  an  ar- 
rangement whereby  they  were  called  upon  to  guarantee  so 
unstable  a  thing.  Austria  was  the  onlv  ])ower  to  give  free 
consent.  Russia  refused  to  be  bound  1)\-  an  agreement,  but 
submitted  certain  stipulations  with  regard  to  the  manage- 
ment of  the  Order  itself.  ( in  which  that  pow  er  was  especially 
interested,  the  Emperor.  Raul  I,  having  at  one  time  been  the 
(Irand  Master).^  The  ab.^orplion  of  Switzerland  bv  the 
iM-ench  brought  the  delay  to  a  close,  ior  Great  Britain  de- 
manded that  Switzerland  and  Holland  be  evacuated  by 
Ronaparte,  before  the  R)ritish  soldiers  should  be  removed 
from  Malta.      .\  new  dead-lock  ensued,  war  again  broke  out, 

'  Hardniaii.  433. 
-  Hard  man.   407f. 
:'  Garden,  VII.  41f. 


ORIGINS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  jg 

and  Great  Britain  maintained  military  possession  of  the  is- 
lands till  1814,  when  the  Treaty  of  Paris  gave  her  perma- 
nent sovereignty  over  them  Although  the  neutralizing  ar- 
rangement never  passed  beyond  the  embryonic  stage,  it  fur- 
nished a  precedent  which  has  been  followed  in  the  later 
cases  of  neutralization.  It  was  a  plan  for  an  internationally 
guaranteed,  permanent  neutrality,  and  as  such  was  a  direct 
precursor  of  the  neutralization  of  Switzerland  and  Cracow 
at  Vienna.^ 


We  have  seen  how  the  germ  of  the  permanent  neutraliza- 
tion theory  is  to  be  found  in  the  development  of  respect  for 
neutral  rights  among  the  family  of  nations ;  and  how  cer- 
tain international  experiments  pa\ed  the  way  for  its  ac- 
ceptance as  a  part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe.  Our  last 
illustration  will  show  how  a  people,  by  a  consistent  policy, 
followed  for  centuries,  were  prepared,  not  only  to  accept  the 
status,  but  to  apply  it  so  successfully  in  their  national  life  as 
to  evoke  the  admiration  of  the  world.  W'e  refer  to  the 
traditional  neutral  policy  of  the  Swiss.  Indeed.  Swiss  neu- 
traity  is  no  simple  problem.  It  is  rendered  doubly  compli- 
cated by  the  fact  that  until  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
of  1848  the  several  cantons  were  held  to  be  sovereign  in 
their  own  territory,  thus  making  concerted  action  by  the 
Diet  of  the  Confederation  impossible."  and  making  it  ex- 
ceedingly difficult  for  the  student  of  Swiss  history  to  dis- 
cover a  policy  which  may  be  said  to  have  been  that  of  the 
state  as  a  wdiole. 

The  Swiss  state  may  be  said  to  have  its  origin  in  1291. 
when,  out  of  the  chaos  of  the  collapse  of  feudalism,  there 
developed  a  union  of  the  three  tiny  divisions  of  Alpine  peo- 

1  Morand,  535. 

2  Bury,  S.,  La  neutralitc  suisse.  R.  D.  I..  II.    (1870),  637. 


20  THE  NEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

pies  about  Lake  Lucerne.'  These  cantons,  as  tliey  came  to 
to  be  called,  were  Vr\.  Scliwyz  and  Unterwaldcn :  and  this 
alliance  is  the  germ  of  the  Swiss  Confederation.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  union  was  primarily  mutual  protection  against 
external  foes,  ])articularly  the  llabsburgs.  The  battle  of 
Brunnen,  in  1315.  made  certain  the  freedom  of  the  cantons 
from  the  power  of  Austria.  Shortly  afterward  the  Austrian 
citv  of  Lucerne  was  annexed  to  the  League,  and  the  evolu- 
tion of  Switzerland  fn>m  tlien  on  was  a  gradual  drawing- 
together  of  more  and  more  \  alley  cmnmunes  and  free  cities 
around  the  original  League.-  Some  of  the  added  cantons 
maintained  their  own  indix  idnality :  others  were  brought 
into  subjection  to  one  or  more  of  the  (M-iginal  members; 
while  many  diversities  were  manifest  in  the  terms  by  which 
the  several  cantons  were  admitted.  Each  was  permitted  to 
form  separate  alliances  with  different  cantons  of  the  League, 
and  considerable  latitude  was  given  in  the  matter  of  alli- 
ances with  outside  jjowers. 

During  the  religious  wars,  anomalous  as  it  may  seem,  the 
religious  cleavage  of  the  cantons  proved  to  be  Switzerland's 
salvation ;  for  concerted  action  or  general  alliance  w'ith  either 
the  Catholic  or  Protestant  party  was  impossible.  Rather 
than  divide  their  union  the  Swiss  kept  up  a  difficult  neutral- 
itv;  for  it  was  obvious  to  thoughtful  Swiss  statesmen  that 
to  join  ill  anv  way  in  the  territic  struggles  of  the  time  must 
mean  a  dixision  of  the  Confederation,  and  that  such  a  di\'i- 
sion  meant  national  suicide.  Such  were  the  circumstances 
from  which  evolved  the  much  heralded  traditional  policy  of 
Switzerland.  It  should  not  be  concluded  that  such  a  policy 
was  followed  to  the  letter,  or  that  the  Swiss  were  united  in 
its  support.      The  latter  part  of  the  15th,  and  the  early  part 

'  Dandliker,  K.,  A  Short  Histori/  of  Switzrrlavd.  (London  and  New 
York,  1899),  44;  Hug.  L.,  Sicitzcfland.  (London  and  New  York, 
1900),  119. 

-  Baumgartner,  F.  W..  The  Nctvtralization  of  States,  in  the  Bul- 
letin of  the  Depart nwrvts  of  History  and  Political  and  Economic^ 
Science  of  Queen's  University.   (Xo.  25.  July,  1917).  6. 


ORIGINS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  2 1 

of  the  1 6th  centuries  witnessed  a  series  of  ajjerressive  for- 
eign  wars,  in  which  tlie  armies  of  the  Confederation  were, 
on  the  whole,  victorious  over  those  of  its  neighliors.  But 
such  exertions  were  too  much  for  the  resources  of  the  Httle 
country,  and  it  was  soon  forced  to  sue  for  peace.  The  dis- 
astrous battle  of  ]\Ierignano,  in  15 16.  marked  the  end  of  the 
important  role  played  by  Switzerland  in  European  affairs/ 
The  first  official  declaration  of  neutrality  dates  from  thirtv 
3^ears  later;  but  this  neutrality  results  from  the  fact  that 
"Switzerland  had  ceased  to  occupy  a  place  among  the  great 
Powers,  and  had  fallen  to  the  position  of  a  recruiting  ground 
for  French  mercenaries."" 

A  word  should  be  said  about  the  practice  of  furnishing 
mercenary  soldiers  to  fight  in  the  armies  of  the  surround- 
ing powers.  This  practice  was  well-nigh  universal  among 
the  small  states  up  to  the  close  of  the  18th  century.  Judg- 
ing from  its  popularitv  in  Switzerland,  the  cantons  founrl 
it  a  "moral  equivalent  for  war",  and  by  this  means  furnished 
an  outlet  for  the  surplus  warlike  propensities  of  its  popula- 
tion. Authorities  state  that  between  1474  and  171 5  the 
Swiss  sacrificed  700,000  men  to  France  alone.^  ^^'hen  a 
state  of  the  size  of  Switzerland  was  gi\'ing  men  at  this  rate 
to  fight  its  neighbors'  battles,  it  could  well  afford  to  be 
neutral  at  home:  but  a  persistent  (juestion  mark  attaches 
itself  tf)  the  eulogies  of  its  admirers  on  the  peace-lo\'ing 
character  of  its  citizens.  The  Diet  of  the  Confederation, 
realizing  the' e\'ils  to  which  the  custom  would  lead,  began 
to  oppose  it  as  soon  as  it  assumed  serious  dimensions :  Ijut 
the  power  of  this  body  was  not  sufficient  to  control  the  in- 
dividual cantons,  and  it  continued  to  protest  in  vain. 

It  is  a  singular  fact  that  the  right  to  hire  out  mercenaries 
by  one  state  and  to  employ  them  by  another  was  sanctioned 
by  international  law  to  a  very  recent  date.     Vattel,  in  his 

1  Dandliker.  116. 
-  C.  M.  H.,  VI,  612. 
3  Ibid.,  621. 


THE  XErriiALIZATlOX   UF  STATES 

"Droit  dcs  i^ois",  says.  "Let  us  see  in  what  consists  llie  im- 
partiality which  a  neutral  pe()])le  ou^ht  td  preserve.  It  re- 
lates exclusively  to  the  war  and  coniiMMses  two  things;  not 
to  i:^i\e  aid  when  not  ohlioed  to  it;  not  to  furnish  without 
ohlis^ation  either  troops,  arms,  ammunition,  or  any  tiling- 
which   is  of  direct  service   for  the   war.  .      When 

a  sovereign  furnishes  the  moderate  aid  which  he  owes  hy 
\irtue  of  an  old  defensixe  alliance,  he  does  not  associate 
l;imself  with  the  war;  he  can.  therefore.  ac(|uil  himself  of 
his  deht  and  jireserve  an  exact  neutrality  in  other  respects".^ 
l'"urnishin.<i'  a  mercenar}-  _<4uard  was  not  deemed  inc<impati- 
hle  with  the  regime  of  permanent  neutrality.  e\en  in  1815. 
Ijiuis  -Will  and  Charles  X,  the  restored  Bourbons  of 
I'Vance.  each  had  four  regiments  of  Swiss  guard.  The 
liourhons  of  Xaplcs  maintained  themselves  for  a  time  on 
their  unstable  thmiu'  by  the  aid  of  Swiss  mercenaries;  and 
ro]je  I'ius  I\  al.^o  had  a  Swiss  guard.  The  last  ca])itula- 
tion  (.f  this  kind  did  not  (lisa])])ear  until  1859.  eleven  vears 
alter  the  adoption  of  the  new  Swiss  constitution."  \"atters 
remark  with  regard  to  a  neutral's  not  gixing  aid  to  a  belli- 
gerent unless  compelletl  to  do  so  has  direct  reference  to 
Swiss  affairs;  for  the  liiile  state  warded  iA'i  manv  a  danger 
by  purchasing  immunity  with  regiments  of  soldiers.'^ 
"J  bus'"  says  Kleen.  "a  ci  ntinual  transgression  of  the  duly 
of  neutrality  was  the  price  of  this  pretended  neutralitv".* 
During  the  TlniMy  ^'ea^s■  Wav  while,  as  has  l)een  said. 
neutrality  was  adi  ])ted  by  ilie  1  )iet  as  a  national  pojicv,  the 
good  intentions  were  onl\-  half  carrieil  'Uit,  inasmuch  as  that 
body  had  no  power  to  enforce  its  orders,  and  the  various 
cantons  were  for  themsehes  a  court  of  last  resort.''     There 

I  Vattel,  Quoted  by  Westlake.  .J..  International  Lair.  (2  vols.,  Lon- 
don. 1906),  II.  202. 

-  Bury,  6.38. 

1  Calonder.  F.  L..  Kin  liriinu/  zur  Fragr  der  Schtveizerischcn  Neu- 
Inilitdl.    (Ziirirh,   ISIHI).  90. 

'  Kleen,  I,  70. 

•••  Dandlik<M-.  le.'.f. 


ORIGINS   OF  PERMANENT   NEUTRALITY  23 

\vere  repeated  \i(jlati()ns  of  Swiss  soil  l>y  Ijolli  parties  in  the 
struggle,  as  well  as  serious  threats  of  religious  wars  be- 
tween the  cantons.  It  was  not  until  1647,  several  years 
after  hostilities  had  ceased,  and  hut  one  heft)re  the  detinitive 
treaties  of  peace  were  signed,  that  the  Diet  passed  the  so- 
called  "Defensional",  1)y  which  an  effective  protection  of 
the  frontiers  was  to  be  assured  l)y  the  organization  of  an 
army  of  36.000  men. 

^^d^en  the  representatives  of  the  several  powers  met  in 
A\>stphalia  to  conclude  terms  of  peace,  there  was  much  de- 
lay and  standing  upon  ceremony.  One  of  the  questions 
which  had  to  be  settled  was  whether  Switzerland,  which 
had  remained  professedly  neutral  in  the  war.  should  be 
given  a  place  in  the  Congress.  The  Empire  had  never 
recognized  the  independence  of  the  cantons,  and  consistent- 
Iv  opposed  giving  them  a  voice  in  the  proceedings.  How- 
ever, during  the  long  delay  caused  by  the  protracted  dis- 
cussions of  the  terms  of  peace,  repeated  reverses  of  the  Im- 
perial arms  rendered  the  Emperor,  who  had  lost  most  of 
his  allies,  conciliatory  toward  Switzerland.^  The  French 
government  had  already  solemnly  recognized  the  autonomy 
of  the  Helvetic  Confederation ;  and  its  representatives  open- 
ly espoused  the  cause  of  the  cantons  in  the  Congress."  By 
the  joint  treaties  of  peace,  signed  in  1648,  at  Munster  and 
Osnabruck,  the  European  powers  recognized  the  indepen- 
dence of  Switzerland.  At  the  same  time  the  thirteen  can- 
tons formulated  and  openly  proclaimed  a  declaration  of  per- 
petual neutrality  tow^ard  all  European  peoples. 

Yet  they  continued  to  send  six  thousand  mercenaries  to 
France,  according  to  the  terms  of  a  treaty  of  1521  ;  and  re- 
newed alliances  with  that  power  continued  to  compromise 
Swiss  professions  of  neutrality.  In  171 5.  shortly  before 
his  death,  Louis  XIV  succeeded  in  concluding  with  the  Cath- 

1  Rott.  Edouard,  La  participation  Helvetique  aux  traites  lie  West- 
phalie,  R.  H.  D.,  XXVIII-XXIX,    (1914-1915),  487. 
■^Ibid..  490. 


^.  THE  yFATRALl'AATloy  OF  8TATE8 

(•lie  cantons  of   S\\  ilzc'rland.   a   11x^115-   the   terms  of  which 
were  of   such   a   natiue   as   in'   relation   n\    neutrality   could 
allow.      r>\-   it   the   i\in.i;-  of    i'vance  was   made  mediator   in 
anv  disi)Ute  which  mii;ht  arise  among  the  Catholics,  or  he- 
tween  the  Catholics  aixl  the  Protestants;  and  he  was  given 
the  right  to  enforce  his  will.     The  King  promised  the  re=^- 
toration  of  Catholicism.'      it  was  not.  however,  until  alarm 
at  the  fate  of  Poland  brought  about  a  closer  imion  of  the 
cantons,  that  the  Protestants  were  led  to  accept  a  new  alli- 
ance with    France.     Sulxirdination  to  a  single  power  was 
preferable  to  dismemberment.     This  agreement  was  known 
as  the  "Treaty  of  Alliance  between  the  Crown  of  France 
and  the  States  of  all  Switzerland",  and  was  concluded  May 
-'<'^.   1777-     By  it  France  gave  up  the  right  to  act  as  medi- 
ator in  cantonal  disputes,  but  retained  the  right  to  raise  re- 
cruits up  to  the  number  of  6.000  in  Switzerland."     The  al- 
liance was  concluded  for  fifty  years,  and  was  in  force  when 
the  Helvetian  Re])ublic  was  set  np  in  17<;.S.  and  Switzerland 
was  brought  still  more  completely  under  the  yoke  of  France. 
When,  at  the  ontl)reak  of  the  F'rench  Revolution,  in  1789, 
a  wave  of  sympathy  swept  over  Switzerland,  the  autocratic 
governments  of  the  cantons  were  successful  in  their  policy 
of   repression,   and    the   government   was   left    undisturbed 
until  1797.  when  the  Directory  violated  Swiss  territory.     A 
highly  centralized  constitution  Avas  drawn  up  on  the  l"'rench 
model;  and  the  latter  power  began  a  polic\-  of  shameless  ex- 
ploitation which   reduced   Switzerland  \irtuall)-  to  a  de])en- 
dency.     By  it  she  was  forced  to  keej)   12,000  men  in  the 
l*"rench  armies.^     A  treaty  of  offensive  and  defensivt  alliance 
followed  in  1798.      In   1800  Bonaparte  formally  recognized 
the  neutrality  of  Switzerland.      Indeed,  he  might  easily  do 
so,  since  the  neutrality  was  all  in  his  fa\(>r.    The  .\llied  Pow- 
er<  naturally  refused  to  recognize  such  a  species  of  neutrali- 

1  C.  M.  II. .  VI.  614. 

-•/bu/..   616. 

3  Baumgartner,  18. 


ORIGINS  OF  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY 


25 


zation.  Switzerland  was  unable  to  defend  her  soil  from 
invasion,  had  she  made  the  attempt;  and  from  1799  to  1802 
she  became  the  battle  ground  of  the  Wiw  of  the  Second 
Coalition. 

In  1803  a  new  government  was  set  up,  bringing  the  un- 
fortunate Swiss  still  more  under  the  control  of  Bonaparte. 
A  "Defensive  Alliance  and  Military  Convention",  aqcepted 
by  this  government,  called  upon  the  Confederation  for  16, 
000  soldiers  for  Napoleon's  armies.  \Mien  the  power  of 
Bonaparte  began  to  crumble,  the  Allies  sent  150,000  men 
into  Swiss  territory,  and  drove  out  the  French.  A  part  of 
these  forces  remained  in  Switzerland  until  after  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna. 

Such,  in  brief  outline,  is  the  history  of  Swiss  neutrality 
prior  to  181 5.  It  will  be  perceived  that  the  profession  of 
neutrality  was  but  badly  lived  up  to  by  the  Swiss,  and  still 
worse  by  the  neighboring  powers.  Yet  the  people  always 
cherished  a  sentiment  for  neutrality,  and  their  Diet  kept 
persistently  proclaiming  it.  The  ever  abiding  jealousies  of 
the  cantons  prevented  united  action.^  It  is  significant  that 
from  the  beginning  of  the  17th  century  to  the  present  day 
only  once  have  Swiss  banners  been  unfurled  in  war  on  for- 
eign soil.'  A  comparison  of  her  history  prior  to  18 ip  with 
that  of  the  more  than  a  century  that  has  elapsed  since  that 
date  will  convince  one  that,  by  the  action  of  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  Switzerland  came  into  possession  of  something 
which  made  her  international  status  far  more  stable  than 
it  had  ever  been  before.  Switzerland  itself  immediately 
abandoned  the  policy  of  forming  alliances  with  outside 
powers;  while  the  powers,  regardless  of  any  advantage 
which  might  accrue  to  them,  have  always  avoided  a  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  established  at  Vienna.     What  was  it 

1  Payen,  La  neutralisation  dc  la  suisse,  Annales  de  I'ccole  libre 
des  sciences  politiques,  VII,  (1892),  620. 

-  Swiss  soldiers  fought  in  Alsace  during  the  Hundred  Days  follow- 
ing the  return  of  Bonaparte  from  Elba. 


2Cy  I  UK  NEUTRAU/.ATloX  oF  STATES 

that  bnnij^ht  about  this  marked  and  ahimst  sudden  change? 
In  the  hrst  place,  it  was  the  formulation  of  a  definite  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  state  itself.  Secondly,  it  was  the  guaran- 
tee of  seven  powerful  states  that  the  neuirality  should  be 
respected. 

The  developing  respect  for  ilic  >tatus  of  neutrality 
brought  about  an  ajjpreciation  of  it  such  that  it  came  to  l)e 
ardentlv  sought  after  by  the  Swiss  themselves.  The  plan 
of  the  l\mper<ir  Leopold  to  place  the  remnant'^  of  Poland 
under  an  international  guarantee  furnished  a  suggestion  of 
common  action  by  the  powers;  the  permanent  neutrality 
given  l»v  the  Imperial  Diet  to  the  Free  Cities  of  (lermany 
ga\e  a  name  for  the  transaction:  the  ])lan  in  detail  was 
worked  out  in  the  Treaty  of  Amiens,  only  the  ])ro\isions  re- 
lating to  local  affairs  needing  alteration;  while  the  professed 
desires  of  the  Swiss  had  at  last  been  brought  into  harmony 
\\\{]\  the  tlesires  of  the  powers. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE    CREATION    OF    THE    PERMANENT    NEUTRALITY 
OF    SWITZERLAND 

Permanent  Neutrality,  as  an  international  status,  was 
a  creation  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  Two  attempts  to 
establish  permanent  neutralities  were  made  by  that  body. 
One.  that  of  the  Polish  city  of  Cracow,  was,  for  reasons 
which  we  shall  see  later/  a  failure;  but  the  other,  that  of 
the  Swiss  Confederation,  has  undoubtedly  taken  a  place 
among  the  permanent  institutions  of  Europe.  Such  a  status 
fitted  well  with  the  geographical  situation  of  that  country, 
and  at  the  same  time  furnished  the  simplest  means  for  curb- 
ing the  jealous  ambitions  of  the  neighboring  powers.  "In 
all  probability",  says  Phillimore,  "the  peculiarity  of  the  posi- 
tion which  Switzerland  enjoys,  the  fact  that  she  is  hemmed 
in  on  all  sides  by  states  who  have  a  direct  interest  in  main- 
taining her  neutrality,  has  been  the  cause  why  that  neutral- 
ity has  been  unquestioned"'.' 

Furthermore,  the  internal  condition  of  the  country  in 
1815  made  the  action  of  the  powers  more  plausibe  than  it 
could  ever  before  have  been.  Bonaparte  had  centralized 
the  Swiss  government,  and  had  placed  the  various  cantons 
on  an  equal  footing.  Those  which  had,  under  the  old 
regime,  been  subjected  to  the  government  of  the  leading 
members  of  the  Confederation  objected  at  Vienna  to  re- 
turning to  the  subordinate  position  from  which  they  had 
been  released ;  and  they  won  their  point. ^  With  the  equali- 
zation of  the  influence  of  the  cantons,  the  factions  which 

1  V.  p    68  infra. 

2  Phillimore,  III,  227. 

3  C.  M.  H..  IX,  600. 

27 


28  THK  XKl  TRALIZATIOX  OF  .STATES 

had  hcoii  Switzerland's  curse  for  centuries  died  out.  and  a 
«,a'nuine  i)olicv  of  neutrality  became  a  possibility.  Ibe  re- 
lease of  tile  Confederation  fmni  I'rcncli  control  made  a  re- 
oriranization  under  a  new  constitution  a  necessity;'  while 
the  utter  disoroanization  of  luu'ope  made  certain  that  the 
powers  that  had  humbled  Napoleon  would  haye  the  destiny 
of  Switzerland  at  their  disposal. 

Certain  eyents  prior  to  the  meeting  of  the  Congress  pres- 
saged  well.  The  Treaty  of  Chaumont.  of  March  i,  1814, 
closed  with  a  secret  article  by  which  it  was  stipulated  tliat 
the  Swiss  Confederation  should  be  established  \u  its  did 
borders,  and  that  its  independence  should  be  jjlaced  under 
the  guarantee  of  the  Great  Powers."  By  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris,  of  the  3Cth  of  the  following  May.  France 
acceded  to  this  agreement.^  The  same  treaty  proyided  for 
the  calling  of  a  Congress  to  remake  the  map  of  Europe,  at 
\yhich  all  of  the  European  states  should  be  represented,  with 
the  exception  of  Turkey,  which  had  not  at  that  time  been 
admitted  to  the  family  of  nations.^  The  Diet  of  the  Swnss 
Confederation  sent  three  representatiyes,  while  nearly  all  of 
the  nineteen  cantons  had  one  or  more  agents  present,  look- 
ing after  their  own  special  interests."  One  of  these.  Pictet 
de  Rochemont,  the  delegate  of  (ieneya.  played  a  yery  im- 
portant part  in  the  proceedings." 

There  was,  howeyer,  during  the  earlier  sessions  of  the 
Congress,  serious  discussion  as  to  what  should  be  done  with 
the  Swiss  territory.  Ileilmann.  the  representatiye  of 
Bienne.  wrote  his^  father,'  as  late  as  December  1 3.  that  af- 

'  Dandliker,  238. 

2  Payen.  631. 

•■•Weil.  M.  H..  Lrs  (lessons  du  Congrvs  de  Yienne,  (2  vols.,  Pariis, 
1917).  I.  565. 

••  C.  M.  If.  IX,  576. 

^IhUl.  600. 

•■•  See  the  interesting  work  by  E.  Pictet,  entitled  La  biographic 
de  C.  Pictet  dc  Rochemont.   (Geneva,  1892). 

'  Letter  given  in  Weil,  I,  675. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  SWITZERLAND  20 

fairs  had  only  recently  turned  in  their  favor ;  and  that  even 
then  he  doubted  if  the  Higher  Powers  would  hesitate  to 
sacrifice  the  Confederation,  if  their  own  interests  led  them 
to  do  so.  He  declared  that  there  were  no  less  than  five 
different  plans  under  consideration.  Among  them  were 
proposals  to  give  Saxony  to  Prussia.  Baden  to  the  Duke  of 
Saxony,  and  ^Switzerland  to  the  Grand-Duke  of  Baden;  ro 
cut  Switzerland  up  piece-meal,  and  divide  it  among  various 
members  of  the  German  Confederation;  and  to  give  it  a 
Mce-King.  and  make  it  a  protectorate  of  one  of  the  Great 
P^OAvers. 

But  several  interests  were  working  in  favor  of  the  Swiss. 
Czar  Alexander,  of  Russia,  under  the  influence  of  his  for- 
mer tutor.  Cesar  la  Harpe.  was  inclined  to  champion  the 
rights  of  the  Swiss  people,  and  pledged  his  honor  that  there 
should  be  no  interference  with  their  country  or  their  insti- 
tutions.^ Tallyrand.  the  French  plenipotentiary,  adopted, 
as  his  policv,  an  attitude  of  friendship  toward  the  smaller 
powers,  and  early  won  the  confidence  of  the  Swiss  dele- 
gates." It  was  due  to  his  influence  that  a  French  representa- 
tive was  admitt  ;d  to  the  Committee  on  Swiss  Affairs,  which 
had  been  given  special  charge  of  the  problem." 

The  matter  of  internal  reorganization  under  a  working 
constitution  was  one  of  particular  importance.  The  fall 
of  the  French  monarchy  made  a  new  constitution  necessary, 
but  the  SavIss  made  it  known  that  they  would  never  accept 
one  imposed  upon  them  by  the  Congress.*  A  plan  in  the 
form  of  memoirs  from  the  Swiss  deputies  was  submitted  at 
the  first  session  of  the  Committee  on  Swiss  Affairs,  No- 
vember 15,  1814,  with  the  recjuest  that  the  powers  also  con- 
firm the  neutrality  of  Switzerland.'     Suggestions  of  changes 

iWeil,  I.  565. 
2/6M.,  260. 

3  Ibid,  653;   C.  M.  H.,  IX,  601. 

4  Weil,  I,  388. 

^Ibid.,  606f;   Chodzko,  J.  L.,  Compte  d'  Angelberg.  Le  Congrcs  clc 
Vienne  et  les  traitcs  cle  ISlo,  (4  vols.,  Paris,  1864).  I,  430. 


^Q  THE  XEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

ill  the  i)lan.  often  i)r()nii)tc(l  l;y  their  n\\n  selfish  interests. 
were  not  wanting  on  the  part  of  the  powers.  I'or  instance, 
one  of  the  terms  of  reconstruction  jjrojxised  by  llie  Conrt  of 
X'ienna  was  that  Switzerland  should  accord  to  all  the  powers 
the  rij^ht  to  enlist  soldiers  in  its  tei'ritory.'  This  wotild 
have  perpetuated  the  wretched  mercenary  system  in  its 
worst  form,  and  would  ha\e  rendered  Swiss  neutralization 
a   farce   from  the  outset. 

Proceedings  dragged  on  slowly  till,  on  March  7,  word 
came  to  \*ienna  that  Bonaparte  had  escaped  from  Elba,  and 
was  again  in  l-rance.  A  positive  course  of  action  suddenly 
l)ecame  a  necessity,  and  a  Declaration  of  the  Eight  Powers 
on  the  Affairs  of  Switzerland  was  signed  March  jo.  1815." 
The  Declaration  acknowledged  that  the  general  interest 
of  Europe  demanded  that  the  Helvetic  States  should  enjoy 
the  benefit  of  a  perpetual  neutrality;  and  declared  that,  as 
soon  as  the  Helvetic  Diet  should  accede  to  the  ])lans  promul- 
gated in  the  Declaration,  an  act  should  be  prepared,  contain- 
ing the  acknowledgement  and  the  guarantee,  on  the  part 
of  all  ilie  Powers,  of  the  pcr])clual  neutrality  of  Switzer- 
land in  her  new  frontiers. 

The  Diet  of  the  Confederation,  bv  a  Declaration  made  on 
May  2j,  expressed  "the  eternal  gratitude  of  the  Swiss  na- 
tion toward  the  High  Powers  which.  b\  the  proclamation 
of  March  20,  have  solemnly  ])romised  to  recognize  and 
guarantee  in  favor  of  the  Hehetic  Confederation,  the  [)er- 
manent  neutrality  which  the  general  interests  of  Europe 
demands."" 

In  this  Declaration  of  March  20,  1814.  is  found  the  kev 
of  the  whole  matter  of  the  disposal  of  the  Swiss  problem. 
The  powers  were  prompted  by  a  single  motive;  and  that 
motive  was  to  erect,  out  of  the  remnants  of  the  old  Con- 

'  Weil,  II,  244. 

-  Hertslet.  E..  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty.   (4  vols.,  London,  187.5). 
I,  64;   Chodzko.  Ill,  934. 
3  Hertslet,  I.  171. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  SWITZERLAND  o  i 

federation,  a  barrier  state  of  sut^cient  strength  to  prevent 
any  encroachments  which  France  might  be  tempted  to  make 
in  that  direction.  Bnt  since  the  Confederation  in  its  own 
strength  could  never  hope  to  be  strong  enough  to  cope  with 
the  French  armies,  the  powers  bound  themselves  to  cause 
its  neutrality  to  be  respected,  feeling  doubtless  that  the 
moral  weight  of  this  guarantee  would  be  sufficient  to  ac- 
complish the  purposes  for  which  it  was  given,  without  re- 
course to  arms.  The  continual  alliance  of  the  old  Confed- 
eration with  France,  and  its  ultimate  subjection  to  that 
power  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years,  made  the  Allies  suspic- 
ious of  Swiss  professions  of  a  desire  for  permanent  neutral- 
ity. Evidence  of  this  distrust  is  found  in  the  report  pre- 
sented to  the  Congress  by  the  Committee  on  Swiss  Affairs, 
on  Januarv  5.  181 5,  which  reads  in  part  as  follows: 

"The  Allied  Powers  engage  to  recognize  from  the  time  of  the  gen- 
eral peace  the  permanent  neutrality  of  the  Helvetic  Confederation, 
.  but  they  shall  consider  this  engagement  as  binding  only 
as  soon  as  the  Swiss,  in  return  for  Ihe  advantages  hereby  reserved 
for  them,  shall  offer  to  Europe,  as  well  by  the  cantonal  institutions 
as  by  the  nature  of  its  federative  system,  a  sufficient  guarantee  of 
the  capacity  of  its  new  constitution  to  maintain  interior  tranquil- 
lity and  to  compel  respect  for  the  neutrality  of  its  territory. "1 

From  the  tone  of  this  report  it  is  obvious  that  the  powers 
had  learned  from  the  history  of  the  preceeding  centuries 
that  a  mere  unilateral  declaration  of  permanent  neutrality 
on  the  part  of  Switzerland  was  insufficient  to  insure  the 
integrity  of  its  soil.  Taking  their  cue  from  the  Anglo- 
French  scheme  for  the  neutralization  of  Malta,  in  1802, 
they  developed  the  idea  of  binding  themselves  to  observe, 
and  to  cause  to  be  observed,  the  profession  of  neutrality 
which  the  Swiss  had  been  making  for  two  centuries.  The 
policy  was  rendered  more  effective  by  the  fact  that  France 
was  willing  to  become  a  co-guarantor.  Hence,  permanent 
neutralization  was  the  logical  solution  of  the  whole  problem. 

iChodzko,  II,  619. 


^2  THE  -NEUTRALIZATIONS'  OF  STATES 

■■'J'lic  ct inclusion  is,""  says  Xys.  "that  neither  generosity,  nor 
vcl  the  elementary  sentiment  of  jnsiice.  inspired  the  states 
gnaranteeing  the  nentrahty  of  Sw  it7.erlan(l,  lielgium  and 
Luxemburg;  but  that  these  events  came  al)out  for  the  single 
purpose  of  giving  satisfaction  to  their  ambitions,  and  to 
their  mutual  jealousy.""'  Whatever  the  wishes  of  the  Swiss 
mav  have  been,  the  powers  were  in  little  mood  to  regard 
them.  If  the  Swiss  liad  not  wished  the  status  of  neutrality 
it  would  ]ia\e  made  no  difference:  for  that  status  would, 
undoubtedly,  have  been  imposed  u])on  them."  In  order  to 
render  Switzerland  more  immune  from  otUside  aggressions, 
ii>  borders  were  extended  to  i)oints  which  gave  splendid  op- 
portunities for  militar\  defense,  so  that  the  Confederation 
consisted  of  twenty-twD  cantons,  instead  of  the  nineteen  of 
which  it  was  composed  in  179<^;  and  Chaublais  and 
Faucigny.  parts  of  Saxoy  thn  iigh  which  approach  to  the 
heart  of  Switzerland  was  ])ossible,  were  also  neutralized  and 
jiermission  was  gi\en  for  the  maintenance  of  Swiss  garri- 
sons in  these  sections  in  case  of  threatened  invasion.^ 

lUu  Swiss  neuiraliiy.  in  spite  of  all  the  earlv  declarations 
of  the  powers,  was  destined  to  undergo  rough  treatment  at 
their  hands,  even  before  the  close  of  the  Conirress.  On 
May  6,  1815,  the  powers  addressed  a  note  to  the  Swiss 
government,  asking  it  to  join  the  coalition  against  Bona- 
parte. The  note  warned  the  Confederation  that  its  wel- 
fare, neutrality  and  independence  ^\()ul(l  alwavs  be  jeopar- 
dized and  exposed  to  attacks,  so  long  as  Bonajjarte  re- 
mained in  power  in  France.  They  declared  that  they  ap- 
jjreciated  the  value  which  Switzerland  placed  on  the  main- 
tenance of  its  neutralit}  ;  and  that  it  was  not  to  do  it  injury. 
but  solely  to  hasten  the  tiiue  when  this  principle  could  be 
ap])lied  in  an  advantageous  and  permanent  manner  that  they 
])n  posed  to  the  Confederation  to  take  energetic  mea.sures, 

1  Xys,  Ernest.  Xotrs  sur  la  7irutralitr.  R.  D.  L.  XXXI,   (1900),  587. 

-Ibid,  591. 

■'  HfTtslet,  I.  262. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  SWITZERLAND  oo 

which  slioiild  be  proportionate  to  the  needs  of  the  time, 
without,  however,  bearing  any  consequences  for  the  future. 
At  first  the  Diet  declared  for  the  observance  of  the  strict 
neutrahty  which  the  Alhes  had  agreed  to  respect;  but  a 
little  later  Switzerland  acceded  to  the  Coalition,  and  granted 
passage  to  the  Allies  through  its  territories/  Thus  the 
permanent  neutrality  of  Switzerland  was  pledged  by  the 
powers  on  Alarch  20.  violated  by  them  in  ]\Iay  of  the  same 
year,  and  re-pledged  November  20.  "The  neutrality  of 
Switzerland,"  says  Milovanowitch,  "was  violated  before  be- 
ing definite! V  sanctioned,  by  the  guaranteeing  powers  them- 
selves ;  truly  a  bad  omen  for  the  future.""  An  effort  was 
made  to  efface  any  bad  impression  which  might  have  been 
produced  by  this  precedent  by  a  new  Declaration  of  Novem- 
ber 20.  1 81 5,  that 

"No  inference  unfavorable  to  the  rights  of  Switzerland  relative 
to  its  neutrality,  and  the  inviolability  of  its  soil,  should  be  drawn 
from  «the  events  which  brought  about  the  passage  of  the  Allied 
troops  over  Helvetian  soil.  This  passage,  freely  consented  to  by 
the  cantons,  in  a  convention  of  May  20,  was  the  necessary  result  of 
the  free  adhering  of  Switzerland  to  the  principles  manifested  by 
the  Signatory  Powers  to  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  of  March  25. "s 

The  Declaration  of  the  Powers  of  November  20,  18 15, 
again  formally  recognized  the  permanent  neutrality  of 
Switzerland.  It  is  on  the  wording  of  the  paragraph  con- 
taining this  acknowledgment  that  Dr.  Schweizer  bases  an 
argument  that  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland  was  not  guar- 
anteed by  the  powers.*  The  section  in  question  reads  as 
follows :  . 

"The  powers  who  signed  the  Declaration  of  Vienna  of  March  20 
declare,   by   this   present  act,   their   formal   and   authentic  acknowl- 

1  Chodzko,  III,  1207. 

2  Milovanowitch,  153. 

3Hertsl6t,  I,  370;  Chodzko,  IV,  1640. 

■"'Schweizer,  P.,  Geschichte  der  Schweizerischen  Neutralitat. 
(Frauenfeld,   1894),  595ff. 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

etlgmont  of  the  perpetual  neutrality  of  Switzerland;  and  they  guar- 
antee to  that  country  the  integrity  and  inviolability  of  its  terri- 
tory in  its  new  limits,  such  as  they  are  fixed,  as  well  by  the  Act 
of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  as  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  this  day, 
and  such  as  they  will  be  hereafter."i 

I-Vom  this  Dr.  Sclnvci/.cr  draws  the  conchisioii  that  the 
neiitrahtv  was  merely  ackiiow  ledi^'ed.  while  the  intei^rity 
and  inviolahililv  of  territory  was  i^uaranteed.  I'.iit  all  pre- 
ceecHnj;-  documents  had  ex])ressly  j^iiaranteed  the  netitrality ; 
and  the  Treaty  of  ]*aris,  here  referred  to.  makes  no  mention 
of  a  modification  of  the  gnarantee.  ( )n  the  C(  uitrary.  Article 
XT  of  that  treaty  stipnlates  that 

"The  Treaty  of  Paris  of  May  30,  1814,  and  the  Final  Act  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  of  June  9.  1815,  are  confirmed,  and  shall  be 
maintained  in  all  such  of  their  enactments  which  shall  not  be 
modified  by  the  Articles  of  the  present  Treaty. "- 

It  is  hard  indeed  for  an  nnijrejndiced  student  to  conceive 
that  the  powers,  while  using  such  kmguage,  had  any  idea  of 
altering  their  proposed  guarantee,  and  we  are  led  to  con- 
clude that  Dr.  Schweizer.  in  his  desire  to  free  his  native 
country  from  any  trammels  which  mig-ht  be  placed  on  its 
sovereig^ntv  hv  its  international  position  of  guaranteed  neu- 
trality, has  caught  at  a  straw.  The  guarantee  is  clear  and 
precise  in  every  document  in  which  reference  to  the  Swiss 
])rol)lem  is  made,  with  the  single  exception  (^f  the  h'inal  Act 
of  the  Congress  of  \  ienna;  and  no  di])lomal  had,  at  the 
lime,  any  idea  of  contesting  its  validity.  "There  was  noth- 
ing lacking  in  the  guarantees  which  the  powers  made  to 
Switzerland."  says  Kleen.''  At  the  best  Schweizer  made 
InU  a  fine-drawn,  technical  distinction,  which  could  ha\e  no 
weight  in  fact.       This  is  the  \iew  taken  by  .\lphonse  l\i\ier.^ 

1  Hertslet.  I.  370. 
-Ibid.,  349. 
:  Kleen,  I,  90. 

'  iRivier,  A.,  Review  of  Gcschichte  dcr  Schweizerschen  Neutrali- 
Uit,  R.  D.  /•,  XXX.  (1899),  399. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  SWITZERLAND 


35 


who  reviewed  the  book  upon  its  first  appearance;  and  Pic- 
cioni^  Richter",  and  a  host  of  less  famous  writers  have  fol- 
lowed him. 

1  Piccioni,  Essai  S2ir  la  neutralite  pei-petuelle,    (Paris,   1902),   11. 

2  Ricliter,  K.,  Der  Neutralisation  von  Staaten,  54ff. 


CHAPTER  ITI 

TITE    CRFATTOX    OF    THE    PERMAXEXT    XErXRALITV 

OF    BELGIUM 

Trior  to  1830  Belgium  had  never  Ijeen  an  independent 
state,  and  to  tho  casual  observer  its  existence  as  a  political 
division  of  Europe  seems  almost  paradoxical.  Its  divisions 
are  more  easily  discernible  than  its  unity/  It  has  ever 
been  surrounded  by  greedy  neighbors  w  ho  have,  one  by  one, 
attempted  to  absorb  it.  "If  there  is  one  truth  which  is 
demonstrated  by  history."  says  an  eminent  Belgian  author, 
"it  is  that  the  Belgians  liave  refused  to  be  blended  with  any 
foreign  people.  United  to  Spain,  they  did  not  become  Span- 
iards; bound  to  .Uistria.  they  did  not  become  Austrians: 
conquered  by  Erance,  they  did  not  become  French ;  given  to 
Holland  as  an  increase  of  territory,  they  did  not  become 
Dutch.  Belgium  has  never  been  a  fortunate  possession  in 
the  hands  of  foreign  powers;  she  demands  the  right  to  live 
her  own  life.""  "Spain  never  could  succeed  in  rendering 
the  Belgians  Spaniards."  said  another  Belgian  publicist;  "nor 
ci>uld  Austria  convert  them  into  Austrians,  nor  Erance  meta- 
mf)rphose  them  into  h^-ench.  nor  Holland  transform  them 
intii  Dulch."''  "Belgium  cannot  perish."  declared  again 
this  enthusiastic  patriot.  Baron  J.-B.  Nothomb,  in  a  discourse 
l^efore  the  General  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, on  October  26.  183 1.  "because  it  is  a  law  for  Europe 

1  Xolhonib.  Pierre,  La  barrirrc  BeU/r,   (Paris.  1916),  14. 

sWoeste.  Charles,  La  nrutralitv  Belgiquc,  (Brussels,  1891),  14. 

•■  Nothomb.  J.-B.,  Essai  historique  et  politique  sur  la  revolution 
BrU/iqur.  Quoted  in  White,  Chas.,  The  Belgic  Revolution  of  1830, 
(2  vols.,  Loiulon.  183.5),  I.   3. 

.if) 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  ->-- 

that  she  should  not  perish."^  And  Pierre  Nothomb  ex- 
plains the  necessity  to  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  of  the 
existence  of  the  Belgian  state.  "Evconomically  it  is  an  in- 
ternational clearing-  house ;  politically,  a  field  of  experience ; 
militarily,  a  barrier;  and  intellectually,  an  interpreter/'" 

While  Belgium's  status  as  a  permanent  neutral  was  not 
its  own  creation,  nor  yet  the  result  of  the  free  choice  of  the 
Belgian  nation,^  the  history  of  the  territory  comprising  the 
southern  part  of  the  old  Low  Countries  had  for  centuries 
been  such  as  to  render  neutralization  a  plausible  solution 
for  its  disposal.  It  was  in  harmony  with  the  policy  of  erect- 
ing a  barrier  between  France  and  Germany ;  a  policy  which 
had  been  in  vogue  since  the  Treaty  of  Verdun,  of  843,  when, 
upon  the  disruption  of  the  Empire  of  Charlemagne,  a  nar- 
row strip  of  territory,  reaching  from  the  North  Sea  through 
Italy,  was  given,  with  the  title  of  Emperor,  to  Lothair, 
thereby  separating  the  lands  of  Louis  the  German  from 
those  of  Charles  the  Bald  of  France. 

Later  the  region  of  the  Low  Countries  was  assimilated 
as  a  part  of  the  hereditary  estates  of  the  Dukes  of  Burgundy, 
and  bv  the  marriage  of  Mary,  the  heiress  of  that  house  with 
the  future  Emperor,  the  title 'of  Duke  of  Burgundy  was 
transferred  to  the  Hapsburg  family.  From  this  a  con- 
fusion frequently  arises,  for  the  Netherlands  never  were  an 
integral  part  of  the  Empire,  but  were  merely  joined  to  it  in 
the  relation  which  is  known  in  international  law  as  a  Per- 
sonal Union.*  The  first  suggestion  of  establishing  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Netherlands  came  at  the  time  of  Charles  the 
Fifths     The  proposal  came  from  Mary  of  Hungary,   the 

1  Quoted  in  Nothomb,  P.,  02).  cit.,  Introduction. 

^Ibid,  15. 

sWoeste,  18. 

4  Descamps,  Edouard,  La  neutralitc  de  la  Belgique,  (Brussels  and 
Paris,  1902).  14. 

'•  Dollot,  R.,  Les  arigines  de  la  neutralitc  de  la  Beige  et  le  sys- 
tcme  de  la  harriere,  (Paris,  1902),  .i2f. 


201683 


fv*^ 


TllK  \Kl  TIx'MJZATlUX   OF  STATES 


I'jiiperor's  sister:  Inil  ii  filled  in  ))ii(irl\-  with  Cliaiies'  am- 
bitious schemes,  and  tailed  to  rccei\e  his  sni)])ort.  When 
Cliarles  abdicated  the  Uelgian  territories  jjassed  to  his  son 
I'hihp.  and  were  then  joined  in  I'ersonal  Union  to  Spain. 

A  century  later  Car(Hnal  kicliebeu.  the  French  Minister, 
in  accord  with  his  pohcy  of  checking  the  Hapsburgs.  pro- 
l)osed  an  indejjendent  and  permanently  neutral  kingdom  of 
llelgium;'  but  Spanish  forces  were  in  tlie  Low  Countries 
in  such  numbers  that  the  I'elgians  \v(juld  not  i)articipate  in 
the  desired  revolt.  Ma/arin.  Richelieu's  successor,  took  up 
the  plan,  and,  in  1658,  entered  into  fresh  negotiations  to  es- 
tablish such  a  kingdom."  But  the  Dutcli  at  this  time  had  a 
strangle  hold  011  Ijclgian  development  liv  their  control  of  the 
Scheldt  River,  wliicli  had  been  closed  1)\  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  Munster,  in  1648.  riuis  the  city  of  Antwerp  had 
been  well-nigh  ruined,  while  all  of  the  commerce  of  the  time 
went  through  the  Dutcli  cities  at  the  mouth  of  the  ri\-er.^ 
An  independent  Belgium  would  necessarily  mean  a  free 
river,  and  to  this  the  Dutch  would  not  agree;  and  again  the 
proposal  met  with  no  permanent  results. 

In  1 71 5  the  hreiuh  go\ernment  for  a  third  time  presented 
a  memoir  to  Holland  ])roposing  )oint  action  in  establishing 
between  them  a  new  state  \\\th  a  status  of  permanent  neu- 
trality.'' But  Holland  had  now  the  advantage  of  garri- 
soned f(»rts  along  the  I'rench  border  within  the  territory  in 
question,  in  addition  to  its  commercial  interests  which  it 
guarded  jealouslx ,  and  hence  again  peremptorilv  refused  re- 
fu.sed  to  accede.  T.y  the  Treaty  of  I'lrecht,  which,  in  1713. 
clo.sed  the  War  of  ihe  Spanish  Succession,  the  Spanish 
Netherlands  were  ceded  to  Austria:  and  from  that  time  un- 
til the  French  I\e\'oluti<  n  they  were  known  as  the  Austrian 

'  Van   der  Essen,  Leon,   A   Short  History  of  Belgium,    (Chicago, 
1916),  146. 
-  Dollot.  119f. 
3  Nothomb.  P.  78f. 
'  Dollot,   412. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  -^q 

Netherlands.     Their  union  with  the  Empire  was,  however, 
still  purely  personal. 

When  the  French  occupied  Belgium  in  1793,  great  con- 
sternation arose  in  England  ;^  for  the  latter  power  had  made 
its  continental  headquarters  at  Bruges  since  the  fall  of  Calais 
in   the    i6th   century.'     It   soon  hecame   apparent   that   the 
Island  Empire  would  play  an  important  part  in  the  settle- 
ment of  Continental  affairs,  particularly  as  far  as  the  dis- 
posal   of    the    lands    opposite    its    shores     was     concerned. 
When,  in  181 3,  the  Empire  of  Napoleon  began  to  crumble, 
the  Allies,  confident  of  success,  set  themselves  to  work  evolv- 
ing plans  for  the  reconstruction  of  Europe.     Austria  inti- 
mated that   it   had   no   desire   to   renew    its   claims   to   the 
Netherlands.     Consequently  the  field  was  left  open  for  Brit- 
ish genius  to  work  out  a  solution  of  the  problem ;  and  her 
statesmen  now  embraced  the  old  proposition  of  Richelieu," 
but   with   the  purpose  of   forming  a   barrier   state  against 
France.     Castlereagh  became  the  chief  sponsor  for  the  plan. 
The  Prince  of  Orange  had  recently  been  restored  to  power 
in   Holland,  and,   upon   his  recognition  by  the  Allies,   had 
been  promised  an  increase  of  territory."*     Not  only  was  the 
scheme  to  unite  Holland  and  Belgium  acceptable  to  Great 
Britain  as  forming  a  barrier  to  French  aggression,  Ijut  also 
because    it    would    recompense    Holland    for    the    colonies 
which  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  England  while  the  Dutch 
were  allied  with  Napoleon.     On  July  21,  1814,  the  Prince 
of   Orange   signified  to  the  powers  his   acceptance   of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Belgic  Provinces,^  and  on  May  31,  181 5, 
the  treaty  which  placed  Belgium  and  Luxeml>urg  under  his 
go\ernment  was  concluded  between  him  and  the  Four  Al- 

3  Van  der  Essen,   148. 
•^  Nothomb,  P.,  53. 
a  C.  M.  H.,  IX,  605. 
i  Ibid.,  606. 
^Hertslet.  I,  37f. 


40 


THE  XKITRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 


lied  rowers.'  Luxemburg-  was  still  a  (irand  Duchy  of  the 
Ciernian  Confederation,'-'  hul  ilic  "fusion  ni  the  two  larger 
states"  was  inicnded  to  be  complete."  'i'lie  Scheldt  was 
opened  for  na\igation.  thus  giving  Belgian  trade  an  oppor- 
tunity for  unrestricted  develoi)nient.  I'ut  Prussia  set  her- 
self to  block  the  extension  of  the  new  state  on  the  east,  and 
several  towns  claimed  by  the  Dutcli  and  Iklgians  were  in- 
corporated in  the  Confederation.  Tlius  a  check  was  o.nce 
more  put  upon  the  fullest  development  of  the  Xetherlands ; 
and  "as  the  Treaty  of  Munster  had  stifled  Belgium  on  the 
coast,  so  that  of  \^ienna  did  on  the  east."* 

In  order  to  render  the  terrilor\-  of  the  new  state  doulily 
.sure  against  I'rench  aggressions  the  Four  .\llied  Powers 
forced,  in  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-chapelle.  in  1818.  upon 
its  go\ernment  a  military  protocol.  l)y  the  terms  of  which 
"a  certain  ninnl)er  of  the  fortresses  of  the  Low  Countries 
should  recei\e  Lnglish  and  Prussian  garrisons."^  In  addi- 
tion the  King  received  sixl\-  million  francs  of  the  indemnity 
money  from  France,  to  be  applied  to  tlie  construction  and  re- 
l)air  of  the  barrier  fortresses. 

The  union  of  the  two  Netherlands  was  destined  to  a  short 
and  troubled  existence.  It  had  been  the  jjrc^mise  of  the 
Allies  before  1814  that  they  would  estal)lish  the  indepen- 
dence of  all  the  countries  opposed  bv  France."  ]\Lmy  Bel- 
gians felt  that  this  ])romise  had  been  broken,  since  they, 
were  united  to  Holland,  under  a  Dutch  Prince;  and  solely 
for  European  interests.  Radical  differences  also  manifested 
themselves  between  the  two  jjcople;  and  these,  coupled  bv 
the  blind  and  headstrong  policy  of  the  King,  rendered  Bel- 
gium rit'e  with  dissatisfaction.      Conse(|uentl\-.  when  in  Tulv. 

'  Ibid.   179f. 
■-'/bif/..  2.50f. 
■■■  Ibid..  40. 
'  Nothomb,    P.,    147. 
'•Chodzko.  IV.  1746f. 

"  See  the  Convention  of  Reifenbach,  June  14,  1813,  in  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  I.  Part  I,  58. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  ^j 

1830.  a  revolution  broke  out  in  Paris,  which  overthrew  the 
Bourbon  monarchy,  conditions  were  favorable  for  a  similar 
movement  in  Brussels ;  and  it  was  not  slow  in  coming. 

There  was  fighting  in  the  streets  of  Brussels  in  Septem- 
ber of  that  year,  and  the  Dutch  government  was  soon  over- 
thrown. William  appealed  for  help  to  the  powers  which 
had  guaranteed  his  position.  A  Conference  met  at 
London,  November  4.  1830,  to  settle  the  matter.  The  Five 
Great  Powers  and  the  Low  Countries  were  represented. 
An  early  protocol  declared  the  union  between  Belgium  and 
Holland  dissolved,  and  directed  the  former  government  to 
send  commissioners  with  full  powers  to  London.^  A  procto- 
col  of  January  20,  183 1,  first  expresses  the  determination  to 
neutralize  the  Belgian  territory ;  and  it  serves  as  a  basis  for 
all  the  treaty  arrangements  Avhich  followed."  It  contains 
eight  articles,  numbers  I,  II,  and  IV  of  which  relate  to  the 
boundaries  of  the  new  state,  number  III  to  the  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  Scheldt  and  other  rivers  which  cross  Belgian 
territory.     The  other  four  articles  follow  : 

"V.  Belgium,  in  the  limits  as  described  conformably  to  tlie  ar- 
rangements made  in  Articles  I,  II,  and  IV  of  the  present  protocol, 
shall  form  a  permanently  neutral  state.  The  Five  Powers  shall 
gjiarantee  this  permanent  neutrality,  as  well  as  the  integrity  and 
inviolability  of  its  territory  within  the  limits  mentioned  above. 

VI.  By  a  joint  reciprocity  Belgium  shall  be  bound  to  observe 
this  same  neutrality  toward  all  other  states,  and  to  disturb  in  no 
way  their  internal  or  external  tranquillity. 

VII.  The  Plenipotentiaries  shall  without  delay  draw  up  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  the  arrangements  of  the  finances,  commerce,  etc., 
which  are  demanded  by  the  separation  of  Belgium  from  Holland. 
As  soon  as  these  principles  are  made  acceptable,  the  present  proto- 
col thus  completed,  shall  be  converted  into  a  definitive  treaty,  and 
communicated  in  that  form  to  all  the  Courts  of  Europe,  with  the 
invitation   to   accede   thereto. 

VIII.  When  the  arrangements  relative  to  Belgium  shall  be  com- 

^  Protocols  of  the  Conference  of  London  relative  to  tlie  Affairs  of 
Belgium,  18S0-1832,    (London,  1832),  30. 
■^IbicL.  34. 


'/•///■;    \i:i  Th'AlJZATlOX   OF  UTATES 

4- 

pleted.  the  Five  Courts  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  investi- 
gate, without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  third  powers,  the  question 
whether  there  is  any  means  of  extending  to  neighboring  countries 
tlie  benefit  of  the  neutrality  guaranteed  to  Belgium." 

One  of  the  most  difficult  pn)l:)lems  wliicli  onfrcjiited  the 
Conference  was  the  choice  <>t  a  Kino-  i",  ,r  the  new  country. 
There  was,  in  P.eli^nuni,  a  laroe  party  in  favor  of  annexa- 
tion to  h'rance;  and.  while  many  knew  this  to  he  impossible 
because  of  the  objections  of  the  other  powers,  it  was  still 
hoped  that  a  close  alliance  with  that  country  might  be 
brous-ht  al)out  by  nannng  tlic  Duke  of  Nemours.  Louis 
J'hilippe's  vouno-er  son.  as  the  Belgian  King.  But  this 
plan  was  also  distasteful  to  the  powers;  and.  under  i)res- 
sure  from  Creat  Britain,  bonis  riiilii)pe  made  it  known  to 
the  Belgians  that  he  could  not  permil  his  son  to  become 
their  Kine-.'  There  was  also  considerable  talk  of  electing 
tlie  Duke  of  Leuchtenberg,  a  son  of  luigene  Beauharnais, 
but  he.  too,  failed  to  gain  the  support  of  the  powers.'.  The 
matter  was  finally  settled  by  llie  choice  of  Prince  Leopold, 
of  Saxe-Coburg-riotha.  This  gentleman  was  a  (lerman  by 
birth,  lie  was  the  widower  of  Princess  Charlotte  of  En- 
gland ;  and  he  had  spent  so  many  years  in  England  that  he 
was  regarded  almost  as  an  English  Prince. "^  On  the  other 
hand,  negotiations  were  immediately  set  on  foot  to  bring 
al)out  his  marriage  with  Princess  Louise,  of  Orleans,  the 
daughter  of  Louis  Philippe,  thereby  winning  the  French 
to  I  lie  Mipport  of  his  candidacy.'* 

A  preliminary  treaty  was  drawn  U])  on  June  26.  183 1. 
It  is  commonly  known  as  the  Treaty  of  the  X\'T1T  Articles."^ 
Articles  1  X  and  X  are  a  reproduction  of  A'  and  \T  of  the 
protocol  of  January  20.  with  the  addition  of  the  clause, 
"without  wishing  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Bel- 
gium,"  inserted   in   the   former,   and.   "constantly   retaining 

1  Protocols,  etc.,  54.  -  Ibid.,  58. 

•■!  C.  M.  H..  IX.  »  Van  der  Essen,  155f. 

•'•  Protocols,  etc.,  85. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  .^ 

the  right  to  defend  herself  against  foreign  aggression," 
added  to  the  latter/  Thus  it  became  evident  that  the  powers 
were  anxious  not  to  impose  any  restrictions  upon  Belgian 
sovereignty,  other  than  those  absolutely  necessary  to  render 
that  country  permanently  neutral.  The  treaty  was  accepted 
by  the  Belgian  Congress;  but  the  Dutch  government,  being 
highly  dissatisfied  with  an  arrangement  which  took  from  it 
over  half  of  its  territory,  refused  to  accept,  and  began  hos- 
tilities anew."  Finding  himself  in  sore  straits,  the  Belgian 
King  appealed  to  the  powders  which  had  become  the  guar- 
antors of  his  neutrality  by  the  Treaty  of  XVIII  Articles; 
and  French  troops,  which  had  been  mobilized  some  time  be- 
fore, hurried  to  the  rescue.^  Having  quickly  driven  the 
Dutch  from  the  Belgian  territory,  with  the  exception  of  their 
occupation  of  the  city  of  Antwerp,  the  French  withdrew, 
and  negotiations  continued  in  London. 

On  October  14  another  treaty,  known  as  that  of  the  XXIV 
Articles,  was  signed  by  the  plenipotentiaries.  The  arrange- 
ments for  permanent  neutrality  were  condensed  into  a 
single  article,  number  VII,  which  reads 

"Belgium,  within  the  limits  indicated  in  Articles  I,  II,  and  IV, 
shall  form  an  independent  and  perpetually  neutral  state.  It  shall 
be  required  to  observe  such  neutrality  toward  all  other  states."* 

This  treaty  was,  in  turn,  accepted  by  the  Belgian  Con- 
gress, and  a  twenty-fifth  Article  was  added,  giving  Belgium 
the  guarantee  of  the  Five  Powers  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  whole  arrangement.  "The  Courts  of  Great  Britain, 
Austria,  France,  Prussia  and  Russia  guarantee  to  His 
Majesty,  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  the  execution  of  all  tlie 
preceeding  Articles."^     The   Dutch   government   again   re- 

1  Ibid.,  84. 

2  White,  Chiarles,  II,  299. 
^lUcl.,  324. 

4  Protocols,  etc.,  176. 

5  Hertslet,  II,  870. 


.  ,  THE  XEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

fused  to  accept  the  treaty;  and  it  was,  to  some  extent,  en- 
courag"ed  by  the  attitude  of  the  reactionary  gc^vernments  in 
Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia.'  The  Bnghsh  and  French 
lio\ve\er.  were  determined  to  enforce  the  XX1\  Articles; 
and,  in  May.  1832,  they  entered  into  a  formal  agreement 
to  compel  Holland  to  acquiesce  in  the  terms  of  that  treaty.' 
An  embargo  was  actually  levied  on  all  Dutch  ships  within 
the  waters  of  England  and  France;  while  the  Dutch  were 
gi\en  until  Novem])er  15  lo  evacuate  all  Belgian  territories. 

Sill  mid  ilic  I  )incii  sidl  refuse,  resort  was  again  to  ]:c  had 
to  the  iTcncii  troops;  and,  1)\-  a  Conxenlion  between  France 
and  ]>elgium.  on  November  10.  five  days  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  ultimatum  to  the  Dutch,  permission  was  given 
by  the  government  at  Brussels  for  the  French  troops  to 
enter  Belgian  territory.'  Xot  wishing  to  repeat  the  experi- 
ences of  the  preceeding  year,  the  Dutch  capitulated,  and,  on 
May  21.  1833,  a  Convention  restoring  friendly  relations  be- 
tween France  and  (Ireat  Britain  and  Holland  was  signed 
at  Li  mdon.' 

The  Dutch  King,  liowe\er.  stubbornh-  refused  to  accept 
the  terms  of  the  XXI \'  Articles  until  March  14,  1838.  On 
that  date  he  signified  to  the  powers  his  willingness  to  accept 
the  treaty.  The  Conference  of  London,  which  had  been 
dissolved  in  October,  1832.  was  again  stnnmoned ;  and  De- 
cember 6,  1838,  signed  a  protocol  declaring  itself  in  favor 
of  strict  adherence  to  the  terms  of  the  XX I\'  Articles.  Now^ 
the  tables  were  turned,  for  the  Dutch  King  was  willing  to 
accept,  while  the  P)elgians  were  loath  to  give  u])  their  hold 
on  Luxemburg,  which  they  had  held  since  1832  on  account 
of  William's  refusal  to  accede  to  the  demands  of  the  powers. 
On  January  2^,  1839.  the  Conference  of  London  revived 
the  Treaty  of  Xovember  20.  183  i.  with  a  few  m'xlifications. 

1  Milovanowitch,    190. 
-■  Hertfilet,  II,  909f. 
^Ibid.,  915. 
*  Ibid.,  921. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  ,c 

William  readily  assented,  and,  after  some  stormy  sessions, 
the  Belgian  Congress  gave  its  adhesion.  On  April  19  three 
treaties  were  signed  at  London ;  one  between  the  powers  and 
Belginm.  a  second  between  the  powers  and  Holland,  and  the 
third  between  Belgium  and  Holland.  These  treaties  form 
the  final  basis  of  separation  of  the  two  countries,  and,  except 
for  the  matter  of  the  debt,  their  ])urport  is  identical  with  the 
arrangements  of  1831.  Article  I  of  the  treaty  between  Bel- 
gium and  the  powers  guaranteed  the  enforcement  of  the 
XXIV  Articles,  and  they  were,  accordingly,  annexed  ver- 
batim to  the  treaty.^  By  the  treaty  between  Holland  and 
Belgium,  the  former  adhered  to  the  XXIV  Articles, 
but  did  not  take  upon  itself  to  guarantee  them.'  Holland 
is  thus  bound  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  but  not 
to  cause  it  to  be  respected. 

As  in  181 5.  so  in  1839,  the  British  plan  for  the  solution 
of  the  Belgian  problem  prevailed.  In  181 5,  however,  Eng- 
land was  at  odds  with  France,  and  its  motive  was  to  erect 
as  powerful  a  barrier  as  possible  against  that  power.  In 
1839  England  and  France  had  been  drawn  together  to  some 
extent  by  the  continued  opposition  of  the  conservative  gov- 
ernments of  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia;  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  permanent  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  de- 
signed to  be  as  much  a  safeguard  against  aggressions  from 
the  east  as  against  those  of  France.  In  short,  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Barrier  System  had  broadened  into  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe. 

1  Hertslet,  II,  996ff. 
^/&id..  994f. 


CHAPTER  IV 

TllK   CRKATIU.N    OF    I' 1 1 1'-    T  K  K  M  A  X  K  N'T    NEUTRALITY 
OF    LL'XFiMBL'KG 

TiiK  history  of  T.uxemljurt^-  prior  to  1814  is  identical 
with  that  of  JJelgiuni.  of  which  it  formed  a  part.  When 
the  Hotisc  of  Orange-Xassau  was  restored  to  the  throne 
of  Holland  in  1S14,  tlieir  liereditary  estates  in  (lerniany 
were  taken  frtmi  iheni;  hut  the  Grand  Dnchy  of  Lnxeni- 
Inirg-  was  given  them  in  compensati(Mi/  By  a  Convention 
of  Xovember  8,  1816.  between  the  Netherlands  and  Prnssia, 
an  agreement  was  reached  by  which  the  garrison  of  the 
fortress  of  Luxemburg  was  to  be  one-fourth  Dutch  and 
ihree-fdurths  Prussian;  and  the  Prussians  were  given  the 
right  to  a])])oint  the  commandant  of  the  troops.^ 

Thus,  while  Belgium  was  given  to  Holland  outright  as 
an  increase  of  territory,  with  the  expressed  desire  that  the 
two  ])eoi)les  might  be  amalgamated  into  (Mie.  Puxemburg 
was  placed  in  a  far  more  anomolous  position.  It  was  joined 
to  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands,  with  their  King  as  its 
Cirand  Duke;  but  it  had  no  distinct  administration.^  At  the 
same  time,  it  was  a  member  of  tlie  Cerman  Confederation, 
and  its  sovereign,  as  such,  was  a  (jerman  Prince.  To  com- 
l)licate  its  position  still  farther,  Prussia,  one  of  the  states  of 
the  Confederation,  was  privileged  to  maintain  a  garrison  of 
soldiers  in  the  only  strong  position  of  which  the  little  Duchy 
could  boast.  The  arrangement  becomes  intelligible  only 
when  we  call  to  mind  the  pur])ose  of  the  whole  transaction, 
which  was  to  form  a  bulwark  against  France.  It  was  felt 
by  all  the  powers  that  a  Prussian  garrison  in  the  stronghold 

1  Hertslet,  I,  179ff. 

-Ibid.,  486;   Martens,  Nouvcau  Recueil.  IV,  269. 
3  Servais,    E.,    Le    Grnnd-Duchv    de   Luxembourg    rt    le    trait c    de 
Lnndrrs.    (Paris.   1879).  6. 

46 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  LUXEMBURG  <~ 

of  lAixemburg  would  have  a  powerful  influence  in  restrain- 
ing the  French  from  encroachments  in  that  direction. 

With  the  exception  of  the  citadel,  which  was  under  the 
control  of  the  Prussians,  Luxemburg  joined  heartily  in  the 
revolt  of  1 83 1  against  the  rule  of  the  Dutch.  The  Grand 
Duchy  remained,  as  we  have  seen,  under  Belgian  control  dur- 
ing the  eight  years  that  King  William  was  making  up  his 
mind  to  accept  the  terms  of  the  separation.  These  years 
w^ere  particularly  happy  and  prosperous  ones  for  the  little 
state;  and  it  was  with  bitter  regret,  both  on  its  part  and  that 
of  Belgium,  that  they  found  themselves  separated  once  more, 
by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  1839.^  During  the  period 
from  181 5  to  1839  Luxemburg  had  no  affiliations  with  the 
German  Confederation,  other  than  those  relating  to  the 
Prussian  occupation  of  the  fortress,  and  the  empty  form  of 
publishing  the  decisions  of  the  Diet  in  the  local  papers.' 

When,  in  1839,  King  William  decided  to  accept  the  terms 
of  the  powers  and  the  separation  of  the  kingdoms  as  a  fait 
accompli,  Luxemburg  was  subjected  to  its  last  and  greatest 
mutilation.  A  division  had  already  been  made,  owing  to 
the  fact  that  but  part  of  its  people  had  taken  part  in  the  re- 
volt. Hence  the  city,  with  its  en\ironments.,  was  confirmed 
to  the  House  of  Nassau,  while  the  rest  of  the  Duchy  was 
united  to  Belgium.  While  getting  the  larger  part  of  the 
territory,  Belgium  received  somewhat  less  than  half  of  the 
population."  Inasmuch  as  the  Belgian  part  of  Luxemburg 
passed  now  from  the  sovereignty  of  the  Confederation,  it 
was  thought  necessary  that  the  latter,  as  well  as  the  Dutch 
King,  should  be  reimbursed.  Hence  a  portion  of  Limburg, 
bordering  Holland,  was  taken  from  Belgium  and  placed 
under  \\'illiam's  sovereignty,  being  at  the  same  time  ac- 
cepted as  a  part  of  the  Confederation.     The  new   Grand 

1  See  the  chapter  entitled  Histoire  Beige  cle  Orancl-Duche  de  Lux- 
emhourg,  in  P.  Nothomb's  La  batrriere  Beige. 
-  Servais,  7. 
3  Wampach,  G.,  Le  Luxembourg  neutre,   (Paris,  1900),  41. 


4^ 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


Ducliv.  while  still  rclaiiiiii!;  lis  1)1;kc  m  the  Confederation, 
was  joined  to  Holland  in  Personal  Union  under  the  House 
of  Nassau. 

The  treaty  of  April  19  gave  the  guarantee  of  the  powers 
to  the  new  territorial  arrangements  made  in  the  Low  Coun- 
tries/'and  they  were  accepted  by  the  German  Confedera- 
tion, by  a  treaty  signed  at  London  on  the  same  day.^ 
Hence,  the  integrity  of  Luxemburg,  within  the  Confedera- 
tion, was  guaranteed  by  the  powers  at  this  time.  Certain 
authors  go  so  far  as  to  hold  that  this  guarantee  extended 
til  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  "The  test  by  which  the 
luiropean  powers  guaranteed  the  existence  of  Belgium, 
which  was  declared  neutral  at  the  same  time."  says  Paul 
Lychen,  "is  identical  f(jr  both  states, — for  Belgium  and  Lux- 
emlnirg."^  But  it  is  extremely  doubtful  if,  in  law.  the  guar- 
antee, so  far  as  Luxemburg  is  concerned,  could  be  extended 
beyond  the  matter  of  territorial  iiuiolability.^ 

.\fter  1839  Luxemburg  was  given  a  distinct  administra- 
tion, and  was  governed  as  a  separate  state.  The  period 
was  one  of  develo])ment  for  the  Grand  Duchy.  When  the 
revoluntionary  movement  of  1848  shook  F.urope.  a  new 
constitution  was  promulgated,  by  which  the  separation  of  the 
Duchy  from  Holland  may  l)e  said  to  have  been  complete, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Personal  L^nion  under  the  same 
sovereign,  and  the  fact  that  Luxemburg  and  Limburg  were 
repre.sented  in  the  Diet  at  Frankfort  by  the  same  minister, 
who  received  his  instructitMis  bv  agreement  between  the  two 
interested  governments.  By  a  treaty  of  February  8,  1842, 
Luxemburg  was  admitted  to  the  Zollverein  of  the  German 
Confederation,  thereby  gaining  considerable  ad\antages  for 
its  internal  dexeli  pmeiit ; '  and  Ijy  a  treaty  of  i'^ebruary   17, 

>  Her-telet.  II,  996ff. 

-■/bjrf..  999;   State  Papers.  XXVII,  1002. 

3  Eyschen,  P.,  La  position  (Ui  Luxembourg  sclou  Ir  droit  des  gens, 
R.  D.  I..  XXXI.   (1899).  7. 
■•  Descamps,  Em.,  6.5. 
■'  State  Papers.  XXXI.  1352. 


PERMAXEXT  XEUTRALITY  OF  LUXEMBURG  ^g 

1856,  Holland  gave  up  its  right  to  supply  the  one-fourth  of 
the  soldiers  of  the  fortress,  the  garrison  of  which  thus  be- 
came wholly  Prussian. 

When  Prussia,  under  the  leadership  of  Bismarck,  started 
on  its  career  which  was  destined  to  break  up  the  German 
Confederation,  and  eventually  to  result  in  the  unification  of 
Germany  under  its  own  hegemony,  Luxemburg  drew  aloof. 
It  refused  to  take  any  part  in  the  proceedings  against  Den- 
mark in  1863^;  and  when,  in  1866.  the  war  between  Prus- 
sia and  Austria  broke  up  the  old  Confederation,  the  Grand 
Duke  refused  to  enter  the  new  Confederation  of  North 
Germany. 

The  future  of  Luxemburg  now  became  a  matter  of  in- 
terest to  the  powers ;  especially  so  since  Bismarck,  while 
seeking  to  insure  a  clear  field  for  his  designs  against  Aus- 
tria, had  suggested  to  Louis  Napoleon  that  the  union  of 
Luxemburg  to  France  might  be  one  of  the  prizes  which 
the  latter  state  could  gain  as  a  reward  for  neutrality  in  the 
struggle  which  was  about  to  convulse  Germany.'  To  this 
agreement  the  Dutch  government  was  willing  to  accede, 
provided  that,  in  exchange,  Limburg  should  be  declared 
free  from  all  bonds  which  bound  it  to  the  Confederation. 
But  when  the  brief  struggle  between  Prussia  and  Austria 
was  over,  and  Bismarck  no  longer  felt  the  need  of  French 
g:ood  will,  he  declared  it  his  intention  to  refer  the  matter 
to  the  powers  which  had  signed  the  Treaty  of  1839.  Mean- 
while, the  Confederation  of  which  Luxemburg  had  been  a 
member  was  dissolved ;  but  iu  spite  of  this  fact  the  Prussian 
garrison  was  still  kept  in  the  fortress. 

It  is  certain  that  Bismarck  stood  on  firm  legal  ground 
when  he  sought  to  bring  the  (|uestion  of  Luxemburg  before 
tlie  p(.wers  which  had  guaranteed  the  Treaty  of  1839.  The 
siR-ners  of  that  treaty  could  not  fail  to  be  interested  in  the 
new    arrangements,    of    whate\er    nature    they    might    be. 

1  Servais,   17,  21. 
.      2  7biri.,  40. 


CQ  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

l"\irihcniii)ro.  since  the  fortress  was  maintained  1)y  the 
French  indemnitx-  money,  it  mig^ht  be  looked  upon  as  a  sort 
of  international  investment.  The  (irand  Duke,  who  had 
intimated  his  \\  illingness  to  cede  the  Duchy  to  France  under 
certain  conditions,  was  anxious  that  the  powers  should  he 
consulted  before  definite  arrangements  were  made:  but 
Louis  Napoleon  wished  the  deal  to  be  kc\A  secret  until  he 
should  himself  judge  the  time  opportune  to  make  it  known. ^ 
With  war  imminent  between  b^-ance  and  Prussia,  the 
guaranteeing  powers  felt  called  upon  to  effect  a  peaceful 
settlement.  Count  Pieust,  the  Austrian  minister,  took  the 
initiative.  He  proposed  that  the  fortress  be  demolished  and 
the  Grand  Duchy  neutralized.  As  an  alternate  proposition 
he  suggested  that  the  Duchy  might  be  ceded  to  Belgium, 
who  should,  in  turn,  recede  to  France  the  towns  of  Philippe- 
ville  and  Marienbourg,  thereby  rectifying  the  old  frontier 
between  the  two  states.  The  Belgian  government  prom])tly 
refused  the  latter  proposal,  and  the  French  Emperor  did  not 
press  the  matter."  Bismarck  would  not  commit  his  govern- 
ment, but  declared  for  the  status  qnu.^  The  Austrian  Chan- 
cellor would  not  be  foiled.  He  called  upon  the  Courts  of 
London  and  St.  Petersburg  to  join  in  the  appeal  to  the 
Court  of  Berlin  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  problem,  and 
these  Courts  now  joined  actively  in  urging  the  Prussians 
to  evacuate  the  fortress.^  Gortchakoff.  the  Russian  Chan- 
cellor, suggested  the  meeting  of  a  Conference  at  Lcjudon  to 
settle  the  whole  (juestion,  and  included  the  suggestion  that 
the  Grand  Duchy  be  neutralized,  and  placed  under  the  guar- 
tee  of  Furojie.''  There  was  much  hesitation  and  delay  on 
the  ])art  of   Prussia,  Bismarck  finally  accepting  only  after 

1  Ibid..  11. 

^  Ibid.,  125. 

3  Ibid.,  129. 

*Ibid;  132.  "    . 

•'Ibid..  1.33. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  LUXEMBURG 


51 


the  French  liad  bound  themselves  to  abide  by  the  terms 
■which  should  be  agreed  upon/  Great  Britain  also 
hesitated  to  guarantee  the  settlement  of  a  problem  of  the 
interior  of  the  continent,  in  which  she  was  not  herself  vitally 
interested.  But  Lord  Loftus.  the  British  Envoy  at  Berlin, 
urged  his  government  to  join  the  Concert  of  the  Powers, 
writing  to  Lord  Stanley,  who  was  then  Foreign  Minister, 
"If  unfortunately  no  conference  meets,  and  this  opportunity 
to  form  one  is  lost,  the  irritation  and  political  dissatisfaction 
will  be  o-reatlv  increased,  and  war  will  be  inevitable.  The 
meeting  of  a  conference  is  the  last  hope  of  avoiding  war."" 

It  was  finally  agreed  that  a  Conference  should  meet  at 
London,  to  be  composed  of  plenipotentiaries  of  the  powers 
which  had  signed  the  Treaty  of  April  19,  1839;  and  that 
Italv,  which  had  recently  been  admitted  to  the  family  of  na- 
tions, should  be  invited  to  accredit  a  representative.  The 
Grand  Duke  was  empowered  to  summon  the  Conference  to 
meet  May  7.  The  questions  designated  for  discussion  were 
the  independence  and  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy ;  the 
guarantee  to  be  given  by  the  powers;  and  the  evacuation 
of  the  fortress  by  the  Prussian  troops.  These  suggestions 
voiced  the  sentiment  of  the  Luxemburgers  who  had  been 
self-governing  for  nearlv  thirty  years,  and  who  looked  with 
consternation  upon  any  plan  which  would  unite  them  with 
either  France  or  Belgium.  "The  very  refrain  of  their  popu- 
lar songs,"'  says  Servais,  "was  'Nous  "Z'oulons  rcsfcr  cc  que 
nous  soiuines/  "" 

The  Conference  met  at  London  on  the  appointed  day. 
Lord  Stanley  was  chosen  to  preside.  There  was  much  pre- 
liminary bickering  of  an  unsatisfactory  nature :  Stanley  was 
unwilling  to  commit  England  to  a  guarantee  of  a  purely 
continental  arrangement.  Bismarck  peremptorily  refused 
to  evacuate  the  fortress  unless  he  were  given  the  guarantee 

1  Ihid..  I35f. 

2  7b!fZ.,   137f. 
^■Ihid..    140. 


c^2  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

of  tlie  powers,  not  only  to  resi)ect,  l)ul  also  to  cause  to  be  re- 
spected, the  neutrality  of  Liixemlmri^-.  it  is  not  hard  to  un- 
derstand his  attitude  when  we  recall  that  he  was  asked  to 
give  up,  in  the  interests  of  luu'opean  peace,  a  stronghold 
which  opened  the  way  to  the  very  heart  of  France,  and 
which  had  been  considered,  in  I'russia  at  least,  a  part  of 
Germany  for  centuries.  "By  withdrawing  their  troops  from 
lAixembur":  and  subscrihiuir  to  the  dismantlement  of  the 
fortress."  says  Eyschen.  "Prussia  renounced  a  means  of 
which  she  was  in  legal  possession  until  1866.  and  in  actual 
possession  at  a  still  later  date."^ 

The  definitive  treaty  was  accepted  May  11.  and  ratifica- 
tions were  exchanged  at  London  on  the  31st.  The  terms 
by  which  the  permanent  neulralit\-  was  established  are  found 
in  Article  II. 

"The  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  within  the  limits  determined 
by  the  Act  annexed  to  the  treaties  of  April  19,  1839,  under  the  guar- 
antee of  the  Courts  of  Great  Britain,  Austria,  France,  Prussia  and 
Russia,  s'hall  henceforth  form  a  permanently  neutral  state.  It  shall 
be  bound  to  observe  the  same  neutrality  toward  all  other  states. 
The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage  to  respect  the  permanent  neu- 
trality stipulated  by  the  present  Article.  That  principle  is,  and  re- 
mains, placed  under  the  collective  guarantee  of  the  powers  signa- 
tory parties  to  the  present  treaty,  with  the  exception  of  Belgium, 
which  is  itself  a  neutral  state."- 

Arliclc  III  ])r(i\i(lcd  for  tlic  dismantlcnienl  of  the  fortress, 
which  was  never  to  be  rebuilt.  The  (irand  Duke.  was. 
however,  given  permission  to  support  the  troops  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  good  order.  While  the  question  of 
the  membership  of  Luxemburg  in  the  ZoUverein  was  not 
mentioned  in  the  treaty,  it  was  decided  by  the  Conference 
that  this  economic  arrangement  should  not  be  disturbed.^ 
This  was  necessary,  for  the  tiny  dimensions  of  the  state  and 
its  lack  of  natural  resc-urces  rendered  its  independent  exist- 
ence impossible. 

'Eyschen.  12.  2  Hertslet.  III.  ISOlff.  ■■!  Servais.   176. 


PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  OF  LUXEMBURG  r-, 

DO 

The  treaty  produced  great  satisfaction,  not  only  among 
the  members  of  the  Conference,  but  throughout  all  Europe. 
Lord  Stanley,  at  the  closing  session,  congratulated  the  mcm- 
l>ers  upon  their  having  accomplished  the  purpose  for  which 
they  had  met ;  and  expressed  the  hope  that  each  would  ha\'e 
occasion  to  rejoice  for  the  part  which  he  had  taken  in  the 
work.  Bismarck,  in  addressing  the  Parliament  of  the  Con- 
federation on  September  24,  declared,  "W'e  have  found  a 
compensation  for  the  right  to  occupy  a  fortress,  and  that 
one  W'hich,  according  to  the  opinion  of  our  military  author- 
ities, was  but  of  feeble  stragetic  utility,  in  the  neutralization 
of  the  territory,  and  in  the  European  guarantee,  in  the 
maintenance  of  which,  if  a  test  should  arise,  I  have  faith,  in 
spite  of  all  chicanery.  This  guarantee  is  a  complete  com- 
pensation to  us  for  the  right  to  maintain  the  garrison."^ 
The  "chicanery"  mentioned  was  an  interpretation  which  the 
FJritish  leaders,  Derby  and  Stanley,  were  putting  upon  the 
rollective  guarantee,  to  which  we  shall  have  occasion  to 
refer  later.'  The  Marquis  de  Moustier,  who  had  repre- 
sented the  French  nation  during  these  trying  times  at  Ber- 
lin, wrote  to  congratulate  his  govermnent  upon  the  avoid- 
ance of  war,  and  also  upon  the  creation  of  a  new  neutral 
state  upon  the  northern  frontier.  "How  times  change!" 
exclaims  Milovanowitch.  "One  may  see  clearly  how  tlie 
treaties  of  181 5  were  preferable  for  France  to  the  new 
order  of  things  brought  about  by  the  events  of  1866.  In 
1 81 5  and  183 1  small  states  neighboring  Frnace  were  neu- 
tralized to  prevent  aggressions  by  the  French.  In  18^)7 
France  herself  rejoiced  over  a  similar  creation,  because  it 
closed  a  part  of  her  frontiers  against  foreign  aggression !"" 

1  Ibid.,  182. 

2  V.  infra,  152,  et  seq. 

3  Milovanowitch,  289. 


CHArrER   V. 

Till-:    CKKATIUX    UK    T 1 1 K    PERMANENT    NEUTRALITY    OF    THE 

CONGO    FREE    STATE 

Till-:  case  of  the  neutralization  of  the  Concho  Free  State 
is  cine  of  particular  interest  to  Americans,  being,  with  the 
sinoic  exception  of  the  attempt  to  neutralize  Samoa,  in 
1878,  the  only  arrangement  of  this  kind  into  which  the 
United  States  has  entered. 

The  Congo  is  a  majestic  ri\er,  flowing  in  a  general  wes- 
terly direction  from  the  mountains  of  East  Africa  into  the 
.Atlantic  Ocean.  It  is  classed  by  geographers  as  the  world's 
fourth  largest  rixer.  Its  estuary  has  a  ^\idth  of  eight  ma- 
rine leagues,  while  the  moiuh  proper  is  about  two  leagues 
in  width.  The  ri\er  is  noted  for  its  depth,  admitting  large 
ocean  steamers  for  about  150  miles,  to  the  foot  of  the  fa- 
mous cataracts.  The  cataracts  exist  as  an  obstruction  to 
naxigation  for  about  300  miles  of  the  course  of  the  ri\-er, 
ab(jve  which  there  lies  an  expansion  of  the  stream,  known 
as  Stanley  Pool.  From  this  point  onward  toward  the 
S(iurce  there  are  some  900  miles  of  navigable  water.  I'low- 
ing,  as  the  stream  does,  through  an  e(|uatoria1  region,  there 
are  many  tributaries,  some  of  considerable  dimensions; 
which  makes  water  communicalitju  with  the  immense  region 
<.n  either  side  possible.  The  basin  of  the  ri\er  embraces 
some  1.090.000  s(|uare  miles;'  and  it  is  small  wonder  that 
its  discovery  and  ex])lorati(  m  restilted  in  a  general  scramble 
among  the  o  Miiniercial  ])o\\ers  of  luu-ope  for  a  foothold  in 
the  region. 

The    rnrtuguese  held  a   prinritx-   of  claim    f(.r  (lisco\er\-. 

1  Stanley,  H.  M.,  The  Congo  and  tJv  Founding  of  its  Free  State, 
(2  vols..  New  York,  1885).     II,  ,"561. 

54 


THE  CONGO  BASIN  c^- 

Towartl  the  close  of  the  i  ^th  century  one  of  their  na\"iea- 
tors.  Diego  Cam.  by  name.  cHscovered  the  Congo  river. 
Howe\er.  the  only  occupation  \\hich  \\as  made  by  Portugal 
\yas  the  maintenance  of  certain  slaye-trading  posts  along  the 
coast.  After  the  Congress  of  Vienna  had  outla\yed  this 
nefarious  business.^  it  ^yas  still  carried  on  for  seyeral  de- 
cades clandestinely.  It  \yas  only  in  1871  that  Great  Britain 
gaye  up  its  right,  granted  by  an  early  treaty,,  to  appoint 
commissioners  to  enforce  the  suppression  of  the  traffic." 

Several  expeditions  ^yere  made  to  the  Congo  during  the 
course  of  the  19th  century,  and  numerous  stations,  or  "fac- 
tories", as  they  \yere  called,  ^yere  established  along  the  coast, 
north  and  south  of  the  river's  mouth.  The  work  of  Chris- 
tian missionaries  sh«uild  also  be  mentioned  in  connection 
\vith  the  exploration  of  the  cotmtry.  and  the  development 
of  European  interest  in  its  people ;  and  it  was  a  search  for 
David  Livingstone,  the  lost  missionary,  that  first  brought  to 
Africa,  Henry  ]\I.  Stanley,  the  man  who.  more  than  anv 
other,  merits  the  title  of  "The  Explorer  of  the  Dark  Con- 
tinent". 

At  the  instigation  t)f  Leopold  II,  King  of  the  Belgians, 
a  meeting  of  savants  of  many  countries  was  held  at  Brus- 
sels, in  1876;  and  at  this  meeting  was  formed  the  Interna- 
tional African  Association,  with  its  headquarters  at  the  Bel- 
gian capital,  and  branches  in  se\eral  European  countries, 
as  well  as  in  the  United  States.  Our  country  was  repre- 
sented at  the  Conference  by  Henry  S.  Sanford,  who  was 
eventuallv  appointed  a  member  of  the  Executive  Committee 
of  Five,  of  which  King  Leopold  himself  served  as  chair- 
man." The  purpose  of  the  natiiMial  branches  was  to  raise 
money  for  the  work  of  exploration ;  while  agents  of  the 
central  office  were  to  found  "hospitable  and  scientific  sta- 
tions", under  the  flag  of  the  Association,  ^^■hich  was  a  gold 

1  Hertslet,  I,  60. 

2  State  Papers.  LXI,  22. 

3  U.  S.  Seitatc  Reports.  No.  39.  1st  Sess.,  '18th  Cong.,  11. 


c6  THE  XEITRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

Star  on  a  hlue  field,  l^hese  stations  were  I'oundcd  It  n"  throe 
general  i)urp()ses.  First,  the  scientific  exploration  of  the 
unknown  parts  of  Africa;  secondly,  to  assist  all  travelers, 
and  to  maintain  conunimication  between  the  coast  and  the 
interior  of  the  country;  and,  thirdly,  to  effect  the  complete 
suppressi(Mi  of  the  sla\e  tr.adc.  The  stations  were  for  the 
use  of  all  nations. 

Tn  1S77.  ^t'tiiley,  by  pushing-  westward  from  Zanzibar, 
had  discovered  the  I'pper  Congo,  and  followed  the  entire 
course  of  the  river  to  its  montli.  His  reports  aroused 
great  interest  in  the  l^pper  Congo,  and  a  branch  of  the  In- 
ternational Association  was  formed  the  following  vear 
under  the  name  of  Coiiiife  (f etudes  dit  Jfaiii  Couno  The 
expeditions  of  this  organization  were  conducted  under  the 
flag  of  the  Association,  but  were  financed  fir  the  most  jxart 
by  Belgian  capital. 

In  ]\Iay,  1879,  Stanley  started,  under  the  auspices  of 
King  Leopold,  on  the  second  Belgian  Expedition  to  Inner 
Africa.^  His  conception  of  the  task  befi)re  him  may  best 
be  described  in  his  own  words.  "On  the  14th  day  of 
August,  1879,"  says  he.  "'l  arrived  befi)re  the  mouth  of  this 
river  to  ascend  it.  with  the  novel  mission  of  sowine  alone 
Its  banks  civilized  settlements,  to  peacefully  con(|uer  and  sub- 
due it,  to  remould  it  in  liarmony  with  modern  ideas  into  na- 
tional states  within  whose  limits  the  European  merchant 
shall  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  dark  African  trader;  and 
justice,  law  and  order  shall  i)revail,  and  murder  and  lew- 
lessness,  and  the  cruel  barter  of  slaves  shall  forever  cease."" 
So  successful  was  he  in  his  undertaking  that  before  his  re- 
turn to  Elurope  in  August,  1884.  he  had  finmded  twenty- 
two  stations  and  negotiated  over  three  hundred  treaties 
with  native  chieftains.  These,  with  those  made  on  his 
l'>rnier  expedition,  made  over  fi)ur  hundred  and  fifty,  con- 

I  Stanley.   I.  49. 
-Ihia.,  59f. 


THE  CONGO  BASIN 


57 


icluded  as  Stanley  says,  with  the  chiefs  ''of  their  own  free 
will,  without  coercion,  but  for  substantial  considerations."'' 

The  negotion  of  treaties  by  Stanley  as  the  agent  of  the 
Association  immediately  precipitated  the  matter  into  the 
field  of  international  law.  The  cjuestion  arose  as  to  the 
validity  of  a  treaty  negotiated  with  the  chief  of  a  savage 
tribe.  Prior  to  1871  the  United  States  Government  had  re- 
peatedly solemnized  treaties  with  the  natives  of  this  conti- 
nent, and  these  treaties  had  been  declared  -a  part 
of  the  law  of  the  land.'  Following  these  and  many  pre- 
cedents from  the_  dealings  of  his  own  country  with  na- 
tive tribes,  Sir  Travers  Twiss,  who  with  Professor 
Arntz,  of  Belgium,  had  been  appointed  by  the  Institute  of 
International  Law  to  investigaj:e  the  subject,  declared  for 
the  validity  of  the  treaties.^  Professor  Arntz  arrived  at 
the  same  conclusion.*  Three  years  later  Martens,  the 
Russian  publicist,  in  commenting  upon  this  opinion  differed 
with  them  to  some  extent, °  but  as  the  work  of  the  Confer- 
ence of  Berlin  had  been  done  in  the  meantime,  the  state- 
ment of  his  opinion  had  no  influence  upon  the  proceedings. 

The  question  was  further  complicated  by  the  conflicting 
claims  of  various  European  states.  Besides  that  of  Portu- 
gal, England  also  put  forward  a  claim  based  on  discovery 
and  the  settlement  of  part  of  the  coast;  but  what  brought 
the  matter  to  a  crisis  was  the  action  of  the  French  under 
Brazza.  This  explorer  had,  as  an  officer  of  the  Asso- 
ciation, headed  an  overland  expedition  to  the  Congo  in  1880, 
and  had  founded  upon  the  river  near  Stanley  Pool  a  sta- 
tion which  he  called  Brazzaville,  in  territory  which  he  had 
received  by  treaty  from  a  native  chief,  Makoko.     0\er  this 

1  Stanley,  II,  379. 

2  Turner  v.  Miss.  Union,  cited  in  Moore,  Digest,  I.  37. 

3  Twiss,  Sir  T.,  La  lihre  navigation  du  Congo.  R.  D.  I..  XV,  (1863), 
437ff;  547ff;  XVI,  (1884),  237ff.  See  U.  S.  Senate  Report.  Xo.  -'li.',.  1st 
Sess.,  48  Congress,  16-30. 

4  Sen.  Rep.  supra.  30-37. 

5  Martens,  F.  de,  La  Conference  du  Congo  a  Berlin.  R.  D.  I., 
XVIII,   (1886),  149. 


58 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


sVdikm  he  cli>])la}c(l  the  tlag  ul  !•" ranee;  and  this  was  the 
sight  whieh  s^reeted  Stanley's  eyes  when  he  emerged  from 
tlie  forest  in  liis  tri]>  of  exj^loratinn  for  the  Association.^ 
It  became  evident  to  him  that  if  tlie  Association  wished  to 
secnre  tiie  Congo  Basin  for  itself  and  for  neutral  trade,  it 
must  depend  upon  effecti\-e  occupation,  and  not  upon  treaties 
Avith  nati\e  chiefs,  any  one  of  whom  would  sell  or  re-sell  his 
birthright  for  a  jug  of  rum.  Consequentl\-,  on  the  left  hank 
of  the  river,  opposite  Brazzaville,  he  founded  a  station  which 
he  called  Leopoldville,  and  o\er  which  he  displayed  the  flag 
of  the  Association. 

The  action  of  the  French  aroused  a  storm  of  protest  in 
Europe.  It  was.  indeed,  an  evil  portent  for  the  peace  of 
the  colonizing  nations.  "If^  the  explorers  of  other  nations 
follow  the  example  of  M.  de  Brazza,"  wrote  Emile  de 
Laveleye.  "and  plant  their  national  flags  on  the  stations 
A\hich  they  establish,  we  shall  soon  have  on  the  banks  of 
the  Congo  French  territories,  English,  German,  Portuguese. 
Italian  and  Dutch  territories,  with  their  frontiers,  their  forts, 
their  cannon,  their  soldiers,  their  rivalries,  and.  perhaps, 
some  daw  their  hostilities.""  The  matter  was  settled  tempo- 
rarily, by  a  treaty  negotiated  between  the  French  govern- 
ment and  the  Association,  April  3.  1884,  by  which  the 
former  renounced  its  pretensions  to  the  territory  in  cjues- 
tion ;  but  the  Association  agreed  to  recognize  for  France 
a  right  of  preemption  in  case  it  should  ever  decide  to  give 
up  all  or  part  of  its  African  possessions.^ 

Meanwhile  Portugal  continued  to  assert  its  claims  to 
sovereignty  over  the  whole  Congo  basin.  That  power  en- 
tered into  negotiations  with  the  British  government,  the 
latter  being  more  willing  to  listen  to  overtures  since  the 
recent  attempts  to  exclude  the  Germans  from  South  West 

'  Stanley.    I,    292. 

2  Laveleye,  E.  de,  Le  neutralitc  du  Congo.  R.  D.  I..  XV,  (1883,  256. 

3  Clercq,  XIV.  442;   Documents  Diplomatiques.  Affaires  du  Congo, 
(1884-188.5).    48f. 


THE  CONGO   BASIN  c^q 

Africa  had  failed  signally.  Sir  Travers  Twiss,  it  is  true, 
found  the  claims  of  Portugal  but  a  subject  of  ridicule/  He, 
as  well  as  Lavelve  cited  above,  was  advocating  the  neu- 
tralization  of  the  territory  under  the  government  of  tlie  As- 
sociation. 

Feeling  that  international  conflicts  were  a  matter  of  the 
near  future  if  some  general  agreement  w^re  not  reached, 
the  Institute  of  International  Law  was  insistent  in  its  decla- 
rations for  neutralization.  Laveleye  addressed  the.  In- 
stitute in  1883,  closing  his  appeal  with  these  words:  "I 
do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  it  would  be  a  disgrace  to  our  age 
if  one  of  the  best  conceptions  to  which  it  has  given  birth 
should  succumb  because  of  the  indifference  or  the  hostility 
of  the  states  of  whom  we  ask  a  very  simple  thing, — to  rec- 
ognize the  utterances  due  to  an  initiative  inspired  solely  by 
disinterested  love  of  humanity  and  science."" 

At  the  annual  session  of  the  Institute  for  the  year  1883, 
which  was  held  at  Munich,  M.  Moynier.  the  President  of 
the  Red  Cross  Association,  was  the  first  to  bring  up  the 
question  of  the  Congo.  As  early  as  1878  he  had  suggested 
the  neutralization  of  the  territory.  He  now  came  forward 
as  the  champion  of  a  definite  plan,  which  he  enlarged  upon 
before  the  Institute.^  The  Institute  thereupon  appointed  a 
special  committee  to  investigate  the  subject,  and  to  report 
at  the  next  annual  session ;  and  also  adopted  the  following 
resolution  which  was  sent  to  all  the  governments  of  Eur- 
ope, and  to  that  of  the  United  States : 

"The  Institute  of  International  Law  expresses  the  view  that  the 
principle  of  liberty  of  navigation  for  all  nations  should  be  applied 
to  the  Congo  River  and  all  its  'branches,  and  that  all  the  powers 
should  take  proper  measures  to  prevent  conflicts  between  civilized 
nations   in  Equatorial   Africa." 

Regardless  of  these  suggestions  Great  Britain  negotiated, 

1  Twiss,  Sir  T.,  R.  D.  /..  XV,   (1883),  562. 

2  Laveleye,   262. 

3  Given  by  Martens,  R.  D.  I.,  XVIII,   (1886),  246. 


5o  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

early  the  following  year,  what  Martens  calls  a  ''convention 
etrange.'"-  It  was,  indeed,  a  strange  move  on  the  part  of 
the  British  government,  and  it  nearly  dealt  a  death  hlow  to 
all  the  good  efforts  of  the  publicists.  By  it  Great  Britain 
recognized  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  Portugal  to  all  the 
west  coast  of  Africa  between  eight  degrees  and  five  degrees, 
twelve  minutes,  south  latitude,  and  to  a  considerable  extent 
inland.'  This  would  give  to  Portugal  the  mouth  of  the 
river,  and  thus  would  give  that  power  virtual  control  of  all 
commerce  upon  that  stream.  So  great  was  the  storm  of 
opposition  raised,  not  only  by  the  other  powers,  but  within 
commercial  circles  and  by  the  press  of  England  itself,  that 
this  treaty  was  never  ratified. 

The  policy  of  neutrality  now  recei\ed  help  from  an  un- 
expected (|uarter.  Chester  A.  Arthur,  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress,  Decem- 
ber 3.  i8(S3,  had  called  the  attention  of  that  body  to  con- 
ditiiais  in  the  Congo  Basin,  and.  commending  the  work  of 
the  Association,  had  declared  in  favor  of  lending  it  national 
support  in  cooperation  with  the  other  commercial  powers.^ 
On  February  4.  1884,  Mr.  Morgan,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate,  introduced 
a  resolution  urging  prompt  action  on  the  part  of  the  Presi- 
dent toward  securing  "unrestricted  freedom  of  access  and 
traffic  to  our  citizens  in  their  legitimate  enterprises  in  the 
Congo  Basin  from  its  mouth  to  its  sources."*  Rights  of 
sovereignty  and  nf  intervention  by  any  power,  great  or 
small,  over  the  mouth  of  the  Congo  were  emphatically  de- 
nied. On  March  26  Mr.  Morgan  submitted  to  the  Senate 
an  extended  report  on  the  Congo  (luestion."'  This  report 
declared  that  the  interest  of  our  country  in  the  Congo  w^as 

'  Ibid..  148. 

-  state  Papers,  LXXV,  476f. 

•'i  Richardson,  J.  D.,  Messaye.s  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  (8 
vols.,   Washington,   1896).     VIII,   175f. 

•»  V.  S.  Mis.  Doc.,  No.  ■',<).  1st  Sess.,  J,8th  Cong. 
5  U.  S.  Sen.  Rep.  No.  393,  1st  Sess.,  J,8th  Cong. 


THE  CO:SGO  BASIN  5l 

ereatlv  enhanced  liv  the  fact  that  over  one-tenth  of  our 
population  was  descended  from  the  negro  tribes  of  Africa ; 
and  also  l)ecause  of  our  protectorate,  Liberia,  which  Hes  a 
little  west  of  the  region  in  question.  The  work  of  Mr. 
Stanley  also  recommended  itself  very  highlv  to  his  country- 
men. The  report  further  declared  that  existing  conditions 
Avere  "a  just  and  sufficient  foundation  for  the  declaration 
Ijv  the  United  States  which  individualizes  the  tlag  of  the 
African  Association  as  a  national  flag,  entitled  to  our  rec- 
ognition and  respect".  Acting  upon  this  report,  in  April 
of  the  same  year,  the  United  States  government  ordered  its 
officers,  "both  on  land  and  sea,  to  recognize  the  flag  of  the 
International  African  Association  as  the  flag  of  a  friendly 
government."^ 

During  the  same  period  the  German  government  had  be- 
gun to  look  with  covetous  eyes  on  its  neighbors'  successes 
at  expansion  in  Africa.  Bismarck  saw  that  it  would  be  in 
the  interest  of  Germany  to  ha\-e  the  Congo  territory  de- 
clared neutral :  and  he  received  assurances  from  the  French, 
who  were  now  thoroughly  frightened  by  the  collusion  be- 
tween England  and  Portugal,  that  his  efforts  in  that  direc- 
tion would  receive  the  support  of  that  government.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  October  loth,  1884.  he  communicated  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  important  coun- 
tries of  Europe  a  proposal  for  a  Conference,  which  should 
lie  held  at  Berlin  later  in  the  year,  to  take  general  action 
on  the  matter."  He  proposed  as  a  basis  of  agreement  the 
following  principles : 

1.  Freedom  of  commerce  in  the  basin  and  mouths  on  the  Congo. 

2.  Application  to  the  Congo  and  the  Niger  of  the  principles 
adopted  by  the  Vienna  Congress  with  a  view  to  sanctioning  free 
navigation  on  several  international  rivers,  which  principles  were 
afterward  applied  to  the  Danube. 

3.  Definition  of  the  formalities  to  be  observed  in  order  that 
new  occupations  on  the  coast  of  Africa  might  be  considered  effective. 

1  Malloy,  W.  H.,  Treaties.  Conventions.,  etc..  hctiveen  the  U.  8. 
and  other  Powers.    (3  vols..  Washington,   1910).     I,  327f. 

2  U.  8.  8en.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  19G,  1st  8ess.,  'i9th  Cong.,  7. 


(32  THE  NEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

Mr.  |()lm  A.  Kasson,  the  I'nitcd  Stales  Minister  at  the 
Court  of  Uerhn.  liad  taken  an  active  interest  in  the  Confer- 
ence from  ihe  bei;innini;  of  the  preparations.  The  United 
States  government,  after  deciding-  that  participation  in  the 
Conference  would  not  in\<)l\e  it  in  a  departure  from  its 
time-honored  policv  of  non-interference  with  luu^opean  af- 
fairs, and  that  it  would  not  he  bound  to  accept  the  con- 
clusions, instructed  Mr.  Kasson  to  attend  its  sessions  as  the 
American  representative.^  He  was  directed  to  avoid  any 
action  in\dl\-ing  territorial  questions  of  foreign  nati(~)ns. 
and  to  reser\e  the  fullest  liberty  for  his  govern- 
ment to  act  on  the  conclusions  of  the  Conference.  He  was 
to  stand  l,v  the  earlier  ])olicy  of  his  government  in  the 
recognition  of  the  tlag  of  the  Association  and  to  adxocate 
neutral  control  for  the  whole  region.  Mr.  Sanford,  who 
had  long  been  an  officer  of  the  Association,  was  named  as 
associate  delegate:  and  Mr.  Stanley,  who  was  unquestion- 
abl_\-  the  greatest  living  authority  on  African  affairs,  was 
requested  to  attend  as  expert  adviser."  All  of  the  powers 
ha\ing  accepted  the  invitation  to  the  Conference,  the  15th 
of  November  was  agreed  upon  as  the  date  of  its  opening 
session.  Just  prior  to  the  ojjening  of  the  Conference  Mr. 
Kasson  was  conhdentally  informed  by  IHsmarck  that  the 
flag  of  the  Association  had  been  recognized  b.v  the  Ger- 
man government.^ 

At  the  opening  session  of  the  Conference  Bismarck  was, 
with  the  usual  ceremonies,  chosen  chairman;  and  he  ])ro- 
ceeded  to  elaborate  the  piu-posc  of  the  gathering.^  He  de- 
clared it  to  be  the  fundamental  itlea  ui  the  program  to  facili- 
tate access  to  the  interior  of  Africa  for  all  commercial  na- 
tions; and  suggested  that  it  would  be  well  for  goods  in- 
tended for  the  interior  lo  be  admitted  free  anywhere  on  the 
African   coast.      Having  in   mind   the  simplification  (^f   the 

1  Ihid.,  13f. 

2  Ibid.,  16. 

3  Ibid.,  23. 

^  Ihid..   25f. 


THE  CONGO  BASIN 


63 


task  which  was  before  the  Conference,  Bismarck  announced 
a  project  by  which  the  powers  exercising  sovereign  riglits 
in  the  basin  of  the  Congo  shoukl  agree  to  accord  free  access 
to  these  territories  to  all  nations.  While  expressly  declar- 
ing that  it  was  not  within  the  competency  of  the  Confer- 
ence to  decide  concerning  the  validity  of  previous  i)osses- 
sions,  he  proposed  that,  in  order  for  an  occupation  in  the 
future  to  be  effective,  the  occupying  power  should,  within 
a  reasonable  time,  furnish  evidence,  by  positive  institutions, 
of  its  intention  and  ability  to  exercise  its  rights  there,  and 
to  fulfil  the  duties  connected  therewith.  At  the  close  of 
the  Chancellor's  address  Sir  Edward  Alalet,  the  British 
plenipotentiary,  spoke  at  some  length,  supporting,  on  the 
whole,  Bismarck's  suggestions  ;  but  he  made  it  clear  that  the 
case  of  the  Niger  was  very  different  from  that  of  the  Con- 
go." The  coast  region  about  the  mouth  of  the  former  was 
entirely  under  British  control,  and  hence,  while  e(|ual  pro- 
tection was  accorded  to  the  commerce  of  all  nations,  the 
British  government  would  not  accept  any  plan  for  the  con- 
trol of  that  ri\'er  by  an  International  Commission. 

x\t  the  second  session,  on  November  20,  j\Ir.  Kasson 
took  the  opportunity  to  present  the  \iews  of  his  govern- 
ment,' calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  interior  of  the 
country  had  first  been  explored  by  an  American.  He  ex- 
plained the  reasons  why  his  government  had  recognized  the 
flag  of  the  Association,  declaring  that  sovereign  rights  had 
been  obtained  by  that  organization  through  its  treaties  with 
the  native  princes,  and  that  it  had  established  dc  facto  gov- 
ernments for  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  and  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  all.  He  declared  that  his  coun- 
try would  favor  neutralization  of  the  Congo  territory 
against  aggression,  with  equal  rights  for  all  under  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Association. 

i/bifZ..   25f. 
■^IhicL,  29. 
3Zbi(Z.,  33f. 


54  THE  XEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

A  commission  was  appointed  to  investigate  and  report 
of  the  proper  definition  of  the  Congo  Basin.'  The  question 
to  be  solved  was  whether  the  "Congo  Basin"  mentioned  in 
the  preliminaries  should  he  limited  strictly  to  the  geographi- 
cal basin,  or  be  held  to  include  the  whole  economic  basin 
which  looked  to  the  Congo  for  an  outlet,  as  well  as  the  over- 
land routes  which  were  necessary  for  the  fullest  commer- 
cial (leveloi)ment  of  the  region.  Mr.  Kasson  favored  the 
latter  interpretation,  and  was  ably  seconded  by  Mr.  Stanley.' 
Bv  the  hnal  settlement  the  Atlantic  Coast  was  neutralized 
from  two  degrees,  thirty  minutes  South  latitude,  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Loge  River,  at  about  eight  degrees  South. 
The  northern  boundary  followed  the  parallel  two  degrees, 
thirty  minutes  until  that  parallel  intersected  the  geographi- 
cal basin  of  the  Congo ;  and  the  southern  toundary  followed 
the  course  of  the  Loge  River  to  its  source,  whence  it  struck 
due  eastward  until  it,  too,  intersected  the  geogl-aphical 
basin.  The  entire  territory  east  of  the  Congo  Basin  was 
included  in  the  neutral  zone,  from  five  degrees  North  lati- 
tude to  the  mouth  of  the  Zaml>ezi  River,  provided  the  con- 
sent of  the  governments  of  Portugal  and  Zambezi  could  be 
obtained ;  and  the  powers  agreed  to  employ  their  good 
offices  to  obtain  such  consent.^  Thus  the  Free  Trade  area 
would  contain  some  2,400,000  square  miles. 

It  was  first  proposed  to  settle  the  (|uestion  of  import  duties 
1)\'  making  them  forever  illegal;  but  Baron  de  Courcel,  the 
l"'rench  plenipotentiary,  suggested  that  this  might  give  rise 
to  impleasant  conditions  should,  at  some  time  in  the  future, 
the  natixe  tribes  reach  a  stage  of  national  development  when 
it  would  be  unjust  t'.  comnel  tliem  to  abide  b\-  tariff  regula- 
tions imposed  upi  n  them  li\-  the  powers  of  Euro[)e.'      Con- 

1  Ibid..  42f. 

^  Stanley,   II.  395,  409f. 

•"  Hertsl<^t,  Mat)  of  Africa  by  Treaty.  (3  vols.,  3rcl  Edition,  Lon- 
don,  1909),   II,  467. 

■•  {'.  .S'.  Se7i.  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  /.'";.  Isl  Scss..   '/Uth  Cong..  152. 


THE  CONGO  BASIN  ^r- 

sequently.  the  Conference  decided  not  to  establish  a  perma- 
nent tinancial  regime;  and  reserved  the  right  to  decide,  after 
twenty  years,  whether  freedom  of  entry  should  be  main- 
tained or  not/ 

As  has  been  said,  the  initiative  in  the  matter  of  neutral- 
ization came  from  Air.  Kasson.  The  German  government 
immediately  declared  in  favor  of  the  step;-  and  Belgium  fol- 
lowed suit,  requesting,  however,  that  she  might  be  excused 
from  any  participation  in  the  guarantee  which  would  bind 
it  to  cause  the  neutrality  of  the  Congo  to  be  respected ;  and 
in  this  attitude  it  was  consistent  with  its  earlier  stand  toward 
the  guarantee  for  Luxemburg. 

The  final  action  taken  in  the  matter  is  found   in  Chai; 
ter  III  of  the  Act  of  the  Conference  of  Berlin." 

"Article  X.  In  order  to  furnish  an  additional  guarantee  of  se- 
curity to  commerce  and  industry,  and  to  promote,  by  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace,  the  development  of  civilization  in  the  regions  men- 
tioned in  Article  I,  and  placed  under  the  regime  of  commercial 
freedom,  the  high  parties  that  have  signed  the  present  Act  and 
those  which  shall  hereafter  adhere  thereto,  pledge  themselves  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  the  territories  or  parts  of  territories  which 
are  dependencies  of  said  regions,  including  the  territorial  waters  as 
long  as  the  Powers  that  exercise,  or  that  may  hereafter  exercise 
rights  of  sovereignty  or  protectorate  over  those  territories,  using 
their  option  of  proclaiming  themselves  neutral,  shall  fulfil  the  duties 
which  neutrality  requires. 

"Article  XI.  In  case  a  power  exercising  rights  of  sovereignty  or 
protectorate  in  the  countries  mentioned  in  Article  I,  and  placed 
under  the  free  trade  system,  shall  be  involved  in  a  war,  the  High 
Signatory  Parties  to  the  Permanent  Act,  and  those  which  shall 
hereafter  adoptl  it,  bind  themselves  to  lend  their  good  offices  in 
order  that  the  territories  belonging  to  the  Powers  and  comprised 
in  the  Conventual  Zone  of  commercial  freedom  may,  by  the  com- 
mon consent  of  this  Power  and  the  other  belligerent  or  belligerents, 
be  placed  during  the  war  under  the  regime  of  neutrality,  and  be 
considered  as  belonging  to  a  non-belligerent  state,   the  belligerents 

1  Hertslet,  II,  467f. 

^r.  S.  8en.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  WG.  1st  -S'ess-,   'i^th  Cong..  63. 

■  Z&kZ.,  300;    Hertslet,  II,  467. 


56  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

tht?nceforth  abstaining  from  extending  hostilities  to  the  territories 
tlius  neutralized,  and  from  using  them  as  a  base  of  warlike  opera- 
tions. 

"Article  XII.  In  case  a  serious  disagreement,  originating  on  the 
subject  of,  or  within  the  limits  of,  the  territories  mentioned  in 
Article  I  and  placed  under  the  system  of  commercial  freedom,  shall 
arise  between  any  Signatory  Powers  of  the  Permanent  Act,  or  the 
Powers  which  may  become  parties  to  it,  these  Powers  bind  them- 
selves, before  appealing  to  arms,  to  have  recourse  to  the  mediation 
of  one  or  more  friendly  Powers.  In  a  similar  case  the  same 
Powers  reserve  to  themselves  the  option  of  having  recourse  to  arbi- 
tration." 

Thus  the  permanent  neutrahty  of  the  Congo  was  created. 
By  its  terms  were  included  colonies  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Portugal,  (iermany  and  Italy,  the  native  kingdoms  of  the 
interior  and  of  Zambezi,  and  the  lands  of  the  International 
African  Association  of  the  Congo.  The  latter  underwent 
a  change  of  status  during  llic  period  that  the  Conference 
was  in  session.  Before  the  close  of  the  Conference  all  the 
states  interested  in  the  affair,  with  the  exception  of  Zam- 
bezi, liad  recognized  the  independence  of  the  Association.' 
A  letter  from  Colonel  Strauch.  its  Ih'esident,  which  con- 
tained its  formal  adherence  to  the  acts  of  the  Conference. 
was  read  at  the  closing  session;  and.  in  commenting  on  it. 
Bismarck  announced  that  a  new  state  had.  by  the  acts  of 
the  past  months,  come  into  existence.'  On  August  i  King- 
Leopold,  whose  great  interest  and  inxeslments  in  the  work 
of  the  .\ssociation  made  him  the  logical  ])art\-,  announced 
that  he  had  been  chosen  as  the  hrsl  ruler  of  the  new  state; 
and  that  he  had  been  granted.  i)y  the  P)elgian  Legislative 
Chambers,  permission  to  accept  ihe  title.'' 

Whatever  the  weaknesses  of  tlie  work  mav  have  been,  it 
is  certain  th.'it  at  the  lime  it  was  hailed  as  the  great  diplo- 
matic triumph  of  the  age.      IhVniarck.  in  lii>  address  at  tiie 

'  U.  S.  Se7t.  Ex.  Dov.  I'JU.  I.st  s<ss..   '/Dth  Cong..  184. 
^Ibid..  196. 
■■-Ihid..  327. 


THE  CONGO  BASIN 


67 


closing  session  of  the  Conference,  declared,  "The  wi^^k  of 
this  Conference.  Hke  all  other  lal^ors  of  man,  may  be  im- 
proved and  completed,  but  will  mark  an  advance  in  the  de- 
A-elopment  of  national  relations,  and  form  a  new  bond  of 
union  among"  civilized  states."^  Sir  Tra\"ers  Twiss.  who 
had  labored  unceasingly  for  the  success  of  the  Conference, 
declared  it  an  event  which,  in  its  importance  in  international 
relations,  was  second  only  to  that  of  the  Congress  of  Vien- 
na.' Martens,  while  far  from  as  enthusiastic,  was  of 
a  favorable  opinion ;  and  he  c[uotes  from  Guyot  a  statement 
comparing  it  favorably  with  W^estphalia  and  \'ienna.^ 
President  Cleveland,  in  his  first  annual  message  to  Congress, 
December  8,  1885,  declared  the  arrangement  a  fortunate 
one,*  while  Mr.  Stanley,  who  had  given  his  life  work  to 
Africa,  expresses  his  unboimded  satisfaction  with  the  ar- 
rangements which  had  been  made  at  the  Conference.^ 

i/bifZ..  294. 

-  Twiss,  Sir  T.,  Le  Congris  de  Vienne  et  la  Conference  de  Ber- 
lin, R.  D.  I..  XVII,   (1885),  201. 

3  Martens,  F.  de,  R.  D.  I..  XVIII,    (1886),  244. 

4  Richardson,  VIII,  329f.  However,  Mr.  Cleveland  did  not  sub- 
mit the  treaty  to  the  Senate  for  ratification,  giving  as  his  reason  for 
refraining  from  so  doing  that  "an  engagement  to  share  in  the  obli- 
gation of  enforcing  neutrality  in  the  remote  valley  of  the  Congo 
would  be  an  alliance  whose  responsibilities  we  are  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  assume." 

5  Stanley,  -11,  407. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MISCKIJ.AXEOrS    NEUTRALITIES 

I.      Tlic  Republic  of  Cracow 

The  attempt  to  neutralize  the  Republic  of  Cracow  grew 
out  of  the  bitter  struggle  at  the  Congress  of  A'ienna  over 
the  disposal  of  Poland.  Previous  to  the  opening  of  the 
Congress  there  had  been  a  concentration  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  forces  in  the  former  Polish  territories,  the  latter 
holding  Galicia.  while  the  city  of  Cracow  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  Russians/  The  solution  of  the  problem  was  re- 
garded as  one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  of  the  Congress, 
since  it  involved  the  mutual  jealousies  of  the  three  Eastern 
Powers ;  while  Great  Britain  and  France,  being  removed 
from  actual  participation  in  the  disjwsal  of  the  territories, 
lent  neither  aid  nor  sympathy  to  their  j)lans."  At  the  out- 
set the  i'uture  of  the  Polish  territory  seemed  to  lie  in  the 
hands  of  Russia  and  Austria;  yet  Prussia  was  deeplv  in- 
terested in  the  disposition  made  of  it;  and,  by  holding  the 
balance  of  power  between  the  two  ri\al  Empires,  she  used 
her  advantage  to  gain  a  valuable  increase  of  territorv  in 
Germany. 

It  was  the  Russian  Emperor's  desire  to  form  a  new  Pol- 
ish state  out  of  the  disputed  territory.  Over  this  new  state 
he  was  to  be  the  ruler,  and  thus  it  would  be  joined  in  per- 
sonal union  to  the  Russian  Empire,  under  the  House  of 
Romanoff.  He  promised  the  Poles  a  constitutional  form  of 
government,''  and  even  after  he  had  been  forced  to  give  in 

'  Weil,   I,  20. 
-Ibid..  22. 
^IMd.,  269. 

68 


MISCELLANEOUS   NEUTRALITIES 


69 


to  the  demands  of  Prussia  and  Austria  tor  a  division  of  tlie 
Polish  territory,  he  still  promised  that  the  part  which  fell 
to  him  should  be  governed  by  its  own  constitution.  Furth- 
ermore, he  insisted  that  the  \"istula  should  be  the  lx)undary 
between  Poland  and  Prussia  throughout  its  entire  course, 
thereby  opposing  the  claims  of  the  latter  to  the  towns  of 
Thorn  and  Dantzic.  on  the  east  bank  of  that  river/ 

Meanwhile  Great  Britain  had  declared  for  an  indepen- 
dent Poland,  under  a  distinct  dynasty,  this  being  consistent 
with  her  policy  of  erecting  buffer  states  between  the  Great 
Powers."  The  Treaty  of  Warsaw,  of  February  28,  1813, 
had  provided  for  the  division  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
among  the  three  Eastern  Powers  f  but,  by  a  new  agreement 
entered  into  at  Vienna  in  September,  181 4,  the  right  of 
Great  Britain  to  participate  in  any  action  was  recognized.* 

Castlereagh  held  tenaciously  to  the  stand  taken  bv  his 
country  at  the  beginning;  but  was  importuned  by  Harden- 
berg,  of  Prussia,  who  was  under  the  influence  of  Metter- 
nich,  to  give  in,  since  a  Polish  state  under  the  sceptre  of 
Alexander  would  weaken,  rather  than  strengthen,  the 
power  of  Russia.^  By  November  1 1  an  agreement  had 
been  effected  between  Alexander,  Aletternich  and  Harden- 
berg,  in  opposition  to  Castlereagh."  The  existence  of  some 
kind  of  Polish  state  was  now  practically  assured  ;  and  the 
disposal  of  such  territories  as  were  not  to  be  included  with- 
in it  became  the  predominant  question.  In  December 
Alexander  declared  in  favor  of  a  free  and  neutral  city  of 
Cracow,  and  let  the  Austrian  government  feel  that  to  re- 
fuse to  accede  to  his  proposal  would  mean  war."  The 
Austrians,  knowing  that  a  strip  of  neutral  territory  between 

i/birf.,  386. 

2  Chodzko,  II,  265f. 

3  Martens,  Nouveau  Receuih  VI.  234.  .  • 

4  Chodzko,  I,  250. 

5  Ibid.,  406. 
6/&tfZ-.  417. 

7  Weil,  I.  711. 


-n  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

them  and  Russia  wnuld  l)c  of  ^reat  service  to  them,  and 
tliat  Cracow  was  of  no  niiliiar_\-  \ahie.  accepted  Alexander's 
l)roposal.  On  April  j;,  1S15.  commissioners  were  charged 
i)y  the  three  Eastern  IViwcrs  with  the  (Organization  of  the 
Repiihlic  of  Cracow.'  and.  a  month  later,  joint  treaties 
were  signed  hetween  Kn^sia.  Anstria  and  Prussia.  1)\-  which 
ihc  freedom,  independence  and  neutralit}-  of  the  Town  of 
Cractjw  and  its  surroundings  were  recognized.'  This  ar- 
rangement was  later  emhodied  in  the  J^'inal  Act  of  the  Con- 
Stress  of  \'ienna.'  The  Duchv  of  Posen  was  added  to  the 
territory  of  Prussia;  Galicia  was  confirmed  to  Austria; 
while  the  (Irand  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  rechristened  the  King- 
dom of  Poland,  was  placed  under  the  sceptre  of  the  l^mi)er- 
or  of  the  Russias. 

By  the  terms  of  the  Final  Act  which  hore  u])on  the  Polish 
f|uestion  the  d'own  of  Cracow  with  its  territor\-  was  estab- 
lished as  a  free,  independent  and  strictly  neutral  city,  under 
the  protection  of  the  Eastern  Powers;  while  the  latter  were 
strictly  forbidden  to  f(nind  any  military  establishments 
which  might  threaten  the  neutrality  of  the  new  Republic. 
The  Town  of  Cracow  was.  on  the  other  hand,  forbidden  the 
pri\ilege  of  granting  asylum  to  fugitives,  deserters  or  per- 
sons under  prosecution,  belonging  to  any  of  those  Powers; 
and  such  fugiti\'es  were  to  be  given  u\)  immediately,  if  cap- 
tured on   Pdlish  soil. 

It  was  the  interpretation  put  upon  this  last  pro\'ision  which 
resulted  in  the  un(l(-ing  of  the  little  state,  after  an  uncertain 
existence  ot  thirt\-one  years.  The  almost  constant  insur- 
rections ot  the  poles  in  the  neighboring  ])rovinces  could  not 
tail  to  awaken  echoes  in  the  breasts  of  their  countr\nien  at 
Cracow.  The  Town  was  re])eatedly  occupied  b\-  tr(;o])s  of 
;he  protecting  T^owers  in  disregard  of  the  provisions  of  the 
I'inal  Act,  on  the  ])retence  that  refugees  were  being  harbored 

'  Ibiil..  576;    Chodzko.   III.   1166. 

2Choclzko.   Ill,   1146. 

•■■•  Hertslet.  .Ua/*  0/  Europe.  I.  96.  107.  121.  218. 


MISCELLANEO  US    NE U TRALITIES 


71 


there.  In  1833  the  protecting  Powers  modified  the  consti- 
tution wliich.  in  18 15,  they  had  given  and  guaranteed  to  the 
Repnlihc.  taking  to  themselves  the  right  to  name  the  pro- 
fessors in  the  University  of  Cracow.  FinaUy,  when  a 
Pohsh  insurrection  broke  out  in  Cialicia.  in  1846,  the  Aus- 
trian government  declared  that  Cracow  had  been  the  center 
of  the  conspiracy,  and  that  forays  had  been  made  into  Aus- 
trian territory  from  within  the  bounds  of  the  Republic; 
and,  by  a  treaty  with  Russia  and  Prussia,  November  6,  of 
that  year,  the  entire  territory  was  annexed  to  Austria.^ 
Inasmuch  as  the  signers  of  the  Final  Act  of  Vienna  had 
guaranteed  the  arrangements  thereby  made,  Great  Britain 
and  France  entered  protests  against  this  violation  of  treaty 
agreements."  The  protests  were,  however,  but  mild  in  char- 
acter ;  and,  as  they  contained  no  suggestion  of  an  appeal  to 
arms,  they  made  no  impression  upon  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment. Xo  action  was  ever  taken  to  reverse  the  judgment 
of  the  Eastern  Powers. 

There  is  no  question  but  that  the  Austrian  government 
exceeded  its  rights  when  it  absorbed  Cracow.  The  danger 
that  it  would  furnish  a  hot-bed  for  conspirators  was  fore- 
seen by  the  Powers  at  Vienna,  and  they  took  their  own  pre- 
cautions to  secure  themselves  against  it.  The  right  of  in- 
terference to  compel  the  expulsion  of  refugees,  although  a 
serious  limitation  upon  the  sovereignty  of  Cracow,  could  in 
no  way  be  interpreted  so  as  to  justify  absorption.  Nor 
did  the  fact  that  Cracow  had  l)een  placed  under  Austrian 
control  in  1795  carry  with  it  any  legal  sanction  for  the  dis- 
solution of  the  arrangements  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna.  No 
single  provision  of  that  Treaty  could  be  broken  without  es- 
tablishing a,  dangerous  precedent  for  the  other  Signatory 
Powers,  should  the  time  ever  come  when  it  would  be  to 
their  advantage  to  follow  it.     This  point  did  not  escape  the 

1  Hertslet,  II,  1061ff;    Chodzko,  IV,  1832ff. 
-'Hertslet,  II.  1068ff;   1073ff. 


-2  THE  ^NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

I'^-onch  government,  which  called  attention  to  it  in  the  pro- 
test against  the  act  of  incorporation. 

2.      The  Xciitrali.':ation  of  Sai-oy 

Wt  have  already  noted  that  a  part  of  Sa\i)\-  hordering 
Switzerland  on  the  sonth-west  was  inclnded  as  an  annex 
to  the  neutrality  of  that  state.'  The  sanction  of  the  ar- 
rangement is  found  in  Article  XCll  of  the  I'inal  Act  of 
Vienna.  By  it  the  Provinces  of  Chauhlais  and  Faucigny, 
and  the  whole  of  the  territory  of  Sa\'ov  north  of  the  L'gine 
River,  were  neutralized;  and  the  Swiss  lOn federation  was 
empowered  to  supply  for  these  territories  whatexer  garri- 
sons should  he  deemed  necessary  to  defend  this  neutrality 
in  time  of  war. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Turin,  of  March  24.  1860.  the  King  of 
Sardinia  ceded  Savoy  and  Nice  to  Louis  Xapoleon.  as  a  re- 
ward for  assistance  against  the  Austrians  r  hut  the  cession 
was  qualified  hy  the  provision  that  the  neutralized  parts  of 
Savov  were  to  continue  in  the  same  status  as  before.  The 
Swiss  government,  on  March  28.  entered  a  vigorous  pro- 
test against  the  cession,^,  holding  that  it,  as  an  interested 
party,  should  have  been  permitted  to  take  part  in  the  ne- 
gotiations, and  insisting  upon  its  rights,  under  the  interna- 
tional agreements  of  1815,  to  occu])\-  hy  P'ederal  troops  the 
neutralized  region  in  time  of  war.  An  a])peal  was  made  to 
the  powers  which  had  guaranteed  the  former  arrangement 
to  prevent  the  contemplated  action;  or,  if  this  were  im- 
])racticahle,  to  demand  the  cession  to  Switzerland  of  the 
frontier  districts  of  Savov. 

The  Treaty  of  Tin-in  received  the  definitive  sanction  of 
the  governments  ui  Sardinia  and  France;  but.  on  June  20. 
the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  AfTairs  offered  to  join  in 
any  arrangement  which  the  Powers  might  think  best  for 
reconciling  .\rticle  XCII  of  the  Final  Act  of  Vienna  with 

1  V.  stipra.  32. 
^  Hertslet.  II.   1430. 
^Ibid..  1435f. 


MISCELLANEOUS    NEUTRALITIES  7^ 

the  terms  cf  the  Treaty  of  Turin/  He  suggested  a  General 
Conference  of  the  powers;  an  exchange  of  ncMes  among 
the  guarantors  and  Switzerland  itself,  by  which  Fvance 
would  recognize  itself  bound  by  the  same  conditions  as 
Sardinia  had  been  hitherto ;  or,  finally,  a  deposition  leaving 
the  settlement  of  the  matter  to  be  worked  out  by  direct  ne- 
gotiation between  France  and  Switzerland.  Lord  Russell, 
replying  for  the  British  government  five  days  later,  de- 
clared in  favor  of  a  Conference,  which  should  be  held  at 
Paris,  and  in  which  the  guaranteeing  powers  and  Switzer- 
land and  Sardinia  should  participate.'  The  Conference, 
however,  was  never  held. 

3.      TJic  NciitraUzation  of  the  Ionian  Iskiiids 

By  a  special  act  of  November  5,  181 5,  between  Great 
Britain,  Russia,  Austria  and  Prussia  the  Ionian  Islands  off 
the  west  coast  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  were  formed  into 
the  United  States  of  the  Ionian  Islands,  and  made  a  pro- 
tectorate of  Great  Britain.^  To  the  protector  was  given 
the  right  to  occupy  the  fortresses  of  the  interior,  and  the 
native  troops  wxre  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  British 
Commandant. 

The  independence  of  Greece  was  established  a  few  years 
later,  and  was  guaranteed  by  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Russia.  Great  Britain  eventually  turned  the  Ionian  Islands 
over  to  the  new  kingdom ;  and,  to  prevent  them  from  fall- 
ing into  the  hands  of  the  Turks,  should  war  break  out  in 
the  Balkans,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  from  becoming  too  great 
a  menace  to  Western  Turkey,  because  of  Greek  garrisons, 
the  Conference  of  London,  by  a  treaty  of  November  14. 
1863,  declared  for  the  neutralization  of  the  Islands,^  and 
ordered  the  demolition  of  the  fortifications. 

The   serious   restriction  upon  the  sovereignty  of  the  Greek 

^Ibid.,  II,  1448. 

2  Ibid..  1450. 

s/bifZ..  I,  337f;  State  Papers.  Ill,  250. 

4  Hertelet,  II,  1569f ;  State  Papers.  LIII,  19f. 


-  ,  THE  NEUTRALIZATION^  OF  STATES 

nation  in  the  islands  met  with  Httle  support  even  among 
tlie  Powers  which  had  planned  it ;  and  so  determined  was  the 
oppi^sition  on  the  ]:)art  of  the  Greeks  and  lonians  that  it 
was  tinallv  limited  U)  the  two  northern  islands  of  the  group, 
Corfu  aiul  Paxo.  This  arrangement  was  sanctioned  hy  the 
protocol  of  a  Conference  held  at  London,  March  29,  1864,^ 
and  the  Sultan  gave  his  adhesion  April  8.  1865.  Great 
liritian,  J'rance  and  Russia,  hy  virtue  of  their  position  as 
guaranteeing  powers,  made  a  formal  declaration  of  the  pev- 
manent  neutrality  of  Corfu  and  Paxo;  and  the  Courts  of 
Prussia  and  Austria  gave  their  consent.  The  King  of  the 
Hellenes  ensraced.  on  his  part,  to  maintain  the  neutrality. 
This  arrangement  still  exists,  and  has  gi\en  rise  to  very 
little  friction. 

4.      The  So  lilt  Kill  I  si  ii  II  (is 

In  1889  an  agreement  was  reached  at  P>erlin  hy  represen- 
tatives of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  by 
\\hich  a  regime  somewhat  similar  to  permanent  neutrality 
was  established  in  the  Samoan  Islands.  In  order  to  under- 
stand the  significance  of  this  agreement,  and  to  appreciate  the 
difficulties  under  which  the  cmnmissioners  labored,  a  lirief 
sketch  of  the  history  of  the  Islands  will  l)e  necessary.  The 
grou])  lies  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  extending  from  ajjproxi- 
mately  thirteen  degrees,  thirty  minutes,  to  fourteen  degrees, 
thirt}-  minutes,  sc^uth  latitude  and  from  approximately  one 
hundred  sixty-nine  degrees,  thirty  minutes  to  one  hundred 
seventy-three  degrees,  west  lingitude.  It  contains  three 
islands  of  imjxjrtance,  Savaii,  Cpolu  and  Tutuila ;  with  some 
dozen  or  more  smaller  ones.  The  importance  of  the  group 
lies  in  its  geograjjhical  situation,  rather  than  in  any  intrinsic 
\ahie  of  the  islands  themselves.  Containing  several  good 
harhMvs  in  a  jiart  cf  the  Pacific  where  few  harbors  are  to  be 
found,  they  are  useful  to  the  commercial  nations  for  coaling 
stations.     Great  Britain,  especially  the  colonies  of  Australia 

1  Hertslet,  III.  1589f. 


MISCELLANEOUS   NEUTRALITIES  7- 

and  New  Zealand,  clung  tenaciously  to  the  foothold  that  had 
been  gained  in  Samoa,  because  of  its  importance  as  a  cable 
station  on  the  Trans-Pacific  line  which  they  hoped  soon  to 
see  laid  connecting  Vancouver  and  Auckland.  The  United 
States  felt  itself  interested  in  the  disposal  of  the  islands  be- 
cause of  its  interest  in  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  the  canal 
being,  even  at  that  day,  considered  merely  a  matter  of  time. 
Germany  had  the  largest  actual  commercial  interest  in  the 
islands,  and  regarded  their  annexation  as  a  part  of  the 
scheme  of  colonial  expansion  upon  which  that  government 
embarked  during  the  closing  decades  of  the  last  century. 
The  Germans,  throughout  the  entire  controversy,  were  in- 
clined to  pay  little  heed  to  the  rights  of  the  natives,  or  t()  the 
claim  of  the  latter  to  self  government.  The  United  States, 
on  the  other  hand,  stood  for  the  maintenance  and  integrity 
of  the  native  governments ;  while  the  British  followed  no 
fixed  policy,  but  were,  as  a  rule,  inclined  to  favor  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States. 

Commercial  relations  were  established  between  the  United 
States  and  the  islands  about  the  middle  of  the  last  century,^ 
and  an  agreement  by  which  the  United  States  government 
was  given  the  privilege  of  a  naval  station  in  the  bay  of  Pago- 
Pago,  in  the  island  of  Tutuila,  was  effected,  on  February 
17,  1872,  by  Commander  Meade,  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Naragan- 
sett.  In  return  the  native  chief  requested  the  friendship 
and  protection  of  the  United  States ;  but  when  President 
Grant  communicated  the  agreement  to  the  Senate  its  terms 
were  regarded  as  contrary  to  the  policy  of  our  government, 
and  it  was  never  ratified.'  However,  the  harbor  has  re- 
mained since  that  time  under  our  control. 

With  the  development  of  commerce  and  trade  our  De- 
partment of  State  was  influenced,  in  1873,  to  send  Colonel 
Steinberger  t(^  the  islands,  in  order  to  gain  trustwortliy  in- 

1  Moore,  J.  B..  A  Digest  of  International  Law.  (8  vols..  Washing- 
ton, 1906).     I,  536. 

^H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  161,  1st  Sess-,  .'iWi  Cong..  6. 


76 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


formation  as  to  actual  Cdiiditions  there;  and  his  report  was 
communicated  to  Congress  early  the  following  year.^  A 
few  niduths  later  lie  was  sent  back  on  a  special  dijilomatic 
errand.  During  this,  his  second  stay,  he  engaged  in  (|ues- 
tionable  transactions,  being  accused  of  using  his  influence  in 
Samoa  to  further  the  trade  of  the  German  firm  of  (iodeffroy 
and  Son.  of  Hamburg;'"  and  also  of  establishing  a- govern- 
ment of  which  he  was  \irtual  dictator,  and  which  he  claimed 
to  ha\-e  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  L'nitcd  States. 
He  was  subsequently  deported  on  a  British  man-of-war. 

On  January  16,  1878,  the  first  formal  treaty  effected  by 
the  Samoan  government  with  a  foreign  power  was  conclud- 
ed at  Washington,  through  the  efforts  of  Mamea,  a  native 
prince  who  had  been  sent  there  for  that  purpose.  By  the 
terms  of  this  treaty  the  rights  of  the  United  States  in  the 
harbor  of  Pago- Pago  were  recognized,  and  the  Samoan  gov- 
ernment agreed  that  it  would  not  exercise  nor  authorize  any 
jurisdiction  within  said  i)ort  adverse  to  such  rights  of  the 
United  States  or  restrictive  thereof.  Uncertaintv  arose  as 
to  the  correct  interpretation  of  this  clause;  but  it  was  held  by 
the  United  States  government  to  amount  to  exclusive  juris- 
diction.'  The  United  States  agreed  to  employ  its  good  of- 
fices for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  any  dift'erences  which 
might  arise  between  the  Samoan  government  and  any  other 
government  witli  which  the  United  States  entertained 
friendly  relations.  Although  this  agreement  was  frequently 
construed  as  amounting  to  a  protectorate,  the  United  States 
government  has  never  supported  such  an  interpretation."* 
Indeed,  it  would  have  been  a  radical  departure  from  its  tra- 
diti(  nal  foreign  policy  to  have  entered  into  an  agreement  in- 

1  Sen.  Ex.  No.  Doc.   ',.',,  1st  Sess.,  .',3r(l  Cong. 

-  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  li;i.  1st  Sess..  'i',th  Cong..  128.  The  Document  is 
also  given  in  Cooke,  Samoa,  Nineteenth  Cent.,  XIX,  298ff. 

•■■■  See  Leigh.  The  Powers  and  Samoa.  Fort.  Rev..  N.  S.  LXV, 
(1899),   71. 

■i  Moore,  Digest,  I,  538. 


MISCELLA^'EOUS   NEUTRALITIES  yj 

volving-  a  protectorate;  and  a  highly  inipohtic  act  as  weh. 
since  the  claims  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  -w^udd  have 
been  compromised  thereby. 

As  soon  as  the  terms  of  the  American  agreement  became 
kn(_)\vn  to  the  German  anthcirities  in  the  islands  they  raised 
a  protest,  claiming  that  l)y  the  favors  afforded  to  the  United 
States  the  nati^"es  had  \iolated  previous  agreements  made 
with  Germany/  Use  of  force  on  the  part  of  the  Germans 
followed.  l)nt  friendly  relations  were  again  established  when, 
in  January.  1879.  a  treaty  was  concluded  by  which  Germany 
was  granted  exclusive  rights  to  establish  a  naval  station  in 
the  harbor  of  Saluafata.  A  treaty  conferring  the  most  fa- 
vored nation  privileges  was  concluded  between  Samoa  and 
Great  Britain  a  few  months  later ;  and  the  latter  power  was 
granted  the  right  to  establish  a  naval  station  and  coaling- 
depot  on  the  shores  of  a  Samoan  harbor  thereafter  to  be 
designated.  Apia,  the  local  capital.  Saluafata,  and  that  part 
of  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago  which  might  thereafter  be  se- 
lected for  a  similar  purpose  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  were  excepted.'  In  December  of  the  same  year  the 
three  Treaty  Powers  recognized  the  legality  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  native  King  Alalietoa  Talavou.  who.  at  the  mo- 
ment, was  dominant  amcMig  the  warlike  factions  of  the 
islanders.^ 

The  ci^■il  war  of  the  preceeding  simimer  had  necessitated. 
on  the  ]iart  of  the  consuls,  joint  action  with  the  various 
factions  of  the  natives.  l:)y  which,  (^n  May  29.  all  had  agreed 
to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  territory  in  and  about  Apia. 
Upon  the  death  of  Alalietoa  Tala\'ou.  the  \'ice-King. 
Alalietoa  Laupepa  was  appointed  to  succeed ;  and.  after 
much  delay  and  some  hostilities,  the  leader  of  the  insurgent 
party.  Tamasese.  accepted  the  post  of  Vice-King  and  was  so 
recognized  by  the  consuls  in  a  formal  ceremony  of  July 
12,    1882.     Through   the   intrigues   of  the  German   consul 

^H.  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  238.  1st  Sess..  oO  Cong.,  268. 
2  State  Papers.  LXX.  133f. 
3H.  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  238.  loc.  cit. 


78  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

Malietoa  was  led.  on  November  lo,  1884,  to  sig-n  a  new- 
treaty  witli  the  lni[)erial  government,  by  the  terms  of  whieh 
German  ot'hcials  were  to  l)e  admitted  to  tlie  Samoan  Coun- 
cil of  State,  and  to  tlie  special  police  force:  wln'le  a  (lernian 
was  to  act  as  official  adxiser  to  the  King.'  It  nia\-  be  said, 
to  the  credit  of  Malietoa.  that  when  informed  of  the  full 
meaning-  of  the  treaty  which  he  had  signed  he  refused  to 
put  it  into  operation.  This  refusal  precipitated  high-handed 
proceedings  on  the  part  of  the  German  Consul-general,  and 
blood  was  shed  before  stable  conditions  were  again  restored 
in  the  islands.  I'oth  the  .\merican  and  the  British  Consuls 
entered  \  igorous  protests  against  the  conduct  of  the  Ger- 
mans, who  were  even  accused  of  instigating  Tamasese  to 
revolt.  Malietoa  now  a])])lied  to  Mr.  Greenebaum,  the 
American  Consul,  for  ])rotection.  The  latter,  apparentlv 
n])on  his  own  initiative,  on  May  14.  188(1.  declared  the  is- 
lands under  the  protection  of  the  United  States.-  The  situ- 
ation grew-  more  serious  as  the  rival  factions  of  the  natives 
l)repared  in  earnest  for  war.  The  American  and  British 
Consuls  continued  to  urge  upon  Malietoa  a  policv  of  for- 
bearance, while  the  (ierman  Consul-general  aided  by  retract- 
ing some  of  the  steps  which  he  had  recently  taken.  He 
even  went  to  Tamasese  in  person  to  urge  him  to  refrain 
from  hostilities. 

Meanwhile  the  United  States  government  rejjudiated  un- 
conditionally the  act  of  its  consul,  and  suggested  that  the 
German  and  British  Ministers  at  Washington  be  instructed 
to  enter  into  negotiations  with  Mr.  Bayard,  the  American 
Secretary  of  State,  with  a  view  to  the  establishment  of  order 
in  the  islands.  To  insure  intelligent  action  each  of  the  three 
governments  despatched  an  agent  to  the  islands  to  in\esti- 
gate  conditions  there  and  u>  make  a  tirsl-hand  report.''  The 
Conference  met  at  \\'ashington  in  the  summer  of  1887.  and 

1  state  rai)vrs.  LXXV,   r)08r;    JJ.   Ex.   Doc.  No.  .i.iS.    tst  t<ess..  .',0th 
Cong.,  5. 

2  Ibid..  24ff. 

3  Ibid..  29ff. 


MISCELLANEOUS   NEUTRALITIES  -n 

used  these  reports  as  a  basis  of  their  discussions/  Sir  Lionel 
West  represented  the  British  government.  Baron  von  Alvens- 
leben,  the  German.  It  soon  became  evident  that  no  agree- 
ment could  be  reached,  since  it  was  necessary  for  each  rep- 
resentative to  confer  with  his  government  on  any  plan  which 
might  be  suggested  to  reconcile  the  widely  different  views  ni 
Mr.  Bayard  and  Baron  von  Alvensleben.  Accordingly  an 
adjournment  till  autumn  was  agreed  upon.  The  American 
government  understood  that  during  the  recess  the  status  quo 
should  be  preserved  in  the  islands."  The  Germans,  however, 
seized  the  opportunity  to  dispatch  four  warships  to  Samoan 
waters.  It  declared  war  upon  Malietoa.  on  August  24,  and. 
having  speedily  overthrcnvn  that  unfortunate  chief,  set  up 
his  rival,  Tamesese  as  King,  with  a  German,  Brandeis,  as 
official  adviser.  Malietoa  was  deported,  but  the  natives  ral- 
lied about  Mataafa,  and  revolted  against  the  German  rule. 
Mataafa  was  elected  King  by  the  insurgents,  on  September 
9,  1888,  and  two  months  later  he  succeeded  in  defeating, 
with  a  loss  of  fifty  men,  a  force  of  German  marines  which 
was  attempting  to  land  on  a  pretense  of  protecting  German 
plantations. 

American  ships  were  ordered  to  the  islands,  and  the  press 
of  America  and  of  Europe  discussed  the  probability  of  a 
war  between  the  United  States  and  Germany.  However, 
diplomatic  exchanges  between  the  Department  of  State  and 
Bismarck  were  kept  up ;  and  this,  with  the  destruction  of  the 
ships  of  both  nations  by  a  hurricane  in  the  Bay  of  Apia,  in 
March,  1889,  paved  the  way  for  a  peaceful  resumption  of 
the  consultation  which  had  been  adjourned  in  1887;  and 
after  Germany  had  given  assurances  that  the  independence 
of  the  islands  would  not  be  put  in  question,  the  Conference 
was  renewed  in  Berlin,  April  29,  1889.  Mr.  John  A.  Kas- 
son,  the  veteran  American  diplomat  who  had  ably  repre- 
sented his  government  at  the  Berlin  Conference  on  African 

1  The  Protocols  of  the  Conference  are  given  in  For.  RcL.  1889. 
-Ihid.,   114ff. 


8o  THE  XEUTRALIZATIOy  OF  STATES 

Affairs  four  years  earlier,  headed  tlie  American  delegation; 
Sir  lulward  Malet.  who  had  tilled  a  similar  position  for  Eng- 
land, headed  the  British:  while  Count  PTerhert  von  Bis- 
marck acted  as  s])okesnian  for  ( iermany.'  On  June  14  there 
was  signed  the  (leneral  Act  of  Berlin,  of  1889.  Article  I 
declared  that  the  islands  of  Samoa  were  to  l)e  neutral  terri- 
tory, in  which  the  citizens  and  suhjects  of  the  three  signa- 
tory powers  were  to  ha\-e  e(|ual  rights  of  residence,  trade  and 
personal  protection.  The  three  powers  recognized  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Samoan  government  and  the  free  right  of 
the  natives  to  elect  their  Chief  or  King,  and  to  cluvise  their 
f(.rm  of  government  according  to  their  own  laws  and  ens- 
t(;ms.  The  treaty  further  provided  for  the  restoration  of 
Malietoa  to  the  Kingship.  "The  principle  features  (.f  the 
government  planned  hy  this  treaty  were  a  supreme  court,  to 
consist  of  one  judge,  styled  the  Chief  Justice  of  Samoa,  who 
was  to  he  appointed  hy  the  three  treaty  powers,  or,  if  they 
could  not  agree,  hy  the  King  of  Norway  and  Sweden;  a 
municipal  government  for  the  district  of  Apia,  hy  a  council 
whose  president  was  to  he  agreed  upon  hy  the  powers;  a 
special  commission  for  the  settlement  of  claims  and  titles 
to  lands,  and  a  system  of  revenue  consisting  of  import  and 
export  duties,  capitation  and  license  taxes,  and  certain  oc- 
casional duties."-  In  order  to  insure  peace,  Mataafa  and 
eleven  other  chiefs  of  the  opposition  were  deported;  hut  in- 
ternal disturbances  continued  to  occur,  the  rebels  being, 
after  the  deportation  of  Mataafa,  headed  bv  the  former  Vice- 
King  Tnmasese. 

With  a  change  of  administrations  at  Washington     Mr 
Cleveland,   who  became,    for  a   second   time,    President  on 
March  4.   1893,  ^o^t  no  opportunity  to  attack  the  arrange- 
ment.    President  Harrison  had  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
treaty  would  result  in  "the  permanent  establishment  of  law 

1  See  For.  Rel.,   1SS9.  for  complete  documents  of  the  Conference; 
also  State  Papers.   LXXXI,   1217. 

2  Moore,  Digest,  I,  547f. 


MISCELLANEOUS   NEUTRALITIES  gl 

and  order  in  Samoa  on  the  basis  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  natives  as  well  as  of  the  treaty 
powers."^  The  Democratic  administration  attacked  the 
General  Act  of  Berlin  as  an  entangling  alliance  "in  plain  de- 
fiance of  the  conservative  teachings  and  warnings  of  the  wise 
and  patriotic  men  who  laid  the  foundations  of  our  free  insti- 
tutions."" The  objections  rendered  by  the  administration 
were  given  additional  strength  by  the  fact  that  the  revenue 
from  the  islands  had  proved  insufficient  to  cover  the  expense 
of  the  tripartite  government,  and  this  deficit  had  to  be  met  by 
advances  made  by  the  treaty  powers.^  Although  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  continued  his  attacks,*  and  Mr.  Olney,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  actually  informed  the  German  ambas- 
sador that  the  treaty  was  unsatisfactory  to  the  United  States, 
and  was  one  which  its  interests  required  to  be  essentially 
modified  or  altogether  abrogated.^  Congress  took  no  action 
upon  their  suggestions;  and  when,  in  1897,  the  inaugura- 
tion of  President  ]\IcKinley  brought  in  a  new  Republican 
administration,  the  treaty  of  1889  was  still  in  force. 

With  the  death  of  King  ]\Ialietoa  in  1898  the  situation 
in  the  islands  again  became  acute.  Mataafa  and  his  ban- 
ished associates  were  brought  home,  in  order  that  the  new 
King  might  "be  duly  elected  according  to  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  Samoa. "'^  Upon  the  proposal  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment a  joint  commission  was  appointed  to  govern  the 
islands  until  a  satisfactory  election  could  be  held;  but  be- 
fore this  bodv  had  begun  to  function  the  Chief  Justice  had 
espoused  the  cause  of  one,  Malietoa  Tanu,  and  Mataafa  and 
his  followers  were  again  in  open  revolt.  \\'ith  the  arrival 
of  the  Commissioners  in  Samoa  the  Kingship  was  temporari- 

1  Richardson,   IX,  34. 
2 /bid.,  531. 

3  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  Nos.  93  and  132,  2nd  Sess.,  o3rd  Cong.,  and  No.  97, 
3rd  Sess.,  53  Cong. 
*  Richardson,  IX.   635. 
■'For.  Bel..  1^90.  534f. 
'■'Ihid..  614ff. 


82  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

ly  dispensed  with,  the  consuls  of  the  treaty  powers  being- 
entrusted  with  the  management  of  the  government.  In  their 
final  report  the  Commissioners  declared  that  the  chief  sources 
t)f  difficulty  in  the  islands  were  the  Kingship,  the  rivalries  of 
foreign  nationalities,  the  absence  of  regular  government  out- 
side of  A[)ia,  and  the  distribution  of  large  ([uantities  of 
arms  among  the  natives  in  consequence  of  the  insufficient 
enforcement  of  the  customs  regulations/ 

A  proposal  for  the  division  of  the  islands  came  from  the 
United  States  during  the  winter  of  1898- 1899.  The  Ger- 
man government  eagerly  accepted  the  plan,  and  was  willing 
to  insure  for  the  United  States  complete  control  of  Tutuila." 
On  November  14,  1899,  a  con\ention  was  concluded  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  whereby  the  former,  for  remu- 
neration elsewhere,  renounced  in  favor  of  the  latter  all  its 
rights  in  the  islands  of  Savaii  and  Upolu,  and  in  favor  of 
the  United  States  all  rights  in  Tutuila  and  the  other  islands 
lying  east  of  the  one  hundred  seventy-first  meridian  west  of 
Greenwich.^  Before  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty  were  ex- 
changed, a  similar  treaty  was  concluded  between  the  United 
States,  Germany  and  Great  Britain,  by  which  our  govern- 
menl  gave  its  sanction  to  this  plan  of  jjartition,  and  the  Gen- 
eral Act  of  Berlin  of  June  14,  1889,  as  well  as  all  previous 
treaties  and  agreements  were  annulled.^  Thus  the  United 
States  abandoned  its  earlier  policy  of  maintaining  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  native  goxernment  in  the 
islands.  Tutuila,  with  the  adjacent  islands,  was  placed  un- 
der the  administration  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  while 
the  remainder  of  the  group  was  organized  as  a  German  col- 
ony. .\  noteworthy  convention  was  concluded  about  the 
sauK'  time  between  the  treat\-  ])o\\ers.  wherebv  tliev  agreed 
to  submit  to  arbitration  all  claims  put  forward  b\'  their  re- 

5  Moore,  Dif/rst.  I,  .551. 

2  For.  Rel.,  ISS9.  63. 

3  State  Papers.  XCI.  70ff. 

*  Ibid.,  7.5f;   For.  RcL,     /,S',S,0.  665f. 


MISCELLANEOUS   NEUTRALITIES  g^ 

spective  citizens  for  compensation  on  account  of  losses  which 
they  alleged  that  they  had  suffered  in  consequence  of  un- 
warranted military  action  of  the  officers  of  any  of  the  three 
Powers  between  January  i,  1899,  and  the  arrival  of  the 
Joint  Commission  in  Samoa.  The  cases  were  to  be  decided 
in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  international  law  or 
considerations  of  equity/  The  King  of  Sweden  and  Nor- 
way was  chosen  to  act  as  Arbitrator,  and  not  only  were  the 
claims  of  nationals  of  the  treaty  powers,  but  those  of  outside 
states  as  well  thus  amicably  settled. 

The  German  government  continued  to  control  the  larger 
part  of  the  archipelago  until  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Great 
War,  when,  in  the  summer  of  19 14,  sailors  from  New  Zea- 
land took  possession  in  the  name  of  that  colony,'  thus  ful- 
filling a  long-felt  desire  of  the  New  Zealanders,  for  it  was 
against  the  bitter  protests  of  its  colonies  in  the  Pacific  that 
Great  Britain  gave  up  her  claims  to  Samoa  in  1899.^  At 
the  close  of  the  Great  War  New  Zealand  was  appointed  to 
serve  as  Mandatary  for  German  Samoa,  and  the  latter  will 
undoubtedly  be  absorbed  as  an  integral  part  of  that  colony. 

1  state  Papers.  XCI,  78ff. 
■^independent,  LXXIX,  365. 
sLeigh^  Fort.  Rev-,  LXV,  73. 


CHArTKR  \  11  '     . 

SOME   GENERAL   CONSIDERATIONS    OF    PERM  AX  EXT 

NEUTRALITY 

It  is  the  purpose  of  the  remainder  of  this  (hssertation  to 
make  clear  wliat  the  system  of  permanent  neutrahty  is; 
what  its  effects  upon  hoth  the  neutralized  and  the  guaran- 
teeing states  are;  and  to  illustrate  these  conclusions  and  ef- 
fects by  concrete  problems  drawn  from  the  history  of  the 
neutralized  states  which  have  Ijeen  created  since  1815.  We 
shall  also  devote  some  time  to  a  study  of  permanent  neutral- 
ity in  the  year  19 14. 

Believing  that  the  projier  approach  to  an  underslanding  of 
this  system,  as  of  any  ctlier  international  phenomenon,  is 
through  historical  channels,  we  have  devoted  considerable 
space  to  a  study  of  the  international  circumstances  and  the 
conventions  l)y  wliicli  the  permanent  neutralities  were  es- 
tablished. The  positive  bases  of  research  are  the  treaties  in 
question, — that  of  Vienna  of  1815;  of  London  of  1839;  of 
London  of  1867;  and  that  of  Berlin  of  1885.  Of  these  we 
have  quoted  the  parts  of  importance  to  our  study,  and  fre- 
(|uent  references  will  be  made  to  their  proxisions  as  our  tech- 
nical study  proceeds. 

A  preliminary  explanation  of  the  meaning  of  the  term 
permanent  neutralitv  was  gi\en  at  the  lieginning  of  oiu" 
work.  We  are  ncjw  in  a  position  to  go  into  the  subject  in 
a  more  extended  fashion.  According  to  0])penheim.  whose 
definition  is  perhaps  as  satisfactory  as  any  to  be  foinid.  "a 
neutralized  state  is  a  state  whose  independence  and  integritv 
are  for  all  the  future  guaranteed  by  an  international  con- 
vention of  the  powers,  under  the  condition  that  stich  state 
binds  itself  not  to  take  up  arms  against  any  other  state  ex- 

84 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  85 

cept  for  defense  against  attack,  and  not  to  enter  into  such 
international  obligations  as  could  indirectU-  drag  it  into 
war.'"^ 

With  this  definition  the  writers  on  international  law  are 
in  eeneral  accord.'  From  it  certain  conclusions  may  be 
drawn.  It  is  evident  from  the  name  given  to  the  system 
that  the  action  taken  is  regarded  as  for  all  time.  It  also 
must  rest  upon  conventions  as  a  basis,  and  cannot  exist  ex- 
cept by  special  compact.^  Furthermore,  it  is  not  created  ab- 
solutely for  the  benefit  of  the  neutralized  state,  but  is  used 
by  the  powers  as  a  means  of  settling  disputed  c|uestions 
among  them.  In  the  delicate  situation  in  whicli  all  diplo- 
matic affairs  were  constantly  placed  during  the  course  of 
the  19th  century,  it  would  be  impossible  to  hold  that  the 
Great  Powers  went  cut  of  their  way  to  guarantee  permanent 
peace  to  three  of  the  minor  states  of  Europe,  simply  out  of 
a  desire  to  bring  the  benefits  of  peace  upon  them.  A  glance 
at  the  map  of  Europe  will  explain,  in  conjunction  with  our 
historical  exposition,  the  international  importance  of  these 
neutralized  territories.  Switzerland,  for  instance,  controls 
the  natural  passes  through  the  Alps,  connecting  four  of  the 
major  Powers  of  Europe.  From  the  days  of  the  l^arbarian 
invasions  of  Rome  to  the  defeat  of  Napoleon,  the  pages  of 
European  history  are  full  of  struggles  f(.r  the  control  of 
these  passes.  Roman  and  Goth,  Frank  and  Hun,  mingled 
their  blood  with  the  Swiss  mountain  streams  in  their  effort 
to  control  the  natural  gatew^ays.  During  the  ]\ Fiddle  Ages 
the  mighty  inroads  of  the  mediaeval  emi)erors.  and  later. 

1  Oppenheim,  I,  140f. 

2  Kleen,  I,  87;  Lawrence.  The  Princivles  0/  International  Law. 
(London,  1895).  485f;  Despagnet,  F.,  Cours  (le  droit  international 
puhlic,  ^th  ed.  by  de  Boeck.  (Paris.  1910),  177;  Funck-Brentano  et 
Sorel,  44;  Holland,  Studies  in  International  Law.  (Oxford,  1898), 
271f;  Descamps,  Em.,  95. 

3Wlheaton,  H.,  Elements  of  International  Law.  (8th  Edition,  by 
Dana,  London,  1866),  510;  Bonfils,  H.,  Manuel  de  droit  intcrna- 
tional  public.    (Paris,    1912),   212. 


8(3  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

of  tlie  l-'rcnch  Kings  were  made  through  them.  The  sup- 
port which  the  French  Cardinal-Statesmen,  Richeheu  and 
Mazarin,  lent  to  the  Swiss  people  was  due  to  the  fact  that, 
if  they  could  not  hold  direct  control  of  this  territory  for 
I'^-ance.  they  preferred  that  it  should  he  in  neutral  hands, 
rather  than  under  the  control  of  the  Hapshurgs;  while  the 
tardy  recognition  of  Swiss  independence  by  Austria  was 
tinally  granted  through  fear  that  if  it  were  longer  withheld 
the  mountaineers  would  ding  themselves,  passes  and  all,  into 
the  waiting  arms  of  France.  We  have  seen  how  the  tra- 
ditional neutral  policy  of  the  Swiss  aided  in  laying  the  foun- 
dation for  the  successful  permanent  neutralization  of  their 
soil.  It  would  be  equally  accurate  to  say  that  the  geograph- 
ic and  ethnological  situation  of  the  country  is  responsible  for 
its  traditional  policy.  Situated  as  it  is  on  the  confines  of 
three  great  peoples,  Switzerland  has  considerable  elements 
of  the  stock  of  each.  If  the  ethnological  test  were  the  true 
test  by  which  to  determine  a  nationality,  Switzerland  could 
never  lay  claim  to  that  distinction.  The  Germans  dominate 
in  the  north  ;  there  is  a  smaller  section  of  French  in  the  west ; 
while  in  the  south  a  still  less  numerous  group  is  Italian. 
For  centuries,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  cantonal 
divisions,  (for  each  canton  was  a  miniature  republic,)  ren- 
dered a  true  national  state  impossible;  but  since  1815  the 
heterogeneous  po]^ulation  has  united  under  its  international 
regime  of  neutralilv  until  few  states  deserve  more  thon)UO:h- 
!}■  the  title  of  "nation". 

When  we  tiu'n  to  P)elgium  we  find  that,  while  the  geo- 
gra])hical  features  of  the  country  are  \'ery  different  from 
those  of  Switzerland,  tlie  strategic  ])osition  of  its  territory 
in  its  relation  to  France,  (lermany  and  CJreat  P)rit'ii  1  is  no 
less  marked  than  is  that  of  Switzerland  to  its  neighbors. 
Through  Belgium  runs  the  great  highway  of  lun-ope.' 
More  often  than  Switzerland  has  its  territorv  served  Fu- 
rope  fc;r  a  battle-ground.    Lacking  the  natural  means  of  dc- 

'  Funck-Brentano  and   Sorel.   l.")2. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  g^ 

fense  as  well  as,  to  some  extent,  the  sense  of  nationality  and 
the  love  of  independence  of  the  Swiss,  the  Belgian  people 
saw  their  territories  for  centuries  hartered  about  bv  their 
neighbors,  and  crossed  and  recrossed  liy  fighting  hosts. 
Gradually  the  sense  of  homogeneity  and  the  similarity  of 
institutions  developed  a  strong  desire  to  unite  with  France, 
but  this  desire  was  quickly  checked  by  the  powers,  wdio,  upon 
the  fall  of  Napoleon,  had  the  disposal  of  the  Belgian  people 
at  their  discretion.  Even  their  independence  was  blotted 
out  for  a  time  under  the  Dutch  regime.  But  the  Belgians 
asserted  their  rights  once  more,  and  they  concluded,  with  the 
help  of  the  powers,  that  permanent  neutrality  which,  it  was 
thought,  alone  could  preserve  them  from  a  constant  repeti- 
tion of  the  dangers  and  disgraces  through  which  they  had 
so  often  passed. 

Luxemburg,  while  of  far  less  importance  than  either 
Switzerland  or  Belgium,  occupies  a  territory  containing  a 
fort  which  points  the  way  straight  to  the  heart  of  both 
France  and  Germany.  As  a  part  of  the  penalty  placed  upon 
France  at  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  this  fort  was 
permitted  to  be  garrisoned  with  Prussian  soldiers.  But 
France  always  chafed  under  this  condition  of  affairs,  and 
finally,  under  threat  of  war,  succeeded  in  ol;;taining  the  with- 
drawal of  the  garrison,  the  demolition  of  the  fort,  and  the 
neutralization  of  the  territory.  This  was  the  logical  solu- 
tion at  the  time,  and  was  so  recognized  by  the  powers.  Had 
Prussia  continued  to  hold,  or  had  France  succeeded  in  gain- 
ing possession  of,  the  fort,  the  war  which  was  destined  to 
break  out  eventually  would  have  come  more  rapidly  than 
it  did,  and  the  field  of  operations  would  have  been  in  a  dif- 
ferent locality. 

Permanent  neutrality  is,  then,  the  normal  and  rational 
product  of  historical  and  geographical  conditions  ;^  yet  it 
is,  in  its  international  standing,  essentally  a  legal  institu- 
tion.    History  has  proved,  in  the  case  of  Cracow  for  in- 

1  Dollot,  Introduction,  xi. 


88  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

Stance,  that  no  attempt  t(^  erect  a  permanently  neutral  state 
can  be  successful,  unless  conditions  are  favorable  to  its  ex- 
istence; yet.  on  the  other  hand,  we  feel  perfectly  justified  in 
saying  that  this  status  could  never  be  established  except  in 
the  public  interest  of  Europe.'  Speaking  on  this  point, 
Funck-Brentano  and  Sorel  say,  "The  European  ])owers  de- 
prived themselves  of  the  means  of  action;  they  limited  their 
battle-fields  in  advance,  and  increased  the  difficulties  of  war. 
They  did  a  wise  and  politic  thing,"-  So  important  a  step  as 
this  could  not  have  been  taken  without  due  deliberation  on 
the  part  of  all  interested  powers,"'  and  the  sacrificing,  on  the 
part  of  some  of  them  at  least,  of  their  individual  interests 
for  the  common  good.  We  do  not  mean  to  impl\-  that  all 
interested  states  must  guarantee  the  neutralitv.^  A  mere 
recognition  is  sufficient.  Thus,  in  1S39,  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment recognized  the  neutrality  (;f  Belgium  but  did  not  guar- 
antee it;  and.  in  1867.  Belgium  took  the  same  position  to- 
ward Luxemburg. 

The  action  of  tlie  powers  in  such  a  case  is  regarded  as 
sufficient  to  elevate  the  neutralization  into  a  ])rihcii)le  of  the 
public  law  of  Europe."'  That  the  action  of  all  the  so-called 
Great  Powers  is  to  be  desired  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the 
Kingdom  of  Sardinia  was  invited  to  take  part  in  the  Con- 
ference of  London  of  1867;  and  that  it  joined  in  guarantee- 
ing the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg,  although  it  could  not  be 
said  to  have  the  slightest  personal  interest  in  the  matter. 

Again,  in  order  that  a  regime  of  ])ermaiieni  neutralitv 
may  be  successful,  the  neutralized  state  should  of  its  own. 
free  will  become  a  signer  of  the  treaty.'"'  Switzerland  and 
Luxemburg  hailed  with  joy  the  recognition  of  their  pcrma- 

1  Fiore,  Pasquale,   Nouveau   droit    international   puhUv.    (Srcl    Edi- 
tion translated  by  Chais.  Antoine,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1S86),  I.  428. 

2  Funck-Brentano   and   Sorel,    152. 

3  Lawrence,  486. 
*  Kleen,  I,  87. 

5  Lawrence,  487. 

fiBonfils,  213;    Rivier.  I,  108. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  gg 

nent  status  among  the  powers  of  Europe;  and  a  similar 
sentiment  was  expressed  by  the  International  African  As- 
sociation over  the  neutralization  of  the  Congo.  If  there 
was  opposition  on  the  part  of  a  strong  party  in  Belgium  in 
1839,  it  soon  disappeared.  It  is  a  generally  recognized 
principle  of  private  law  that  an  agreement  entered  into 
under  duress  is  not  binding  upon  the  party,  and  the  same 
rule  would  apply  to  a  state  upon  which  a  status  of  perma- 
nent neutrality  was  forced  against  its  will.^  This  has  gen- 
erally been  recognized  by  the  diplomats  at  the  Conferences. 
For  example,  when,  in  1863,  a  proposal  was  made  to  place 
Greece  under  this  regime,  so  strenuous  were  the  objections 
raised  by  that  state  that  the  proposal  was  dropped."  It  is 
obvious  that,  were  the  status  forced  upon  any  state,  it  would 
seize  the  first  opportunity  to  throw  it  off;  and  such  an  op- 
portunity would  come  with  the  first  outbreak  of  war  in  its 
neighborhood.^  Since  these  treaties  are  concluded  in  view 
of  war  alone,*  the  whole  purpose  of  the  transaction  would 
be  defeated.  The  policies  of  the  permanently  neutral  state 
do  not  vary  materially  in  time  of  peace  from  those  of  other 
states.  Consequently,  to  place  a  territory  under  the  regime 
of  permanent  neutrality  with  the  option  of  forsaking  it  at 
the  outbreak  of  war  would  be  to  create  an  anomaly. 

For  a  permanently  neutral  state  offensive  warfare  is  for- 
ever interdicted.  The  name  itself  is  sufficient  guarantee  of 
this  fact.  Upon  the  outbreak  of  war  between  two  or  more 
powers  in  any  part  of  the  world  it  is  customary  for  states 
to  exercise  their  so-called  sovereign  prerogatives  by  pro- 
claiming themselves  participants  or  neutrals.  From  the  legal 
point  of  view  their  choice  is  absolutely  free.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  permanently  neutral  state  has  renounced  for  all 
time  this  option,  and  its  policy  during  the  war  is  fixed,  pro- 
vided  that   its   neutrality   is   respected   by   both   belligerent 

1  Despagnet,  177. 

-  Deepagnet,   179. 

3  Bonfils,  213. 

*  Funck-Brentano  and  Sorel,   153. 


90 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


partes.  It  is  for  tliis  purjinsc  tliat  the  permanent  neutral- 
ities are  created.  Certain  strategic  points,  to  whicli  no 
single  power  could  present  a  clear  title,  are  thus  placed  under 
the  contrnl  of  an  innffcnsiw  state,  and  arc  thus  removed 
Ironi  the  held  of  action  of  the  belligerents.  As  a  corollary 
of  the  renunciation  of  the  right  to  wag-e  offensive  war,  all 
offensive  alliances  with  neigiihoring  states,  even  in  time  of 
peace  are  absolutely  forbidden.  It  is  the  duty  of  such  a 
state  to  avoid  in  sjjirit  and  in  letter  every  agreement  which 
might  entangle  it  in  war.^  The  reason  back  of  this  restric- 
tion is  explained  by  b'unck-Brentano  and  Sorel.  "ddie  neu- 
tral state  may  not  conclude  any  treaty  of  alliance,  nor  in  gen- 
eral any  engagements  which  states  contract  in  view  of  war, 
for,  being  incapable  of  performing  the  oljligations  which  re- 
sult therefrom,  it  ought  not  to  assume  them.  It  should 
avoid  any  political  action  which  might  lead  it  into  engage- 
ments of  this  kind."- 

Some  writers,  however,  hold  that  in  this  strict  interpreta- 
tion of  the  law  renunciation  goes  to  too  great  an  extreme. 
Bluntschli  reasons  as  follows: 

"Neutral  states  do  not  renounce  their  right  to  make  war;  but  as 
long  as  they  remain  neutral,  they  abstain  from  all  participation  in 
it.  This  principle  applies  equally  to  states  of  which  the  neutrality 
is  called  permanent.  To  renounce  its  right  to  make  war  would  be 
for  a  state  to  renounce  its  virility,  its  right  to  defend  and  to  cause 
to  be  respected  its  constitution.  This  would  be  fundamentally  to 
renounce  its   independence. "3 

Arguing  from  this  foundation  Ernest  Nye  holds  that  a 
neutralized  state  may  make  war  for  its  own  preservation,  a 
conclusion  to  which  there  is  no  objection,  except  as  to  inler- 
pretaton :  and  "for  its  legitimate  development."  a  thesis 
Avhich  it  wonld  be  difhcult  to  support,  and  which  if  left  thus 

'  Wheaton,  516;   Oppenheim,  571. 
-  Funck-Brentano  and   Sorel,   153. 

y  Bluntschli,  Lr  droit  inienmtional  codifir,  (translated  into 
French  by  M.  C.  Lardy,  Paris,  1895),  743. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  gi 

indefinite,  would  give  rise  to  serit^us  difTerences  (f  interpre- 
tation. 

There  is  general  agreement  among  all  anthorities  that  a 
permanently  neutral  state  may  conclude  with  its  neighlx)rs 
certain  kinds  of  treaties  of  a  peaceful  character. Whether  or 
not  this  is  to  be  interpreted  to  include  defensive  alliances  is 
an  unsettled  cjuestion.  It  is  sufficient  to  say,  for  the  present, 
that  such  an  alliance  would  be  a  dangerous  thing.  Defen- 
sive alliances  of  a  small  state  with  a  great  tend  to  give  the 
latter  a  powerful  influence  over  its  ally,  an  influence  which 
could  easily  defeat  the  very  purpose  of  the  neutralization.^ 
Indeed,  too  friendly  relations  of  Belgium  with  France  and 
Great  Britain  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  causes  which,  by 
arousing  the  jealousy  of  Germany,  led  to  the  invasion  of 
Belgium  in  19 14."  If  the  permanently  neutral  state  may 
contract  a  defensive  alliance  in  order  to  safeguard  its  own 
neutrality  it  may  be  answered  that  this  is  already  safe- 
guarded by  a  special  convention  in  the  form  of  the  neutral- 
ization treaty,  and  is  thereby  guaranteed  by  many  powers, 
and  hence  a  further  alliance  would  be  futile.  In  spite  of  all 
that  has  been  written  to  the  contrary,  history  shows  that 
the  greatest  safety  for  small  states  lies  in  the  strictest  inter- 
pretation, on  their  part,  of  their  treaty  obligations.  The 
celebrated  Article  V  III  of  the  present  Swiss  constitution, 
which  declares  the  right  of  the  Swiss  government  to  contract 
alliances,  is  regarded  merely  as  a  declaration  of  sovereign 
powers  on  the  part  of  Switzerland,  and  has  never  been  put 
into  operation.  In  the  strictest  interpretation  of  the  perm- 
anent neutrality  treaties,  however,  no  restriction  may  be 
put  upon  treaties  governing  economic,  material  or  moral 
interests,  provided,  of  course,  that  it  safeguard  itself  against 
the  fusion  of  these  interests  with  similar  interests  of  its  ally. 
Treaties  of  commerce  and  navigation,  for  the  execution  of 

1  Nye,  Le  droit  inter  national,   (3  vols.,  Paris,  1905),  I,  428. 

2  Waxweiler,  E.,  Belgium  Neutral  and  Loyal,   (N.  Y.  and  London, 
1915),  Chapter  IV. 


g^  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

judg-mcnts.  the  extradtion  of  criminals,  of  the  post,  and  for 
the  protection  of  patents  and  copyrights  are  unobjejction- 
able.^  The  permanently  neutral  states  were  also  represented 
at  the  Hague  Conferences. 

]  Attention  may  here  l>e  called  to  the  fact  that  only  states 
of  the  second  rank  could  be  successfully  neutralized.^  No 
other  state  would  consent  to  such  an  arrangement,  since 
thereby  it  relinquishes  the  prerogative  of  self-determination. 
It  is  applicable  only  to  a  state  which  has  no  ambition  to  ex- 
])and.  and  no  so-called  "unredeemed  territory."  It  was 
her  ambition  to  exi)an(l  nortliward.  tluis  uniting  to  licr  ter- 
ritories the  Thracian  and  Albanian  lands  occupied  more  or 
less  by  Greeks,  that  led  Greece,  in  ICS63,  to  refuse  to  accept 
the  status  of  permanent  neutrality.  Bonfds  calls  attention 
;o  the  fact  that  although  the  neutralized  state  will,  in  all 
probability,  be  located  between  the  Great  Powers,  it  should 
net  occupy  the  only  passage  between  them.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  neutral  i)owers  situated  between  l^'ance  and  Ger- 
many during  the  Great  War  adds  emphasis  to  this  point. 
Ik'lgium  and  Luxemburg  in  1914  occupied  the  only  unpro- 
tected sections  of  the  bVench  frontier.  Had  tiiere  been  a 
strong  line  of  forts  along  the  Belgian  border  of  P>ance  as 
well  as  along  the  German,  it  is  probable  that  the  strategists 
of  the  latter  state  would  have  chosen  to  "hack  their  way 
through"  some  other  route,  rather  than  incur  the  condem- 
nation of  the  civilized  world  by  breaking  their  treaty  obli- 
gations to  Belgium.  The  folly  of  creating,  out  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  a  third  independent,  neutralized  state  between 
France  and  Germany'  needs  no  demonstration.  J\ 

Support     has     been     given     by     the     Russian     publicist 
Martens  to  the  validity  of  a  permaiicnt  neutrality  unilater- 

'  Despagnet,  183;  Wheaton,  517. 
-'  Bonfile,  213. 

•'>Phillip6on,  C.  Alsacc-Loiraine,  Past,  Present  and  Future,   (Lon- 
don, 1918).     271.  282. 


GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 


93 


ally  declared/  This  conception  is.  however,  generally  op- 
posed hv  ncarl\-  all  other  writers  on  the  (juestion  >)f  perma- 
nent ncutralitv.  li  is  true  that  a  state  may  adopt  neutrality 
as  a  permanent  line  of  conduct."  The  case  is  strengthened 
if  this  policy  is  incorporated  in  the  state  constitution,  thus 
making  it  a  part  of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land.  But 
this  unilateral  declaration,  while  admirable  as  a  state  policy, 
is  without  legal  status  in  international  affairs.'*  The  entire 
conception  of  a  unilateral  declaration  is  political  rather  than 
legal.      Xvs,  in  commenting  on  ^Martens'  article  declares — 

"This  is  a  complete  error.  Permanent  neutrality  is  not  the  fact 
of  a  unilateral  declaration.  It  results  from  the  accordance  of  the 
wills  of  the  states  which  are  present,  and  of  which  one  declares  it- 
self perman-ently  neutral,  or,  at  least,  consents  to  accept  the  perma- 
nent neutrality,   while  the  others   take  the  engagement  to   respect 

it A    unilateral    declaration    of    permanent    neutrality 

cannot  bind  other  states;  it  is  without  legal  value;  as  well  might 
a  decree  pronouncing  the  invoilability  of  a  state,  and  pretending  to 
impose  on  the  other  states  the  recognition  of  a  sacred  character, 
without  asking  them  if  they  wish  to  assume  such  an  obligation."* 

To  be  sure,  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  a  small  state  to  adopt 
for  kself  a  policy  of  permanent  neutrality.  This  was  done 
by  Switzerland,  with  varying  degrees  of  success  for  two 
centuries  prior  to  its  formal  recognition  by  its  neighbors  at 
\"ienua;  and  it  1ms  been  the  professed  policy  of  Holland, 
SAveden,  Norwav  and  Denmark  for  decades.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  a  political  act.  It  does  not  do  aw-ay  with  the  neces- 
sity of  making  a  declaration  of  the  intention  to  continue 
such  a  policy  at  the  outbreak  of  every  war.  It  places  the 
state  making  such  a  declaration  in  exactly  the  same  position 
as  that  held  by  all  neutrals.  It  places  no  restrictions  upon 
its  conduct  in  time  of  peace.  Such  a  state  may  contract 
alliances  of  any  kind,  whenever,  and  with  whatever  power 

1  Martens,  La  neutralisation  du  Danemark.  R.  D.  M..  (Nov.  15, 
1903),  314ff. 

-'  Descamps.  Ed.  303ff. 

3  Lawrence,  486;  Nys,  I,  429;   Bonfils,  212. 

4Nys,  I,  430. 


-^ 


g,  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

it  pleases.  If  it  chooses  to  abandon  the  iu'licy  at  any  lime, 
and  to  ens^aoe  in  a.c^^ressive  warfare,  the  abandonment  is 
not,  in  itself,  a  violation  of  treaty  ao:reements.  The  state 
is  protected  onlv  bv  the  e^cneral  rnles  of  inicvnalional  law 
for  the  benefit  of  nenlral>.  and  the  sijccifir  rnlcs  laid  down 
by  the  Hagne  Conventions  to  govern  snch  relations.  But 
the  further  protection,  secured  by  states  which  have  re- 
nounced bv  international  con\entions  the  rii^ht  to  make  war, 
and  therehx  ha\e  received  the  specitic  guarantee  of  protec- 
tion from  the  powders,  cannot  be  claimed  by  any  snch  un- 
ilateral declaration.  In  other  words,  an  international  stains 
cannot  he  created  hv  the  action  of  a  single  nation. 

From  the  point  of   view  of  the  sanctions  given   by  the 
powers,  there  are  two  classes;    (i)   those  whose  status  as 
such  is  merely  recognized,  and   (2)   those  whose  status  as 
such  is  guaranteed  by  the  signatory  powers.     Both  classes 
are  given  legal  recognition,  and  occupy  a  definite  place  in 
the  international  held.     The  powers  are  bound  only  to  re- 
spect the  legal  status  of  such  states  as  fall  in  the  first  group: 
but  they  are  lx)und  by  their  own  action  to  cause  this  status 
to  be  respected  for  states  falling  in  the  second  group.     The 
neutrality  of  Switzerland,  that  of  lielgium.  and  that  of  Lux- 
emburg belong  in  the  second  group,  as  they  are  fully  guar- 
anteed bv  the  conventions  which   created  them.      1die  neu- 
trality  of  the  Congo  was  recognized  by  the  powers,  but  was 
not    guaranteed    by   them.      Hence    it    belongs   to    the   first 
group.      The   neutrality  of  Cracow   was   recognized   by   the 
V\\c  Powers,  but  was  guaranteed  only  by  Russia,    Prussia 
and   .\ustria.      Hence  it   was  a  hybrid  neutrality  according 
to  this  classification. 

Just  to  \\,hat  extent  the  guaraiUee  will  be  of  value  will  be 
discussed  in  a  later  chapter.  We  may  anticipate  a  moment 
on  the  thornv  ([uestion  of  the  guarantee  to  say  that,  if  en- 
tered into  with  anv  degree  of  sincerity  by  the  guarantors,  it 
is  of  distinct  advantage  t<i  all  concerned,  and  gives  a  tre- 
mendous prestige  to  the  international  act  creating  the  neu- 
tralitv. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   EFFECT   OF    PERMANENT    NEUTRALITY    UPON    TFIE 
SOVEREIGNTY  OF  A  STATE 

It  is  not  surprising  to  find  great  variation  of  opinion  as 
to  the  effect  of  permanent  neutralization  upon  the  sovereign- 
ty of  a  state,  for  there  is  very  httle  agreement  among  writ- 
ers upon  the  nature  of  scn-ereignty  itself.  Oppenheim  de- 
clares that  the  condition  of  neutralization  dees  not  in  any 
way  destroy  the  full  sovereignty  of  the  neutralized  state.' 
The  entrance  of  the  state  into  this  status  is  an  act  of  its  own 
sovereign  power,  and  differs  in  no  w-ay  from  treaties  of  al- 
hance  and  kindred  acts  of  non-neutralized  states.  Baron 
Descamps  is  of  the  same  opinion.'  and  he  is  followed  h-y 
Nys,-'  Richter.*  and  Westlake.' 

The  writers  who  hold  the  opposite  view,  and  argue  that 
permanent  neutralization  involves  a  loss  of  sovereignty  and 
renders  part-sovereign  the  states  subject  to  its  regime,  are 
no  less  explicit  in  their  statements,  and  their  arguments  are 
no  less  logical.  Despagnet,"  Funck-Brentano  and  Sorel." 
Baumgartner,*  Morand,®  and  Kleen'°  are  to  be  found  in  this 
group.     The  last  mentioned  takes  the  lead  in  the  extreme 

1  Oppenheim,    I,    142f. 

2  Descamps,  Ed.,  340ff. 

3Nys,  Notes  sur  la  neutralite.  R.  D.  I.,  ind  8rr..  III.  (1901),  21. 
4"Richter,  21f. 

5  Westlake,  Notes  sur  la  neutralltr  jicrmanrnte.  R.  D.  I..  2nd 
Ser.,  Ill,   (1901),  392f. 

6  Despagnet.   178. 

"•  Funck-Brentano   and   Sorel,    153. 
"^  Baumgartner,  23ff. 
9  M'orand,  522ff. 
loKleen,  I,  88f. 

95 


g5  THE  NEUTRALIZATIOy  OF  STATES 

views  of  the  relation  of  i)ermanent  nculraliiy  to  sovereignty. 
Xot  only  tloes  he  hold  the  acce])tance  (;n  the  part  of  the  neu- 
tralized state  to  be  a  renunciation  of  sovereign  rights,  hut 
he  regards  that  act  to  be  a  renunciation  of  an  independent 
existence. 

"This  is  exactly   what  every  neutralized  states   does  to  some  ex- 
tent.    It  renounces  one  of  the  essential  attributes  of  the  sovereignty 

of   an    independent    state Permanent    neutrality    is 

incompatible  with  the  right,  inherent  in  the  sovereignty  of  every 
independent  state,  to  decide  for  itself  the  means  for  defending  its 
own  existence,  its  integrity,  and  its  rights  against  the  violations 
of  which  they  may  he  the  object.  International  law  may  not  lend 
its  sanction  to  political  acts  contrary  to  the  very  principles  which 
it  proclaims.  But  among  these  principles  figures  this,  that  sov- 
ereignty is  an  essential  attribute  of  a  state,  and  that  the  decision 
of  questions  of  peace  and  war  is  one  of  the  inseparable  functions  of 
sovereignty;  all  the  more  since  international  law  recognizes  war 
only  as  an  extreme  means  of  providing  for  its  own  defense  before 
a  criminal  attack  directed  against  the  integrity  of  a  state.  It 
matters  little  in  reality,  for  the  question  of  principle,  whether  this 
defense  is  made  on  the  territory  of  the  state  or  outside  of  its  fron- 
tiers  When    permanent   neutrality  ■deprives    the    state 

of  the  right  to  defend  itself,  or,  at  least,  of  the  right  to  decide  for 
itself,  it  deprives  it  of  a  sovereign  right,  a  condition  of  its  political 
emancipation,  and  one  which  is  indespensible  to  the  very  end  of  the 
state  as  such."i 

lie  a|)plies  also  to  international  law  the  rule  of  private  law 
bv  which  are  considered  null  any  acts  of  the  indixidual  1)\- 
which  he  disposes  of  liis  so-called  inalienable  rights.  P)Ut 
nui  all  rules  of  priwite  law  .are  ai)i)lical)le  in  the  international 
domain.  This-  is  due  to  ihc  fact  that  there  is  no  supreme 
international  coun  witii  ])«  w  cv  tn  imjjose  its  will  upon  the 
individual  states.  The  only  influence  to  assure  the  validit}- 
of  international  agreements  is  the  will  of  the  states  In*  which 
they  are  made."     Hence,  if  a  state  wills  to  renounce  a  part 

1  Kleen,   I,  95f. 

-  Hagerup,  F.,  La  neutnilitr  lurmdnrnte,  R.  D.  I.  P.,  XII,    (1905), 
581. 


SOVEREIGNTY  07 

of  its  sovereign  international  status,  or  even  to  commit 
"state  suicide,"  there  is  no  higher  tribunal  to  say  it  "No." 

From  the  mass  of  conflicting  opinion  to  which  we  have 
referred,  and  to  ^^  hich  material  might  be  added  indefinitely, 
it  is  utterly  impossible  to  draw  exact  conclusions;  nor  can 
we  feel  justified  in  accepting  the  opinion  of  any  one  author- 
itv  to  the  exclusion  of  that  of  another.  The  difficultv  lies, 
it  would  soom,  in  the  fundamental  conception  of  the  nature 
of  sovereignty  itself,  and  in  a  vain  attempt  to  make  all  in- 
ternational relations  fit  into  preconceived  rules,  as  molten 
metal  is  run  into  a  mould  It  is  well  to  remember  in  this 
connection  that  the  law  is  made  for  states,  and  not  states  for 
the  law.  In  all  relations  of  men,  and  international  relations 
are  no  exception,  theories  must  yield  to  facts,  or  by  taking 
full  cognizance  of  the  institutions  actually  in  existence,  they 
must  submit  to  an  analysis  from  which  they  emerge  broad- 
ened and  enlarged,  until  they  can  be  made  to  include  all  ex- 
isting conditions,  ^^'hen  Kleen  argues  that  "international 
law  cannot  appro\'e  of  permanent  neutralization,"^  he  ignores 
the  fact  that,  at  the  \ery  time  he  was  writing,  the  permanent 
neutralization  of  Switzerland  iiad  been  for  eighty-three 
years  a  principle  of  the  public  law  of  Europe ;  and  it  is  now 
finishing  the  one  hundred  and  fifth  vear  of  this  status.  When 
an  institution,  in  conflict  with  a  scholastic  theory,  maintains 
itself  for  oxer  a  century,  it  is  high  time  that  the  theory  be 
submitted  to  a  close  analysis  to  determine  where  its  de- 
fect lies. 

The  history  of  human  thcjught  throughout  the  ages  could 
be  covered,  for  the  most  part,  by  telling  the  story  of  man- 
kind's struggle  to  locate  something  absolute.  The  Deity, 
the  Empire,  the  Church,  the  Bible,  the  King,  and.  final)}-, 
the  State,  have  each  ser^■ed  their  turn  in  this  capacity ;  and 
each  has  still,  e\en  among  the  most  thoughtful,  devout  wor- 
shippers at  its  shrine.  It  is  in  this  tendency  on  the  part  of 
mankind  to  seek  an  "original,  absolute,  unlimited  and  uni- 

1  Kleen,  I,  96. 


98 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


\-ersal  power,"'  that  we  find  the  origin  of  the  theor_\-  o\  an 
indivisible,  inahenable  sovereignty.  Many  students  of  po- 
Htical  science  today  hold  this  view,  and  may  be  called  theor- 
ists or  abolntists.  At  the  other  extreme  is  a  steadily  in- 
creasing g"r(>u[)  of  ])ragmatists,  who  hold  iliat  the  soN'ereign- 
ty  of  the  theorists  is  but  a  myth;  thai  so\-ereignt\'  is  mere- 
1\-  the  power  to  rule;  and  lience  is  capable  of  all  manner  of 
degrees  and  limitations."  The  great  majority  of  scholars, 
however,  are  to  be  found  taking  a  stand  between  the  two  ex- 
tremes. Reluctance  to  break  with  old  s}-stems  and  an  in- 
nate fondness  for  subtle  logic  render  such  hesitant  about  em- 
bracing so  extreme  an  innovation  as  the  pragmatist  theory 
of  sovereignty,  even  while  they  feel  that  the  extreme  stand 
of  the  absolutists  is  no  longer  tenable.  Consequently  the 
utmost  confusion,  of  which  the  citations  already  made  are  a 
fair  example,  arises  whenexer  a  f|uestion  involving  S(^ver- 
eignty  is  under  discussion. 

In  one  of  the  most  famous  passages  in  ilic  whole  realm 
of  jurisprudence.  John  Austin  defined  a  law  as  "a  ccMiimand 
which  obliges  a  person,  or  ])ersons,  and  obliges  generalh'  to 
acts  or  forbearances  of  a  class. "^  According  to  thi§  com- 
ception  the  essence  of  law  is  a  command;  the  essence  of  the 
command  is  the  obligation  en  the  part  of  th.e  one  com- 
manded to  obey;  and  thus  the  entire  lec'al  s\stem  is  made 
to  rest  purely  on  force.  Coordinate  with  liis  conception  of 
law  Austin  regarded  soxereignty  as  absolute.  "If  a  de- 
terminate human  superior"  said  he  "not  in  tlie  habit  of 
obedience  to  a  like  superior  reccix'es  habitual  obedience  from 
the  bulk  of  a  given  society,  that  deternunate  su])eri(M-  is  so- 
vereign in  that  society,  and  the  societ\-  is  a  society  political 

1  Burgess,  J.  W..  PoUtical  ScioH'r  and  ('o)istitutio)i(il  Law.  (2  vols., 
X.  Y..  1890).  I,  3f. 

-'Crane,  R.  T.,  The  State  in  ConstitutioiKil  <iiid  International  Law, 
■Johns  floitkins  Univ.  Studies  in  Hist,  and  Pol.  ScL.  Ser.  25,  No»s. 
6  and   7.   8. 

•  Austin.  J.,  Lrrttires  on  J urisjyrudence ,  (3rd  ed.,  by  R.  Campbell, 
Lrondon,  1869),  I.  98. 


SOVEREIGNTY 


99 


and  independent."^  It  is  in  endeavoring  to  harmonize  this 
theoretical  conception  with  existing  facts  and  conthtions  that 
many  writers  have  been  inchned  to  distort  facts  rather  than 
to  achnit  that  tlie  conception  itself  is  in  error,  while,  as  Pro- 
fessor Dunning  says,  the  fact  that  there  can  exist  limita- 
tions upon  sovereignty  is  "lost  sight  of  .  .  through 
an  irrational  striving  after  mathematical  exactness  in  a  sci- 
ence which  is  not  exact."" 

It  is  obvious  that  under  Austin's  definition  there  is  no 
place  for  international  law  as  such ;  and  he  was  perfectly 
consistent  with  his  legal  theory  when  he  assigned  the  rules 
which  govern  international  affairs  to  a  secondary  position, 
under  the  nomenclature  of  "positive  international  morality." 
But  under  a  more  liberal  definition  of  law  the  position  of 
these  laws  is  clearly  determined  ;  and  their  claim  to  the  legal 
title  is  amply  justified  by  the  fact  that  they  are  accepted  as 
law  by  all  civilized  nations,  and  that  their  provisions  are  en- 
forced as  law  in  the  municipal  courts.  However,  if  Aus- 
tin's conception  of  law  is  to  be  subjected  to  a  revision  in 
favor  of  existing  facts,  his  conception  of  sovereignty  can 
claim  no  exemption  from  a  similar  process.  In  fact,  this 
revision  must  follow  the  moment  that  the  legal  character 
of  international  law  is  recognized.  "As  international  law 
deals  with  actual  conditions,"  says  Professor  J.  B.  Moore, 
"it  recognizes  the  fact  that  there  are  states  not  in  all  respects 
independent  that  maintain  international  relations,  to  a  great- 
er or  less  extent,  according  to  the  degree  of  their  depen- 
dence. Such  states  are  generally  called  semi-sovereign,"'' 
a  term  meaning  part-sovereign,  as  no  one  would  think  the 
use  of  the  prefix  sciiii  recjuires  a  literal  interpretation.* 

Our  problem  has  to  deal  \\itli  the  international  phases  of 
sovereignty    alone :      with    wliat    \Mieaton    calls    "external 

^Ibid.,  227. 

2  Dunning,  W.  A.,  A  History  of  Political  Theories,  Ancie^it  and 
Mediaeval   (N.  Y.,  1916),  250. 

3  Moore,  Digest.  I,  18. 
4Westlake,  I,  21f. 


jOo  THE  XEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

sovereignty."^  Yet  there  are  many  authors  who  have  at- 
tacked the  claims  of  tlic  aljohitists  in  tlie  held  of  internal 
sovereignty  as  well;  and  their  position  has  heen  well  sus- 
tained. Professor  H.  J.  Laski.  of  the  New  School  for  So- 
cial Research,  has  ably  espoused  the  conception  of  a  division 
of  sovereignty,"  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  he  has  interpreted 
certain  movements  of  the  Churches  of  Scotland  and  En- 
gland during  the  last  century,  as  well  as  the  stand  taken 
l)y  the  Catholic  party  in  Germany  against  Bismarck.  As 
early  as  1906  Professor  Giddings  reached  the  conclusion 
that  sovereignty  in  the  absolutist  sense  did  not  exist. 
Said  he,  ''Facts  that  daily  stare  us  in  the  face  awaken  our 
skepticism  about  sovereignty  of  the  Austinian  description. 
Is  there  any  power  in  any  commonwealth,  that  really  does 
compel  the  obedience  of  everybody,  or  even  of  every  par- 
ticular individual  whom  it  sets  out  to  coerce?  Does  anyone 
seriously  believe  that  there  is  such  a  power  ?"^ 

The  same  line  of  reasoning  may  be  applied  to  the  problem 
of  external  sovereignty.  The  international  theorv  of  sover- 
eignty is  that  it  consists  of  a  number  of  rights  and  powers. 
"The  powers  of  sovereigns  are  a  bundle  or  collection  of 
powers,  and  they  may  be  separated  from  one  another," 
said  Sir  Henrv  Maine."  The  whole  field  of  the  foreien 
relations  of  a  state,  in  which  its  external  sovereignty  finds 
its  exercise,  is  circumscribed  by  the  mutual  rights  of  other 
states,  and  l)v  the  terms  of  existing  c(.nvcntions ;  for,  as  Pro- 

iWheaton,  53. 

2  Laski.  H.  J..  Studies  in  the  Problem  of  Sovereignty.  (New 
Haven.   1917). 

•■'Giddings,  F.  H.,  Sovereignty  and  Government.  P.  S.  Q..  XXI, 
(1906),  8. 

••Maine,  Sir  H.,  International  Law,   (London,  1888),  58. 


SOVEREIGNTY  lOi 

fessor  Krehbiel  says,  "A  treaty  is  in  itself  virtually  a  re- 
striction of  untrammeled  sovereignty."^ 

Is  there  anv  state  in  the  familv  of  nations  which  is  free  to 
conduct  all  of  its  foreign  affairs  absolutely  to  suit  its  own 
desires,  untrammeled  by  the  desires  or  rights  of  other  pow- 
ers? To  meet  such  a  situation  the  Theorists  have  resorted 
to  a  curious  fiction  by  which  they  hold  that  a  state  is  still 
fully  sovereign,  although  it  may.  by  an  exercise  of  its  sover- 
eign will,  have  consented  to  certain  restrictions  upon  its 
sovereignty.  In  other  words,  the  absolute  sovereign  power 
is  still  absolutely  sovereign,  because  it  has  willed  to  give 
away  a  part  of  its  sovereignty !  Haiti  and  San  Domingo 
are  sovereign  states,  although  their  governments  are  upheld 
bv  American  marines,  and  their  custom  houses  are  in  the 
hands  of  American  officials,  because  their  governments,  set 
up  at  the  point  of  Yankee  bayonets,  accepted  the  situation 
of  their  own  free  w'ill  and  accord,  by  an  exercise  of  sover- 
eign power !  Such  reasoning  in  Pure  Science  would  be  ad- 
mittedly ridiculous ;  and  it  serves  well  to  illustrate  the  ex- 
tremities to  which  slaves  to  a  theory  of  logic  may  be  driven, 
when  they  attempt  to  account  by  preordained  rules  for  all 
the  phenomena  in  actual  existence. 

Yet  this  is  the  exact  ground  taken  by  no  less  an  authority 
than  Baron  Descamps,  who  argues  that  the  neutralized  state 
may,  by  an  act  of  its  sovereign  will,  surrender  a  part  of  its 
sovereign  rights,  in  exchange  for  certain  favors  or  protec- 
tion, the  transaction  being,  as  Hagerup  expresses  it,  "a  mu- 
tual exchange  of  services."  We  agree  with  the  latter  that 
such  an  argument  can  have  no  legal  weight."  In  an  ex- 
tended attempt  to  differentiate  between  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence, terms  which  international  lawyers  as  a  rule 
have  regarded  as  synonymous,"  Westlake,  one  of  the  Peers 

1  Krehbiel,  E.,  The  Ewropean  Commission  of  the  Danube,  P.  S.  Q., 
XXXIII,   (1918),  48. 
-  Hagerup,   591. 
3  Moore,  I,  18. 


102  '^^^-''  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

anioui^'  tliem.  is  likewise  foniul  on  thin  ice  on  this  point. 
He  a(hnits  tliat  so\-ereig^nty  is  partihle.  ihou^li  independence  is 
not.^  Ihit  even  after  he  lias  gone  tluis  far.  he  is  unable  to 
l)reak  entirely  a\\a\-  from  the  Austinian  conception,  and  we  ' 
find  him  arg-uing-  that,  w  liile  sovereignty  may  be  divided,  no 
])art  of  it  can  be  destroyed,  or  cease  to  exist."  He  fails  to 
explain,  however,  just  what  becomes  of  the  alliance  and 
war-making  junvers  of  the  permanently  neutral  state,  after 
the  creation  of  the  permanent  neutrality.  No  claim  to  them 
could  e\er  be  achanced  by  the  guaranteering  powers.  If 
this  were  the  case,  the  permanently  neutral  state  would  be 
obliged  to  forsake  its  neutrality,  when  re(|uire(l  to  do  so  by 
its  guarantors.  It  could  no  longer  be  styled  "permanently 
neutral."  Are  the  alliance  and  war-malting  pc-wers  still 
held  by  the  neutralized  state,  but  in  abeyance,  capable  of 
being  brought  (.ut  and  burnished  up  whene\er  the  govern- 
ment ot  that  state  shall  c(!nsi(ler  the  time  opportune  for 
such  a  ])rocedure?  Again  the  netitralit\-  could  not  be  con- 
sidered "permanent."  The  truth  of  the  whole  luatter  is 
that  the  right  of  the  neutralized  state  to  make  offensive  alli- 
ances and  to  declare  offensive  war  has  ceased  to  exist.  In 
the  face  of  the  theory  that  sovereignty  is  indivisible,  we  sub- 
mit the  fact  that  it  has  been  divided.  It  is  partible;  and. 
furthermore,  its  parts  are  not  indestructible. 

However  much  this  ()i)inicn  may  conflict  with  the  propo- 
sitions ot  the  the(-rists.  it  has  the  solid  backing  of  history 
and  of  existing  institutions;  and  it  is  with  these  things  that 
the  student  of  international  law  has  to  deal,  rather  than  with 
the  um-ealized  ideals  of  any  ])hilosophical  system.  We 
syni])athi/e  ])erfectly  with  I'radier-Foere  when  he  says, 
"Melajjliysically.  there  ought  not  to  be  half-sovereign  states, 
but  historicallv  there  ha\e  been,  and  there  mav  be  aeain"''* 

1  Westlake,  J.,  ('huptvrs  on  the  Principles  of  International  Laiv, 
(Cambridge,   1894).   87. 

-'  Westlake.  Xotrs.  etc-.  393. 

•■i  Pic'ider-Fodere,  Traitc  de  droit  international  puhlie.  (8  vols.. 
Paris,  1885),  I,  159. 


SOVEREIGNTY  jq^ 

Viscount  Bryce  speaks  of  the  "extreme  artificiality  of  the 
doctrine  that  sovereignty  cannot  be  divided,"^  and  declares 
that  "there  are  several  grades  of  what  mav  he  called  semi- 
sovereignty,  or,  perhaps  more  correctly,  of  imperfect  sover- 
eignty.'"' the  weakness  of  tlie  absolutists"  system  is  that 
they  have  worked  out  hard  and  fast  rules  in  theory,  which 
cannot  be  made  to  cover  the  cases  which  we  find  in  fact. 
They  ignore  institutions  actually  in  existence,  in  order  to 
follow  their  logical  reasonings  to  the  end.  But,  as  W. 
Jethro  Brown  says,  "States  are  the  creation,  not  of  logic, 
but  of  history.  We  find  them  in  every  stage  of  being,  becom- 
ing, and  ceasing  to  be.  Whatever  tests  we  may  apply,  we 
must  always  remember  that  the  first  function  of  a  classifica- 
tion is  to  represent  facts;  that  if  facts  are  infinitely  varying, 
the  classification  must  not  be  inflexible."' 

\\'e  have  noted  the  variation  of  opinion  among  the  author- 
ities as  to  the  effect  of  the  permanent  neutralization  of  a 
state  upon  its  sovereignty,  ranging  from  the  declaration  that 
it  carries  no  restriction  to  the  extreme  opinion  of  Kleen,  that 
it  not  only  restricts  the  sovereignty,  but  curtails  the  inde- 
pendence, therebv  rendering  the  existence  of  the  neutralized 
state  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  international  law. 
\Vq  have  shown  that  permanent  neutrality  is  a  decided  re- 
striction upon  the  sovereignty  of  the  neutralized  state,  as 
that  sovereignty  is  usually  conceived  of.  It  remains  for  us 
to  show  the  fallacy  of  Kleen's  argument ;  and  in  order  to  do 
this  we  are  prepared  to  go  a  step  farther  in  our  criticism  of 
the  theorists'  conception  of  sovereignty. 

Sovereigntv,  as  they  conceive  of  it,  is  capable  of  existence 
only  in  a  \ery  highlv  developed  system  of  states  ;*  and,  as  a 

1  Bryce,  Viscount  J.,  Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence,  (Lon- 
don. 1901),  540. 

-'/bif/.,  547. 

''■  Brown,  W.  Jethro,  The  Austinian  Theory  of  Law.  (London. 
1906),  142. 

*IMd.,   141. 


,04  ^^^  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

matter  of  fact,  has  ne\cr  liad  an  existence  outside  of  the 
minds  of  the  pubhcists  who  have  championed  it/  Laski 
refers  to  it  as  "an  idol  which  the  merest  knowledge  of  his- 
tory would  prove  to  have  feet  n\  clay.""  When  a  state 
enters  an  offensive  or  defensive  alliance  it  renounces  its  so- 
called  sovereign  right  to  make  war  nv  ])eace  at  its  own  un- 
controlled pleasure.  When  twn  or  more  states  hind  them- 
selves to  submit  their  mutual  nnsunderstandings  to  arbitra- 
tion, they  sign  away  their  so-called  so\-ereign  right  to  make 
war.  When  a  group  of  states  guarantee  the  independence 
and  neutrality  of  one  of  their  weak  neighbors,  they  sign 
away  their  so-called  sovereign  right  to  remain  at  peace  un- 
der certain  circumstances.  The  effect  of  these  different  ar- 
rangements upon  the  absolutists"  conception  of  sovereignty 
is  identical.  The  obligation  to  go  to  war  in  certain  events, 
under  an  alliance  that  is  offensive  or  defensive  or  both;  or 
the  guarantee  to  cause  the  neutrality  of  a  state  to  be  re- 
s]")ected.  is  just  as  much  restriction  upon  a  state's  sovereign 
discretion  as  is  an  obligation  not  to  go  to  war.  such  as  a 
permanent  neutral  takes  upon  itself.''  If  sovereignty  is  the 
orig'inal,  absolute,  unlimited,  universal  power  of  a  state  to 
manage  its  own  affairs,  internal  and  external,  as  it  sees  fit. 
then  no  state  is  sovereign.  As  has  recently  been  pointed 
out,"  even  in  internal  affairs  "the  right  of  a  sovereiern  de- 
pends  on  the  consent  of  the  people.  As  thev  grant,  so  they 
can  limit  his  exercise  of  the  sovereign  ])ower."  Thev  thus 
automatically  (li\i(1c  internal  so\ereignt\-  into  parts,  one  of 
which  they  vest  in  an  active  agent,  and  the  ('tlier  thev  hold 
back.  So  external  sovereignt\-.  if  there  is  anv  such  thing. 
is  split  into  many  parts,  to  fit  the  cases  which  develop  in  the 
complex  relations  of  international  life. 

1  Pollock.  Sir  Frederick,  Sovereignty  and  the  League  of  Nations, 
Fort.  Rev..  N.   S.  104.    (Dec.  2.  1918),  814. 

2  Laski.  24. 

•f  Pollock,  817. 

■*  Baldwin.  S.  E..  The  Vesting  of  Sovereignty  in  a  League  of  Na- 
tions. Yale  Law  Journal  XXVIII,   (1919).  217. 


SOVEREIGNTY  j  q  - 

But  why  cling  to  so  purely  metaphysical  a  conceptitjn  of 
sovereignty  at  all?  Why  define  it  otherwise  than  merely 
the  power  to  rule?  If  this  simplified  conception  is  adopted, 
the  most  knotty  problems  are  settled  without  difficulty.  A 
state  is,  then,  no  longer  bound  by  philosophical  theories,  to 
prevent  it  from  taking  action  with  the  best  and  most  pro- 
gressive thought  of  the  age.  It  may  bind  itself  by  interna- 
tional agreements  to  pursue,  or  not  to  pursue,  a  certain 
policy,  without  inquiring  what  has  become  of  its  sover- 
eignty. It  may  enter  into  arrangements  for  the  welfare  of 
the  nations  in  general,  without  coming  in  conflict  with  the 
shadowy,  yet  absolute  and  indivisible  sovereignty  of  cer- 
tain pubhcists,  which,  unfortunately  for  their  doctrine,  it  is 
impossible  to  locate  in  the  government  of  the  United 
States.^  It  is  difficult  to  find  any  real  value  in  a  modern 
doctrine  of  sovereignty,  except  as  it  is  based  on  this  liberal 
conception.  The  term  at  its  best  is  an  abstraction  ;  and  some 
writers  have  advocated  discarding  it  altogether.'  Yet,  ra- 
tionally used,  it  would  serve  a  useful  purpose  in  internation- 
al law  and  jurisprudence,  when  once  w^e  are  rid  of  "the  fetich 
of  sovereignty,  the  exacting,  imposing  something,  which  has 
so  commanded  our  worship  as  to  blind  us  to  the  fact  that  it 
is  a  gilded,  dumb  image. 


"3 


1  Laski,  24. 

2  Brown,  P.  M.,  Rights  of  States  in  International  Laic,  Yale  Law 
Journal,  XXVI,    (1916-1917),  40. 

3  Bliss,  P.,  Of  Sovereignty.    (Boston,  1885),  71. 


CHAPTER  IX 

PERMANENT   NEUTRALITY  AND  INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY 

Many  interesting  questions  liave  arisen  involving  the  ef- 
fect of  permanent  nentrality  upon  the  internal  sovereignty 
of  the  state  subjected  thereto.  Since  internal  sovereignty 
involves  primarily  the  internal  ]iolicy  of  the  state,  and  hence 
cannot  be  restricted  by  any  outside  pcnver.  excej)!  at  a  sacri- 
fice of  independence,  there  is  much  greater  unanimity  of 
opinion  among  the  authorities  than  we  found  to  exist  on  the 
(juestion  of  external  sovereignty.  That  the  permanently 
neutral  state  may  manage  its  internal  affairs  absolutely  as 
it  sees  fit,  subject  only  to  the  general  rules  of  international 
law,  is  an  accepted  rule.  It  is  obxious  that  every  specific 
(|uestion  of  this  kind  should,  in  the  last  analysis,  l)e  settled 
upon  its  merits,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Con\ention  b\- 
which  that  particular  neutrality  was  created,  and  after  a 
careful  consideration  of  the  circumstances  surroundino-  the 
case  in  question.^  In  cases  where  the  Convention  is  silent, 
or  expresses  itself  vaguely,  it  is  wise  to  apply  the  general 
principle  /;/  diihio  pro  Ubcrtatcr  and  consider  the  neiUrality 
as  carrying  the  lightest  possible  restrictions. 

One  of  the  most  vital  f|uestions  of  this  class  has  to  deal 
with  the  ])rivilege  of  the  neutralized  state  to  manage  its  own 
military  affairs,  in  the  exercise  of  its  right  of  self-defense. 
A  general  ])riiiciple  of  neutrality  enjoins  upon  all  neutral 
states  in  time  of  war  the  obligation  to  enforce  their  neutral- 
ity. Resort  may  aiid  should  be  had  to  diplomatic  measures 
first;  but  if  these  fail  to  bring  about  the  desired  result,  ec(Mi- 
omic  war.  or  even   military  measures  should    follow.      No 

1  Nys.  E.,  liotes.  etc..  R.  D.  I..  XXIII,  (1901),  20. 
-  Rivier.   II.  393;    Hagerup,  589. 

106 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY  jq- 

neutral  state  has  a  right  to  sit  idly  by,  and  see  its  territory 
used  as  a  base  of  operations  l)y  one  belligerent,  or  group  of 
belligerents,  against  another.  The  question  is  not  one  of 
privilege;  it  involves  a  matter  of  legal  duty/  Permanent 
neutrals  are  under  the  same  obligation  in  this  respect  as  are 
simple  neutrals.  They  are  bound  to  use  due  diligence  that 
their  privilege  of  iteutrality  be  not  abused.  This  involves 
not  merely  definite  action  when  a  crisis  arises,  but  constant 
alertness  against  the  possibility  of  neglecting  anv  practical 
precautions. 

The  neutralized  state  has,  however,  one  recourse  to  which 
the  simple  neutral  can  lay  no  claim, — that  of  appeal  to  the 
guarantors  of  the  neutrality.  The  appeal  should  be  made 
upon  the  first  obvious  threat  against  the  neutralitv.  inas- 
much as  the  slightest  delay  may  be  verv  costlv.  But  not 
too  much  reliance  may  be  put  on  their  assistance.  We  de- 
vote a  later  chapter  to  the  various  interpretations  which  have 
l)een  put  upon  the  guarantees  of  neutrality."  It  is  sufficient 
for  the  present  to  say  that  it  is  highly  improbable  that  any 
of  the  guarantors  will  be  anxious  to  go  to  w-ar  for  the  sake 
of  the  neutralized  state  alone.  Too  often  the  guarantors 
are  themselves  the  violators ;  and.  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there 
has  never  been  any  immediate  danger  of  the  violation  of 
permanently  neutral  territory  by  any  power  other  than  one 
of  its  guarantors.^ 

However,  no  outside  power  may  dictate  to  a  permanently 
neutral  state  what  steps  shall  be  taken  in  order  to  render  this 
precaution  effective.  Some  nations,  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  in  particular,  have  never  felt  called  upon  to  re- 
sort to  universal  military  training  in  order  to  be  prepared 
to  defend  their  neutrality,  or  even  to  plav  the  role  of  prin- 
cipal in  time  of  war.     On  the  other  hand,  the  majority  of 

1  See  the  discussion   on   Neutrality,   with   citations   in  Moore.  Di- 
gest. VII,  860ff. 

-  V.  infra.  151  et  seq. 
"■  Bonfils,  213. 


,q8  the  yEUTRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

the  Continental  Powers  have  felt  that  not  merely  their  neu- 
trality, lull  llieir  life  itself,  depends  upon  some  form  of  that 
system.  The  fact  that  the  Swiss  have  ever  been  famous  for 
their  fighting-  qualities,  and  are  successful  in  the  mamte- 
nance  nf  a  system  of  unixcrsal  military  training  need  not  im- 
ply that  every  neutralized  state  would  be  expected  to  follow 
this  course.  "The  engagement  to  remain  permanently  at 
peace  does  not  invoh-e  the  international  obligation  to  be  al- 
wavs  under  arms."'  The  entire  fjuestion  of  the  method  and 
amount  of  defense  is  for  each  individual  state  to  decide  for 
itself. 

Switzerland  has  always  regarded  her  right  to  maintain 
a  trained  arnu'  as  one  of  the  vital  safeguards  of  her  exis- 
tence. The  Swiss  ])lan  of  military  service  is  favorably 
known  throughout  the  world.  The  experience  through 
which  the  Swiss  passed  during  the  Hundred  Days  was  not 
of  a  nature  to  inspire  confidence  in  the  sinceritv  of  the  Pow- 
ers! and  the  Swiss  people,  rendered  prudent  by  the  events 
of  that  period,  have  provided  against  any  eventuality  of  war 
by  maintaining  a  large  part  of  their  male  population  highly 
trained  and  su1)ject  to  call  for  service  at  a  moment's  notice. 
As  Kleen  says,  "The  military  expenses  which  they  support, 
as  permanent  as  the  neutrality  which  has  l)een  promised  to 
them,  could  scarcely  have  been  more  heavy,  even  if  that 
status  had  never  existed."'  Thus  the  "moral  barrier."  of 
which  Bonfils  speaks,^  is  in  reality,  in  the  case  of  Switzer- 
land more  than  moral ;  it  is  an  actual  barrier,  the  combination 
of  particularly  advantageous  defensive  territory  and  a  par- 
ticularly well-trained  local  population. 

Switzerland  has  constantly  been  on  the  alert  to  enforce 
her  neutrality  to  the  letter,  whenever  war  has  threatened  her 
borders.     During  the  Hundred  Days  the  Swiss  government 

1  Descamps,  Ed.,  400. 

2  Kleen,   I.   90. 

3  Bonfils,  213. 


INTERNAL  SOYEREIGNTY  jqq 

informed  the  Allied  Powers  that  it  was  prepared  to  protect 
its  neutrality;  and,  although  this  position  was  compromised 
for  the  time  being  by  Switzerland's  adherence  to  the  Last 
Coalition,  this  step  was  later  bemoaned  by  her  statesmen  as 
an  act  of  unjustifiable  weakness.  In  1821  General  Jomini 
wrote,  "The  question  of  Swiss  neutrality  is  that  of  its  very 
existence.  It  is  necessary  that  Switzerland  have  not  only 
the  will  1)ut  also  the  ability  to  defend  it."^  With  the  out- 
break of  each  successive  war  near  her  borders,  Switzerland 
has  issued  a  formal  declaration  of  her  determination  to  re- 
main neutral,  and  to  cause  their  neutrality  to  be  respected 
bv  use,  if  necessary,  of  the  entire  military  forces  at  its  dis- 
posal. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  there  was 
much  apprehension  that  the  French  would  endeavor  to  in- 
vade Southern  Germany  through  Switzerland,  thereby  turn- 
ing the  flank  of  the  Prussian  line  of  fortresses  along  the 
Rhine."  On  July  16,  1870.  the  Federal  Council  addressed 
to  the  powers  identical  notes  declaring  the  neutrality  of 
Switzerland  in  the  impending  struggle ;  and  the  same  day 
ordered  a  levy  of  40,000  men  to  garrison  the  frontiers  of 
Schaffhausen,  through  which  runs  the  natural  passage  be- 
tween the  belligerent  territories.  The  following  day  the 
French  government  replied  with  a  promise  to  respect  the 
neutrality;  and  on  the  21st  of  the  month  a  telegram  to  the 
same  effect  was  received  from  Bismarck.  The  efficiency  of 
the  Swiss  military  system  was  shown  by  the  fact  that,  with- 
in forty-eight  hours  from  the  time  the  call  for  troops  was 
issued,  the.  40,000  had  gathered  from  all  parts  of  Switzer- 

1  Pictet,  E.,  410. 

-The  advantag-e  of  this  plan  from  a  miliitary  point  of  view  has 
since  betn  carefully  worked  out  by  a  British  s'trategist  in  an  un- 
signed article  entitled  Stviss  Neutrality,  Fort.  Rev.,  N.  S.  46, 
(1899),  20f. 


► 


J  iQ  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

land,   and   were  in   (iccnpalinii  of  the   xarions   pisitinns   as- 
signed tliem/ 

The  Swiss  army  has  also  played  an  important  part  on 
other  occasions  of  threatened  ai^mressidns.  One  of  the  most 
notahle  of  these  was  the  Xeuchatel  Affair  (it  iS^h.  The 
canton  which  bears  this  name  is  situated  on  the  northern  l)<>r- 
der  of  Switzerland,  at  the  source  of  the  Rhine  river;  and 
was.  during  the  Middle  Ages,  under  the  sovereignty  of  a 
branch  of  the  Bourbon  family.  It  later  allied  itself  with 
the  Swiss  canton  of  Ilerne.  and.  in  1815.  was  included  as  a 
new  canton  of  the  Sw'iss  Confederation.  Previously,  how- 
ever, the  Bourbon  line  of  rulers  had  died  out.  and  the  throne 
had  fallen  to  a  branch  n\  the  Hohenzollerns.  The  nominal 
claims  of  the  latter  were  recognized  even  though  the  terri- 
tory was  a  part  of  the  Confederation,  in  1856  a  revolution 
broke  out  in  the  canton,  as  a  result  of  which  the  local  con- 
stitution was  changed  to  a  reiniblican  form,  and  the  Prus- 
sian overlordship  was  disavowed.  The  King  of  Prussia 
threatened  to  uphold  the  claims  of  his  House  by  force.  -\s 
a  reply  to  this  threat  Swiss  troops  were  sent  to  occupy  the 
territory  and  to  guard  the  Rhine  frontier.  A  Conference 
of  the  Powers  took  the  matter  in  charge  before  any  blood 
was  shed,  and  eventually  the  Prussian  King  renounced  for- 
ever  for  his  family  their  sovereign  rights  in  Xeuchatel." 

So  jealous  has  the  Swiss  government  been  of  its  right  to 
manage  its  own  military  aft'airs  that,  in  i()C().  it  refused  to 
sign  the  Plague  Con\ention  relating  to  the  Laws  of  War  on 
Land,  holding  that  the  terms  of  the  Convention  would  inter- 
fere with  the  Ici'Cc  01  masse,  on  which  the  Swiss  dcjiend 
largel\'  for  self-defense.'  While  this  interpretation  is  hard- 
ly justifiable,  it  shows  the  determination  of  Switzerland  to 
maintain  its  strict  neutralit\-  and  to  a\oid  any  alliances 
which  would  cripple  its  power  to  defend  it.      Indeed,  its  en- 

1  Bury.  S.,  6.39;   Hertfilet.  III.  187Sf. 
-■  Hertfilet.  II,  1317. 

3  Renault.  L..  Im  Convention  dr  la  Hayc  siir  la  gverrc  et  I'attitude 
fir  la  Suisse,  R.  D.  I.  P..  VIII,   (1901),  6. 


INTERNAL  SOYEREIGNTY  1  I  [ 

tire  conduct  since  1815  has  Ijcen  so  conformable  to  the 
regime  of  permanent  neutrality  that  it  would  be  difficult  to 
conceive  of  a  more  thorough  fulfillment  of  that  part. 

When,  in  1815,  Belgium.  Holland  and  Luxemburg  were 
united  under  the  crown  of  the  House  of  Orange,  the  Four 
Allied  Powers  had  in  mind  a  single  purpose,  to  furnish  a 
check  to  the  expansion  of  France.  Feeling  that  this  purpose 
could  best  be  accomplished  by  putting  the  new  state  in  a 
first-class  position  of  defense,  they  agreed  that  the  sums  col- 
lected from  the  French  in  the  form  of  penalties  should  he 
used  to  fortify  the  Netherlands,  the  Rhine  Valley  and  Sa- 
voy; and  by  the  Protocol  of  a  Conference  of  November  21, 
181 5,  it  was  agreed  that  "the  British  government  should, 
conjointly  with  that  of  the  Netherlands,  determine  upon  the 
special  employment  of  the  sums  destined  for  fortifying  the 
latter  country."'  At  the  Conference  of  Aix-la-chapelle,  three 
years  later,  a  military  Protocol  was  signed  between  the  Four 
Powers  and  the  Netherlands,  by  which  a  certain  number  of 
fortresses  in  the  N^thrrtmids  were  to  be  garrisoned  by  Fn- 
glish  and  Prussian  tronps^,-and  the  King  of  the  Netherlands 
was  to  receive  60,000,000  francs  for  the  construction  and 
repair  of  the  fortresses. 

Affairs  continued  under  this  regime  until,  in  183 1.  the 
permanent  separation  of  Holland  and  Belgium  was  accepted 
by  the  Powers.  France  joined  heartily  in  the  acts  of  the 
Conference  of  London,  and,  as  a  result  of  her  cooperation, 
the  Four  Powers  laid  aside  their  suspicions,  and  on  April 
17  joined  in  a  declaration  to  the  effect  that  since  the  perma- 
nent neutrality  of  Belgium  should  give  it  security  certain  of 
its  forts  might  be  demolished.'  Provision  was  made  for 
the  continued  maintenance  of  others,  by  a  new  Convention 

1  Hertslet,  I.  412f. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  856. 


J,  2  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

of  the  Fortresses,  signed  on  the  14th  of  the  following  De- 
cember.^ 

It  seems  that  a  secret  article  of  this  same  Convention 
stipulated  that  the  King  of  the  Belgians  should  occupy  the 
same  position  toward  the  Four  Powers  as  had  previously 
the  King  of  the  Netherlands,  except  for  the  obligations  aris- 
ing from  Belgium's  status  as  a  permanent  neutral;  and,  as 
a  result,  il  was  his  duty  to  concert  with  them  on  measures 
regarding  the  preservation  of  the  forts.'  But  the  Secret 
Article  was  never  ratified  by  the  Belgian  Parliament,  a  step 
indispensable  for  giving  it  legal  standing,  according  to  Ar- 
ticle LXVIII  of  the  Constitution;  and  Avhen  France  raised 
serious  objections  to  the  terms  of  the  Convention,  the  pleni- 
potentiaries of  the  Four  Powers  declared,  the  23r(l  of  Janu- 
ary, 1832,  that  the  stipulations  of  the  14th  of  December 
should  be  understood  only  under  the  reservation  of  the  full 
and  complete  sovereignty  of  the  King  of  the  Belgians  over 
the  forts. ^  Since  the  entire  Convention  of  the  Fortresses 
had  been  a  virtual  restriction  upon  the  sovereignty  of  Bel- 
gium, this  proclamation  on  January  23rd  was  regarded  by 
Belgian  i)ublicists  as  annulling  the  former,  and,  hence,  as  re- 
moving all  such  restrictions.*  At  any  rate,  the  Belgian  gov- 
ernment, with  the  tacit  consent  of  the  powers,  destroyed  the 
very  forts  which  were  chosen  for  preservation,  while  those 
ordered  demolished  have  been  maintained. 

In  the  light  of  these  facts  we  agree  with  Piccioni  that 
there  is  at  the  present  time  no  military  servitude  on  Belgium. 
For  all  practical  purposes  the  military  freedom  of  Belgium 
and  Switzerand  from  outside  control  is  identical.  But  as 
a  practical  ])rol)lem  the  matter  of  self-defense,  is  for  Bel- 
gium, far  from  simple.     The  territorial  configuration  is  not 

1  IhifL,  881. 
-"  Woeste,  7Sf. 
^Ibid.,  80. 

■»  See  in  addition  to  the  work  above  cited,  Banning,  La  defense  de 
la  Belgique.  and  Picoioni,  48. 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY 


113 


of  a  nature  to  make  military  defense  easy.  There  are  no 
natural  defensive  boundaries.  The  frontiers  are  the  work 
of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  and  the  Conference  of  London, 
and  are  higlily  artificial.  To  increase  the  difficulty  of  the 
task  of  erecting  sufficient  fortifications  for  the  protection  of 
the  country,  the  strongholds  on  the  east,  Maestricht  and  Lux- 
embure  have  been  neutralized  and  the  forts  demolished. 
After  a  careful  consideration  of  the  problem  of  self-defense 
Baron  Descamps  declares,  "We  are  compelled  to  remark 
that  the  line  traced  by  politics  has  weakened  the  natural 
strategic  line  of  defense  of  the  country  at  the  three  ex- 
tremities of  the  triangle  of  which  it  is  composed."^  The 
Belgian  military  problem  is,  however,  from  the  nature  of 
its  legal  position  in  the  international  world,  purely  defensive, 
and  has  but  the  single  aim  of  safeguarding  the  independence 
and  permanent  neutrality  of  the  state. 

The  decision  as  to  the  appropriate  means  of  defense  has 
ever  been  considered,  both  by  the  Belgians  and  by  their 
neighbors,  as  purely  a  national  matter.  As  early  as  1859 
it  had  been  shown  that  the  forts  then  in  existence  were  ut- 
terly inadequate  to  provide  for  the  self-defense  of  the  coun- 
try, and  Belgium  set  about  to  create  a  new  series  of  de- 
fenses.' But  these  too  were  eventually  found  to  be  insuf- 
ficient to  repel  the  attack  of  modern  artillery,  and  were 
rebuilt. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  when  the  Belgian  government 
set  about  the  reconstruction  of  these  forts  there  were  ob- 
jections both  in  Germany  and  b^rance,  not  on  the  ground 
that  Belgium  was  exceeding  its  rights  in  rebuilding,  but 
rather  that  the  rebuilding  and  fortifying  would  result  to  a 
disadvantage  to  these  powers.^  It  was  set  forth  by  Gen- 
eral Brialmont,  the  Belgian  strategist  to  whom  was  in- 
trusted the  task  of  providing  the  defense,  that  with  these 

1  Descamps,  Ed.,  405. 

2  Woeste.  68. 

3  7&k/.,  70. 


jl  ,  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

places  strongly  garrisoned  and  a  free  army  of  70,000  in  the 
field,  the  opposition  which  an  invader  would  encounter  would 
be  sufficient  to  deter  him  from  trespassing  on  Belgian  soil.' 
His  proposal  that  the  Belgian  army  should  he  kept  of  suf- 
ficient strength  to  hold  the  balance  of  power  between  its  two 
powerful  neighbors  was  popular  in  Belgium  during  the  8o's 
and  early  90' s ;  but  tlie  rapid  increase  in  German  military 
strength,  without  a  corresponding  development  in  iM-ance. 
led  General  Brassine,  the  Minister  of  War  in  1894,  to  ad- 
vocate its  abandonment,  and  the  system  of  defense  was 
placed  upon  the  firmer  ground  of  an  international  obliga- 
tion to  do  all  in  the  state's  power  to  repel  any  encroachment 
upon  its  territory  from  hostile  forces. 

When  the  Franco-Prussian  War  broke  out  there  was  no 
hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  Belgian  government  as  to  the 
proper  course  to  be  pursued.  The  Chambers  w^re  not  in 
session  at  the  moment,  but  the  government,  on  its  own  re- 
sponsibility, took  measures  t(~»  insure  strict  neutral  it  v.  in 
these  efforts  it  was  loyally  supported  liy  Great  Britain.  In 
a  speech  to  which  Englishmen  have  since  had  occasion  to 
])oint  with  pride.  Lord  John  Russell  declared,  on  August 
2,  1870,  hefore  the  House  of  Lords,  "Our  obligations  as 
to  elgium  are  most  sacred.  We  have  accepted  these  obliga- 
tions individually,  as  well  as  conjointly  with  the  other 
powers.  We  have  not  here  to  choose  between  manv  roads. 
We  have  to  follow  a  single  path  and  this  path  is  that  of 
honor.  We  are  bound  to  defend  l>elgium.""  Accordingly 
identical  treaties  were  negotiated  between  Great  Britain 
and  tlie  warring  powers,  hy  wliicli  each  of  the  latter 
bound  itself  anew  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
as  long  as  it  was  respected  by  the  other.  Great  Bri- 
tain at  the  same  time  declaring  her  intention  to  join  in  the 
hcstilities  on  the  side  of  the  defense,  should  either  party  fail 

'  Descampe,  Ed.,  414f. 

2  Chro7ii(jue  du  droit  international,  R.  D.  /.,  II,  (1870),  698. 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY  jiq 

to  respect  its  obligations  toward  Belg-ium/  Shortly  after- 
ward the  Belgian  Chambers  passed  legislation  prohibiting 
the  export  or  transit  of  arms  of  any  kind,  munitions  of  war, 
military  equipment,  horses,  hay,  grain,  boats,  or  any  sup- 
plies that  might  be  of  use  to  the  armies  of  the  belligerents." 
Later  the  passage  over  Belgian  territory  of  sick  or  wounded 
soldiers  from  either  the  French  or  the  German  armies  was 
forbidden.^  Eventually,  however,  a  considerable  number 
of  soldiers  of  both  parties  were  interned  on  Belgian  soil. 

When,  in  1867,  Luxemburg  was  made  permanently  neu- 
tral, an  international  servitude  was  placed  upon  it,  for  the 
fortress  was  dismantled  upon  the  pretext  that  the  establish- 
ment of  permanent  neutrality  rendered  defenses  unneces- 
sary.^ It  was,  however,  expressly  asserted  by  the  Belgian 
plenipotentiar}'  at  the  Conference,  that  this  statement  should 
not  be  construed  to  impl)^  any  restrictions  upon  the  rights 
of  other  permanent  neutrals,  with  regard  to  their  forts  and 
other  means  of  defense ;  and  this  assertion  received  the 
unanimous  support  of  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  powers.^ 
Not  only  was  the  fortress  of  Luxemburg  demolished,  but 
it  was  expressly  stipulated  that  it  should  never  be  rebuilt ; 
while  the  standing  army  which  the  Grand  Duke  was  per- 
mitted to  maintain  was  limited  to  the  number  necessary  for 
police  duties.  A  tacit  agreement  established  the  number  at 
300.  Thus  the  servitude  is  not  of  a  temporary  nature,  such 
as  the  mere  reduction  of  the  fortress  would  ha\'e  been ;  but 
it  is  a  permanent  restriction  on  the  internal  sovereignty  of 
the  state. 

In  such  circumstances  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  state 
is  absolutely  relieved  from  the  duty  of  enforcing  its  neutral- 
ity.    Indeed,  this  can  but  follow  from  the  establishment  of 

iHertQiet,  III,  1886ff;    1889ff. 

2  Chronique.  704. 

•■'  Ibid..  708f. 

4  Hertslet,  III,  1803. 

■"'Nys,  Notes,  R.  D.  I  .,(1901),  26. 


J  if)  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

SO  "radical"  a  neutralit)-.  Luxemburg  is  reliexed  of  the 
duty  to  make  any  attempt  to  cause  its  neutrality  tc^  be  re- 
spected by  force  of  arms.  It  is  freed,  in  time  of  war.  from 
those  perilous  duties  which  devolve  on  Switzerland  and  Bel- 
gium; and,  in  time  of  peace,  from  the  heavy  military  ex- 
penses which  those  states  bear.  It  is  bound  to  rely  solely 
on  its  right  of  appeal  to  its  guarantors  for  protection. 

The  course  pursued  by  Luxemburg  during  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War  was  fraught  with  danger  from  both  sides. 
Its  railroads  were  freely  used  by  the  Prussians  to  transport 
wounded  soldiers.^  On  December  30,  1870,  Bismarck  sent 
a  note  to  the  Grand-Ducal  government  in  which  he  accused 
Luxemburg  of  failing  to  cause  its  neutrality  to  be  respected, 
and  declared  that  it  would  no  longer  be  respected  by  Prus- 
sia." In  fact,  there  had  been  no  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
Duchy  to  intern  the  French  soldiers  who  had  taken  refuge 
there;  and  the  latter  had  been  allowed  to  pass  freely  back- 
to  their  own  country.  Servais,  who  was  at  the  time  the 
Minister  of  State  of  Luxemburg,  replied  to  Bismarck's 
note  by  referring  to  the  fact  that  the  treaty  of  1867  had  re- 
duced the  forces  of  the  CIrand  Duchy  to  a  minimum,  and 
had  freed  that  country  from  all  obligations  resting  on  force.^ 
In  this  interpretation  he  was  supported  by  Great  Britain  and 
Austria,  and  Bismarck  let  the  matter  drop.  This  was  the 
general  attitude  taken  again  by  Luxemburg  when,  in  1914. 
its  territory  was  unceremoniously  invaded  bv  the  German 
troops  on  the  way  to  h^rance.  Having  no  military  forces 
on  which  to  depend,  the  government  of  Luxemburg  had  to 
content  itself  with  issuing  vigorous  protests  against  the  vio- 
lation of  its  neutrality. 

Closely  affiliated  with  the  right  of  a  permanent  neutral  to 
provide  for  its  own  defense  is  the  question  whether  its  neigh- 
bors may  build  fortifications  within  their  own  territorv  along 

1  Eyschen.  R.  D.  /■.   (1899).  39. 

2  Hertslet.  Ill,  1901f. 

3  Servais,  175. 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY  Uy 

the  neutralized  border.  It  is  difficult  to  formulate  a  legal 
right  on  the  neutral's  part  to  protest  such  acts.  If  this 
privilege  were  denied  the  neighboring  powers  it  would 
amount  to  a  greater  restriction  on  their  internal  sovereignty 
than,  it  is  generally  conceded,  rests  on  the  neutralized  state 
itself.  Furthermore  the  neighboring  power  could  lay  claim 
to  a  purely  defensive  character  for  these  works,  inasmuch 
as  they  do  not  necessarily  carry  a  menace  to  the  neutralitv 
of  the  state  in  question.^  The  fact  that  this  right  has  been 
denied  in  specific  instances  implies  its  existence  in  normal 
circumstances.  In  1815  the  Austrians  were  forbidden  to 
fortify  Podgorce.  near  the  border  of  the  Repuljlic  of  Cra- 
cow." Article  III  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  of  November  20. 
of  the  same  year,  forbade  the  erection  of  forts  at  Hiiningen, 
or  at  any  other  point  within  three  leagues  of  Basle.''  In 
1862  France  and  Switzerland  by  convention  mutually  agreed 
not  to  fortify  the  Valley  of  Dappes.*  On  the  other  hand. 
Article  XC  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Congress  of  \"ienna  se- 
cured to  the  King  of  Sardinia  full  freedom  to  build  defenses 
along  the  Swiss  frontier  of  Savoy-'^  But  this  fact  only 
strengthens  our  contention.  Under  normal  circumstances 
this  right  would  have  belonged  to  Sardinia  without  ques- 
tion, but,  since  the  territories  on  this  frontier  had  been  de- 
clared to  share  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland,"  confusion  as 
to  the  right  might  have  arisen. 

Question  as  to  the  effect  of  permanent  neutrality  on  the\ 
internal  sovereignty  of  a  neutralized  state  may  arise  in  easel 
of  a  constitutional  change.  When  the  powers,  at  ViennaJ 
recognized  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland,  they  required  that 
the  Federal  Diet  should  adopt  a  constitution  whicli  would 
insure  domestic  tranquillity.  A  constitution  was  according- 
ly produced,  and  received  their  sanction.  Switzerland, 
under  this-constitution.  was  a  loose  Confederation  of  twen- 
ty-two cantons,   each  of  which  was  a  miniature  republic, 

1  Despagnet,   183.  *  Ibid..  II,  15266. 

2Hert6let,  I,  219.  ^  Ibid..  I,  261. 

3  Ibid..  246.  efj)iu.,  262. 


IlS  THE  XEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

o\-er  which  the  Federal  Diet  liad  only  a  very  limited  control. 
For  a  generation  a  centralizing"  spirit  grew  among  the  Swiss 
people,  and,  in  1H47,  what  is  known  as  the  Sonderhund  War 
broke  out.  Seven  conservative  cantcms  stood  for  the  consti- 
tuti(Mi  of  1815.  the  Confederation,  and  the  old  regime;  fif- 
teen were  in  fa\-or  of  a  revised  constitution,  and  a  strongly 
centralized  guxernnient.  The  war  lasted  for  fi\'e  weeks, 
at  the  end  of  which  time  the  (Centralist  party  was  trium- 
phant. At  the  outbreak  of  iK.stilities  the  Conservative  gov- 
ernments of  Europe  proposed  interference  on  the  ground 
that  the  go\ernmenl  of  Switzerland  under  the  constitution 
of  181 5  was  guaranteed  by  the  J-'inal  Act  of  the  Congress 
of  Vienna.  Guizot,  the  French  Foreign  Minister  of  Louis 
Philippe,  proposed  a  collective  intervention,  in  order  to  en- 
force respect  for  cantonal  sovereignty.^  His  proposal  met 
with  favor  in  Austria  and  Prussia,  but  the  British  govern- 
ment refused  to  sanction  it.  The  (le\"elopment  of  a  strong" 
liberal  party  in  France  prevented  any  definite  action  on  her 
])art,  and  so  interference  was  delayed  until  the  Federal 
authorities  had  put  down  the  internal  opposition  bv  force. 
The  re\-olutions  of  the  following  year  drew  the  attention  of 
Jun\)pe  from  Swiss  affairs,  and  the  statesmen  of  that  coun- 
try seized  the  opportunity  to  modify  to  a  considerable  extent 
their  constitution.  By  the  new  document  the  ]X)licy  of 
permanent  neutrality  in  .S\\  itzerland  was  elevated  to  a  max- 
im of  State.-  In  1S74  the  constitution  was  again  revised, 
and  we  may  ciuu-hide  that  it  is  a  generally  accepted  principle 
ol  the  public  law  (,f  luu'ciJe  that  a  permanentlv  neutral  state 
may  change  its  constitution  at  ])leasure,  provided  that 
nothing  sliall  be  omitted  or  inserted  which  might  be  con- 
strued to  alter  its  international  status.^ 

The  right  of  Belgiuin  to  cjiange  its  constitution  is  equallv 

1  Guizot,  M.,  Memoircs  pour  srrvir  a  I'liistoirc  de  mon  temps.  (8 
vols.,  Paris  and  Leipsic.  1864),  VIII. 

-Y.  tlie  Federal  Constitution  of  1848,  Articles  LXXIV,  section  6, 
and  LXXXV,  section  9;  that  of  1874,  Article  LXXV,  sections  6  and  12. 


INTERNAL  SOYEREIG^'TY  119 

incontestable.  Article  L\  of  the  Treaty  of  the  XVIII 
Articles  expressly  declared  that  the  powers  had  no  desire 
to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Belg-ium  ;*  and,  although 
this  clause  is  not  found  in  the  final  treaty,  it  is  understood 
as  a  corollary  of  the  independence  of  the  state,  which  that 
treaty  expressly  guarantees.  It  is  true  that  the  powders  at 
the  Conference  of  London  decided  for  a  monarchical  form  of 
government,  and  even  made  a  deliberate  choice  of  a  King 
in  the  person  of  Prince  Leopold,  but  this  was  with  the  sole 
purpose  of  checking  anv  ideas  which  might  be  left  in  West- 
ern Europe  as  a  heritage  of  the  French  Revolution,  at  the 
same  time  making  it  impossible  for  a  French  Prince  to  oc- 
cupy the  throne;  and  should  not  be  construed  as  implying 
that  a  monarchical  form  of  government  is  enforced  upon 
Belgium  by  the  terms  of  her  neutralization.  As  to  the  hy- 
pothetical Cjuestion  whether  or  not  Belgium  would  have  the 
right  to  change  its  government  from  a  monarchy  to  a  re- 
public without  the  consent  of  the  guaranteeing  powers,  even 
so  thorough  a  patriot  as  Baron  Descamps  is  unwilling  to 
commit  himself.  He  declares  that  while  the  powers  for- 
mally denied  any  desire  to  interfere  with  the  internal  affairs 
of  Belgium,  still,  on  so  serious  a  matter  as  such  a  change 
would  lie,  it  would  be  well  to  remember  that  Belgium's 
position  is  not  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  other  countries." 
There  have,  however,  been  several  revisions  of  the  Belgian 
constitution,  the  last  of  which,  in  1893,  "^^'^s  particularly 
thorough ;  yet  there  has  never  been  any  interference  on  the 
part  of  the  guarantors.^ 

The  question  of  constitutional  revision  has  played  no  part 
in  the  affairs  of  Luxemburg  since  1867.  •  There  have  been, 
on  the  other  hand,  dynastic  changes  of  an  interesting-  char- 
acter.    Article  I  of  the  Treaty  of  1867  maintained  for  Lux- 

1  Nys,  Notes.  31;  Piccioni,  77;  Descamps,  Em.,  209. 
-  Descamps,  Ed.,  452. 
3  7&irf.,  449. 


J  20  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

emburg-  the  Salic  law.^  Tliis  was  in  accordance  with  a  Nas- 
sau Family  Compact,  dating  from  1783,  and  sanctioned  by 
the  Treaty  of  \"ienna.  1815.^  The  importance  of  the  re- 
statement of  the  law  in  1867  lay  in  the  fact  that  Prussia  was 
laying-  claim  to  the  heirship  of  every  plot  of  earth  in  Ger- 
many, the  direct  line  of  rulers  of  which  had  become  extinct. 
As  Luxemburg  had  been  a  part  of  the  Germanic  Confedera- 
tion, there  was  apprehension  that  it  too  might  be  absorbed."' 
Consequcnlly.  when  William,  King  of  Holland  and  Grand 
Diike  of  Luxemburg,  died  in  1890,  there  were  sonic  misgi\- 
ings  as  to  the  future  of  the  Grand-Ducal  throne.  Llolland 
went  without  question  to  his  daughter  W'ilhelmina.  Lux- 
emburg passed  to  Adolph  of  Nassau,  the  agnate  heir,  and 
thus  the  personal  union  of  Holland  and  Luxemburg  was 
brought  to  a  close.  L'pon  default  of  a  male  heir,  in  1912, 
the  title  passed  to  the  Grand-Duchess  Marie  Adelaide. 

The  Constitutional  changes  of  the  Congo  Free  State  have 
been  so  many,  and  of  so  complex  a  character  that  we  shall 
defer  the  study  of  them  to  a  later  chapter. 

What  is  the  duty  of  permanently  neutral  states  with  re- 
gard to  the  internment  of  military  refugees?  Here  the  rules 
of  simple  neutrality  prevail.  It  goes  without  saying  that 
the  neutral  state  must  grant  impartial  treatment  to  refugees 
from  both  parties  in  the  war.  The  aid  or  shelter  must  not 
be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  augment  the  forces  of  either.''  It 
usually  consists  in  imposing  a  residence  at  a  certain  ])lacc 
within  the  neutralized  territory.  Ernest  Nys  finds  the  origin 
of  this  custom  in  the  Polish  revolution  of  183 1,  wlicn  1^-us- 
sia  interned  two  corps  of  the  Polish  army  which  had  crossed 
the  border  to  escape  from  the  Russians. '^     The  example  was 

1  Hertslet,  III,   1803. 
2/birf.,  I,  253. 
^  Servaiis,  156. 
••Bonfils,  706. 
•'■•  Nys,  Notes,  26f. 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY  121 

followed  by  Switzerland  in  the  Aiistro-Italian  War  of  1859; 
and  again,  in  1871.  a  l-'rencli  army  of  some  85,000  men, 
with  10,000  horses,  entered  Swiss  territory  and  was  dis- 
armed. jVccording  to  the  rules  for  internment  they  were 
released  at  the  close  of  the  war  with  all  their  arms  and 
equipment,  the  h^rench  government  paying  the  Swiss  11.- 
000.000  francs  to  co\er  the  expense  incurred.^  The  same 
policy  was  followed  by  the  Belgian  government  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  war. 

Questions  of  grave  moment  have  arisen  at  different  times 
with  regard  to  the  right  of  powers  guaranteeing  a  perma- 
nent neutrality  to  interfere  in  its  internal  affairs  to  protect 
themselves  against  plots  and  disturbances  of  a  nature  to 
threaten  their  owii.  domestic  tranquillity.  The  permanent 
neutrals,  Switzerland  in  particular,  have  always  insisted  on 
their  right  to  grant  asylum  to  whomever  they  would ;  and 
this  contention  is  supported  by  the  principles  of  law  and  jus- 
tice. Indeed,  no  state  could  be  regarded  as  independent,  if 
compelled  to  deal  with  propagandists  according  to  the  dic- 
tates of  foreign  powers."  We  have  seen  how  the  right  of 
asylum  was  denied  to  the  Republic  of  Cracow,  and  with  what 
disastrous  results.  Two  questions  are  involved  in  the  prob- 
lem of  asylum.  First,  has  every  state  the  right  to  grant 
such  asylum  ?  and,  secondly,  has  every  refugee  the  right  to 
demand  it?  Is  every  state  bound  to  grant  asylum  to  a 
refugee,  if  it  is  demanded?  Says  Rivier.  "The  right  of 
asylum  is  not  the  right  of  an  alien  to  find  asylum  in  the 
country,  but  rather  a  right  which  belongs  to  a  state,  by 
virtue  of  its  very  independence,  to  grant  asylum  to  whom- 
ever it  wishes;  to  receive,  if  it  sees  fit.  the  alien,  the  fugi- 
tive, the  proscribed.  The  state  has  the  right  of  asylum ; 
there  is,  in  general,  no  obligation  to  furnish  it."^ 

At  first  glance  it  would  seem  that  the  laws  of  humanity  de- 

1  Martens,  Nouveau  recueil  XIX,  639;   Hertslet,  III,  1907f. 

2  Nye,  Notes,  36. 

3  Rivier,  Pri7icii)es,  I,  314. 


J.,,  THE  XEUrRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

iiiaiul  for  the  pcililical  refiii^-ec  the  right  of  asylum  from  any 
state  whose  territories  he  may  reacli.  Tliere  are,  however, 
certain  rules  of  national  and  international  order  that  must 
be  taken  into  eonsideration.  [''nrthermore,  the  right  of 
asvlum.  if  granted,  may  he  instantly  withdrawn  if  misused 
1,v  the  refugee  enjoying  it.  It  may  he  said  that  all  states 
are  under  the  obligation  to  prevent  by  due  diligenee  their 
territorv  from  Ijecoming  eenters  of  revolutionary  move- 
ments against  the  peaee  and  order  of  other  states.'  It  was 
upon  this  ground  that  (kiizot  eventually  plaeed  his  appeal 
to  join  in  checking  the  centralizing  movement  in  Switzer- 
kmd  in  1847.  ^^^  feared  that  if  Switzerland  became  a  Fed- 
eral State  it  would  become  a  center  of  agitation  against  its 
neighlxirs,  and  of  revolutionary  propaganda  which  would 
ccimpromise  their  repose." 

Certain  incidents  occurred  in  Switzerland  during  the  late 
8o"s  in  which  the  ((uestion  of  asylum  was  involved.  In 
1887  there  appeared  at  Zurich  an  anarchist  journal  under 
the  interesting  caption  of  Drr  RotJic  Tcufcl,  in  wdiich  at- 
tacks were  made  upon  the  royal  family  and  the  imperial 
government  of  Germany.^  Investigation  showed  that  the 
sheet  was  printed  at  the  same  establishment  as  the  socialistic 
organ  So::iaI  Dcinokrat,  although  the  proprietors  of  the  lat- 
ter disavowed  the  anarchist  publication.  Both  papers  w^ere 
the  work  of  German  emigres  in  Switzerland.  An  inquiry 
also  brought  out  the  fact  that  certain  of  the  most  violent  of 
the  anarchists  of  Zurich  were  no  other  than  paid  secret 
agents  of  the  German  police.  The  leaders,  who  were  ])ut 
imder  arrest,  were,  with  a  single  exception,  German  citi- 
zens.* A  condential  complaint  was  about  to  l)e  made  to 
the  German  government,  when  it  became  known  that  Cap- 
tain Fischer,  of  the  Zurich  police,  had  made  the  whole  mat- 

'  Hagerup,  595. 

-'Guizot,  VIII,  463. 

•^Journal  du  droit  international  privc.  XVI,    (1889),  423. 

4  Ihid..  424. 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY  1  _,  , 

ter  piiljlic  through  a  letter  to  two  of  the  sociahst  deputies; 
and  a  part  of  the  letter  was  read  in  the  Reichstag,  on  Janu- 
ary 2y,  1888/  Called  to  question  on  the  subject.  Putt- 
kamer,  the  Prussian  Minister  of  the  Interior,  admitted  that 
the  German  police  supported  in  Switzerland  instruments 
for  the  surveillance  of  revolutionary  anarchists."  The  Swiss 
Federal  government  now  took  the  matter  in  hand.  While 
disavowing  the  act  of  Captain  Fischer  in  making  the  cir- 
cumstances public,  it  proposed  to  the  National  Council  the 
creation  of  a  Bureau  of  the  Federal  Police,  which  should  be 
charged  with  the  surveillance  of  foreign  refugees.  The 
words  of  ]M.  Droz,  the  chief  of  the  Swiss  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  speech  before  the  National  Council. 
March  20,  1888,  are  w^orthy  of  note. 

"In  international  law  it  ds  a  fundamental  truth  that  each  sover- 
eign state  is  master  of  iits  own  internal  affairs.  If  iit  is  convenient 
for  others  to  have  monarchial  institutions,  we  have  no  more  right 
to  interfere  with  their  affairs  than  they  may  pretend  to  mix  with 
ours.  .  .  .  But  foreigners  who  come  upon  our  eoil  ought  to 
know  that  they  contract  certain  duties  toward  us.  .  .  .  If  we 
give  thean  free  use  of  the  liberty  of  the  press  and  of  assembly, — 
those  political  liberties  which  are  guaranteed  to  the  Swiss  people 
by  the  constitution,  it  is  on  condition  that  they  prove  themselves 
worthy;  if  not,  we  have  the  right  and  the  duty  to  ap^ply  to  them 
the  laws  of  the  country.  These  Jaws  .  .  .  provide  . 
for  tlie  expulsion  of  foreigners  who  compromise  the  dnternaJ  or  the 
external  security  of  the  Confederation. "» 

Ehrenburg,  the  leader  of  the  conspirators,  made  his  escape; 
Schroeder,  a  naturalized  Swiss,  was  imprisoned ;  while  the 
others,  along  with  six  Germans  who  were  officially  con- 
nected with  the  socialist  publications,  were  expelled.*  The 
German  government  failed  to  take  warning,  and  early  in 
the  following  year  the  German  Police  agent  at  Mulhausen, 

1  Ibid.,  427ff. 

■■^Ibid.,  430. 

3  Given  in  Descamps,  Ed.,  460. 

'^Journal  du  droit  international  p7-iv6,  XVI.  (1889),  425.  note. 


124  '^^^  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

one  Wohlgemuth,  hired  a  Bavarian  emigre,  a  tailor  named 
Lutz,  to  stir  up  anarchi^st  agitation  in  Basle.'  Having  dis- 
covered the  plot  and  secured  the  correspondence  which  had 
passed  between  the  two,  the  F^ederal  agents  seized  an  op- 
portunity to  arrest  both  on  Swiss  soil.  The  German  press 
protested  violently  against  the  imprisonment  of  their  police 
officer.'  The  Federal  Council  ordered  his  expulsion  on  the 
grounds  cited  in  the  speech  of  Droz ;  and  later  Lutz  was 
subjected  to  the  same  penalty. 

The  German  international  lawyers  endeavored  to  establish 
the  legal  \alidity  of  the  acts  of  their  police  agents,  denying, 
as  did  the  government  itself,  that  they  had  been  agitators; 
but  with  the  correspondence  in  plain  evidence  there  was  no 
question,  in  reality,  of  Wohlgemuth's  guilt. '^  Had  his  er- 
rand been  successful,  the  result  would  have  imperilled  the 
internal  security  of  Switzerland.  The  claims  of  the  Ger- 
man press  that  Wohlgemuth  was  innocent,  and  therefore 
should  be  immediately  be  released,  necessitated  a  trial  in  or- 
der that  Switzerland  might  justify  herself  against  the 
charges  of  hasty  action.  Throughout  the  entire  transac- 
tion the  Swiss  government  stood  on  a  tirm  legal  footing. 
June  19,  1899,  von  Biilow.  the  German  Minister  at  Bern, 
informed  the  Federal  Council  that  Germany  was  reserving 
to  herself  the  right  to  take  any  measures  which  it  thought 
advisable ;  while  the  press  kept  making  dire  threats  of  re- 
prisal.* Italy  and  Austria  inclined  to  the  support  of  Ger- 
many, as  they  had  both  been  troubled  by  the  presence  of 
the  "hot-bed  of  Ivepublicanism"  so  near  their  borders.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Germans  living  in  Switzerland,  in  num- 
ber over  100,000,  heartily  supported  the  latter  government. 
'J'hc  question  was  eventually  allowed  to  drop,  Init  the  prin- 
ciples of  law  prevailed,  and  it  may  l)e  said  without  danger 
of  contradiction  tliat  the  ])ermanently  neutral  state  is  master 

^  Ibid.,  418.  ^Ibid.,  432. 

^Ibid.,  221.  4  Ibid.,    436. 


INTERNAL  SOVEREIGNTY  j2r 

as  to  its  right  of  asylum,  and  it  may  grant  or  withold  this 
privilege  to  foreigners  at  its  pleasure. 

Very  closely  allied  is  the  question  of  the  so-called  consti- 
tutional liberties  of  individuals,  namely,  freedom  of  speech, 
of  the  press,  and  of  assemblage.  These  very  questions  were 
involved,  to  some  extent,  in  the  Wohlgemuth  Affair.  1"here 
exist,  in  the  case  of  permanent  neutrals,  no  restrictions 
other  than  those  placed  by  international  law  upon  all  states.^ 
Certain  precautions  are  politically  expedient  to  all  small 
states.  We  take  occasion  to  refer  l)riefly  to  a  few  historical 
incidents.  In  1856  Count  W^alewski.  the  French  Foreign 
Minister,  complained  to  the  plenipotentiaries  at  the  Congress 
of  Paris,  that  every  day  there  were  being  published  in  Bel- 
gium attacks  upon  the  government  of  Louis  Napoleon.^  The 
Belgian  government  was  competent  to  cope  with  the  situa- 
tion. Again,  during  the  course  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War, 
there  were  frequent  complaints  from  German  sources  of 
the  sympathy  of  the  Belgian  press  for  France.  Following 
the  custom  among  neutrals  the  Belgian  government  urged 
caution  on  the  part  of  the  editors  of  papers  published  within 
its  territory  to  observe  a  strict  impartiality.  On  February 
3,  1875,  Bismarck,  who  had  involved  Germany  in  the  Kul- 
turkampf,  made  representations  to  the  government  at  Brus- 
sels against  the  Catholic  press  for  its  violent  attacks  on  the 
Prussian  government.  The  Belgian  Chambers  condemned 
by  a  public  vote  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  press  and 
the  clergy.^ 

The  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  press  in  Switzerland 
has  given  rise  to  several  disputes  between  that  state  and  its 
neighbors.  We  have  already  noted  her  vigorous  action  in 
the  Wohlgemuth  Afifair.  Another  interesting  case  devel- 
oped in  1898,  when,  with  the  outbreak  of  domestic  difficul- 
ties in  many  of  the  cities  of  Northern  Italy,  a  sympathetic 

1  Funck-Brentano   and   Sorel,   219. 

2  Nye,  Notes,  36. 

3  Eysc'hen,  41. 


J 26  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

attitude  was  adopted  l)y  the  Italians  living-  in  Switzerland.' 
Meetings  were  held  in  various  Swiss  cities;  protests  were 
voted  against  the  measures  of  repression  taken  by  the  Ital- 
ian government ;  Italians  were  urged  to  return  to  Italy  to 
help  their  oppressed  brothers ;  and  many  openly  declared 
their  determination  to  go.  The  Swiss  go\-ernment  took 
the  matter  in  charge,  and  eventually  gave  189  conspirators 
over  to  the  Italian  authorities.  I'hus  the  government,  while 
in  theory  inclined  toward  the  broadest  toleration,  was  forced 
to  admit  that  in  practice  it  became  its  duty  to  see  that  for- 
eigners should  show  themselves  worthv  of  the  political  lib- 
erty which  was  guaranteed  them  b\-  the  S\\  iss  people  in  their 
constitution. 

An  instance  of  a  permanently  neutral  state  regulating  its 
internal  affairs  out  of  deference  to  the  wishes  of  its  guaran- 
teeing neighbors  as  a  matter  of  policy  is  found  in  the  case 
of  a  proposed  Jesuit  college  at  Luxemburg.  This  town  had 
been  the  seat  of  a  thriving  institution  of  learning  under 
Jesuit  leadership  prior  to  the  Revolution  of  1789.'  When, 
following  the  Conference  of  London  of  1867,  the  military 
institutions  were  demolished  and  their  restoration  interdic- 
ted, it  was  thought  to  restore  in  their  place  the  ancient  seat 
of  learning.  The  i)roposal  met  with  some  favor  at  first, 
but  when  it  became  evident  that  the  Jesuits,  who  were  under 
the  ban  in  both  France  and  Germany,  were  destined  to  as- 
sume the  leadership  of  the  faculty,  strenuous  objections 
arose  in  both  of  those  countries.  Consequently,  in  spite  of 
the  devotion  of  the  majority  of  the  Luxemburgers  to  Cath- 
olicism, the  i^roposition  was  abandoned.'' 

^  Chronique  des  faites  internatianaux.  R.  D.  I.  P.,  II,  (1898),  480f. 

2  Wamipach,   206. 

3  Eyschen,  41. 


CHAPTER  X 

PERMANENT    NEUTRALITY    AND    INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS 

In  this  chapter  we  shall  discuss  the  effect  of  the  creation 
of  a  permanent  neutrality  on  the  freedom  of  action  of  the 
neutralized  state  in  international  affairs.  We  have  estab- 
lished as  a  general  rule  for  permanent  neutrals  the  obliga- 
tion to  refrain  from  all  offensive  alliances,  and  from  inter- 
national agreements  of  such  a  nature  as  to  involxe  them  in 
unfriendly  or  hostile  relations  with  their  neighliors.  We 
have  shown  that  the  purpose  for  which  the  three  permanent 
neutralities  of  Europe  were  created  was  to  maintain  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power  on  that  continent.  From  this  it  evolves  that 
the  neutralized  state  is  under  obligation  to  its  guarantors 
sedulously  to  avoid  any  international  relations  which  may 
result  in  a  disturbance  of  that  equilibrium.  It  should  be 
equally  on  guard  lest  an  apparent  advantage  to  be  gained 
influence  it  to  take  the  initiative  in  such  a  move,  or  an  in- 
ducement offered  by  another  power  cause  it  to  turn  from 
the  path  of  strict  and  impartial  neutrality. 

It  is  obvious  from  the  general  rule  just  stated  that  any 
action  on  the  part  of  the  neutralized  state  which  would  bring- 
about  the  termination  of  its  existence  as  an  independent 
state  is  prohibited.  It  may  not  enter  into  a  Real  L'nion 
with  another  state,  nor  become  part  of  a  Confederation,  or 
of  a  Federation,  nor  yet  may  it  become  a  Prc^tectorate.  since 
any  one  of  these  relations  would  bring  it  into  closer  relation 
to  the  state  with  which  it  is  allied  than  would  be  consistent 
with  its  duties  to  its  guarantors.^  On  the  other  hand,  a  Per- 
sonal Union  between  a  permanent  neutral  and  another 
state  is  permissible,  and  has  existed  between  neutral  states 

1  Despagnet,  182;  Piccioni,  88. 

127 


I^g  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


and  their  neighbors  in  no  fewer  than  three  instances.  In 
all  cases  of  union  of  this  kind  there  should  be  constant  vigi- 
lance on  the  part  of  the  neutralized  state  to  prevent  a  fusion 
of  interests.  Such  a  relationship  should  receive  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  guaranteeing  powers;  and  the  consent  of  the  lat- 
ter must  be  obtained  before  any  change  therein  can  be  legally 
effected,  unless,  as  was  the  case  with  the  Luxemburg  suc- 
cession, provision  has  been  made  for  such  a  change  before- 
hand. 

The  establishment  of  a  customs  union  between  a  perma- 
nently neutral  state  and  one  of  its  neighbors  has  generally 
been  condemned  on  political  grounds,  although  the  author- 
ities do  not  agree  as  to  its  legal  interdiction. When  two  or 
more  states  enter  into  a  customs  union  they  mutually  agree 
to  remove  all  customs  lines  between  them,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  adopt  for  their  other  borders  a  uniform  tariff.'  It 
is  obvious  that  such  an  arrangement  is  purely  of  an  economic 
nature.  It  has  no  relation  to  warlike  alliances,  which  are 
legally  interdicted  to  permanent  neutrals.  Refusal  on  the 
part  of  a  permanent  neutral  to  enter,  or  on  the  part  of  its 
iruarantcrs  to  sanction,  such  an  arrangement,  is  brought 
about  through  a  desire  for  precaution,  since  the  effect  of  the 
establishment  of  a  customs  union  must  always  he  one  of  con- 
solidation and  fusion  of  interests.  During  times  of  peace  the 
economic  interests  of  the  two  peoples  become  practically 
one;  there  is  constant  interchange  of  views,  and  repeated 
contact  among  the  people.  With  the  exchange  of  ideas,  as 
well  as  of  goods,  there  ine\ital)ly  comes  a  modification  of 
national  customs.  1'he  internal  ])olicy  of  each  state  of  the 
union  reacts  upon  that  of  the  other.'  In  such  a  case  the 
])r(  cess  verv  easilv  becomes  one  of  aljsorption,  or  at  least  of 
subjection  of  the  weaker  power  to  the  hegemouN-  of  the 
str(^nger.  The  most  striking  exanijile  of  this  is  found  in 
the  case  of  Germany.     Of  the  many  states  which,  during 

1  Descamps.  Ed..  394. 

-  Funck-Brenanto  and  Sorel,  169. 


INTERNATIONAL   RELATIONS  I2g 

the  last  century,  entered  into  a  customs  union  with  Prussia, 
only  Luxemburg  has  succeeded  in  maintaining  its  indepen- 
dence. Thus  the  customs  union  becomes  in  time  an  alh- 
ance  which  involves,  not  merely  economic  affairs  of  a  peace- 
ful nature,  but  even  warlike  measures.  Let  a  single  mem- 
ber of  the  customs  union  become  involved  in  war  and  the 
whole  economic  system  of  the  group  is  upset.  Business  and 
exchange  are  subjected  to  difficulties  but  slightly  less  serious 
than  would  result  from  participation  in  the  war  l)v  all. 
Foreseeing  such  an  event,  the  state  joined  in  the  union 
would  undoubtedly  enter  into  agreements  for  the  mutual 
avoidance  of  war  if  practicable,  and  for  mutual  protection 
in  case  one  becomes  involved  in  war,  agreements  that  would 
amount  to  an  alliance  of  a  nature  forbidden  to  permanent 
neutrals.^  A  neutral  would  thus  find  itself  in  an  interna- 
tional situation  from  which  it  could  only  with  difficulty  dis- 
engage itself. 

When  Luxemburg  was  made  permanently  neutral,  in 
1867,  the  question  arose  whether  its  new  status  involved  the 
discontinuance  of  its  economic  relations  with  Germany,  for 
it  had  been  a  member  of  the  Zollverein  since  1842.  The 
continuance  of  the  economic  relations  of  the  two  countries 
was  purely  of  a  political  nature.  Certain  circumstances 
made  it  well-nigh  impossible  that  there  should  be  any 
change  at  the  time.  In  the  first  place,  Prussia,  by  yielding 
its  claim  to  the  right  to  garrison  the  fortress  of  Luxemburg, 
was  showing  a  spirit  quite  out  of  accord  with  its  general 
policy  of  aggression,  and  had  there  been  an  insistence  upon 
the  severance  of  the  economic  ties  as  well,  its-  objections 
would  have  been  sufficiently  strong  to  endanger  the  work  of 
the  Conference.  In  the  second  place,  membership  in  the 
•Zollverein  was  vital  to  the  prosperity  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
itself.  By  it  the  economic  conditions  of  Luxemburg  had 
been  transformed.  New  industries  had  come  into  existence 
which  would  have  been  ruined  had  the  access  of  their  pro- 

^  Ibid.,  168. 


j^o  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

ducts  to  Germany  been  cUjsed.'  1  lie  tiny  state  possesses  less 
than  i,ooo  square  miles  of  territory,  and  is  barely  self-sup- 
porting. Furthermore,  the  terms  of  the  union  safeguard 
the  national  self-respect  of  the  people.  The  Director  of  the 
Customs  Service  is  a  German,  but  those  who  ser\-e  under 
him  are  chosen  from  the  nati\e  population;  while  the  ar- 
rangements are  sanctioned  by  treaty  for  a  definite  period 
of  time,  and  can  be  severed  by  either  part}-  upon  two  years' 
notice  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  agreement.' 

The  attitude  of  the  powers  toward  Luxemburg  in  1867 
was  the  exact  opposite  of  that  taken  l)y  them  in  1841.  when 
there  was  talk  of  a  customs  union  between  hVance  and  Bel- 
gium. The  matter  became  the  subject  of  four  Conferences 
between  the  two  countries."'  The  chief  obstacle  seemed  to 
be  the  refusal  of  the  Belgians  to  admit  French  customs  offi- 
cers into  their  cities,  for  they  held  that  tins  would  be  a  re- 
striction both  on  their  inedjiendence  and  their  neutrality. 
Guizot  was  lalx)ring  under  the  fear  that  Belgiar.s,  if  their 
])roposals  were  rejected  by  France,  would  turn  to  Prussia 
and  gain  admittance  to  the  Zollverein,  as  Luxemburg  had 
just  done.*  The  textile  industry  of  England  was  finding 
ready  markets  for  its  products  in  France,  much  to  the  dis- 
satisfaction of  the  Belgians  who  were  engaged  in  the  same 
industry.  Not  only  were  British  interests  endangered  by 
tlie  proposed  customs  union,  but  they  had  already  been  at- 
tacked by  a  commercial  treaty  between  France  and  Belgium, 
concluded  Ji^dy  16,  1842,  by  which  all  duties  were  removed 
on  thread  and  linen  textiles  brought  from  Belgium  to 
France,  while  the  former  adopted  on  its  frontiers  the*  same 
tariff  on  these  articles  as  was  paid  on  the  l-'rencli  border. 
This  was  a  long  step  toward  a  customs  union. 

1  Wampach,  254f. 

•-  Servais,  176,  and  Despagnet,  179,  express  doubt  as  to  the  legality 
of  the  position  of  Luxemburg. 
»  Guizot,  VII,  276. 
*IMd.,  278. 


INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS  ,  -,  , 

Lively  protests  were  issued  l)y  the  British  Foreign  Of- 
fice.    Lord  Aberdeen  requested  the  Courts  of  Berhn,  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburg  to  join  him  against  a  measure  which  pre- 
sented a   genuine   danger   for   the     European    e(|uiHbriuni. 
Guizot,  however,   refused   to   ch^op   his  ])lans,   until  doubts 
arose  as  to   King  Leopold's  sincerity   in   the  negotiations. 
Metternich,  the  shrewd  Austrian  diplomat,  wrote  in  the  fol- 
lowing: strain:     "Xo  countrv  deliberatelv  lets  itself  be  de- 
.voured  bv  another,  and  in  such  transactions  the  smaller  is 
alwavs  the  one  which  holds  itself  most  on  its  guard. 
I  repeat  that  I  attach  very  little  importance  to  the  whole 
project."^     And  again,  "I  ask  myself  if  King  Leopold  ever 
had  a  real  serious  intention  to  conclude  such  a  treaty,  and 
if  it  is  not  more  probable  that  he  advanced  the  project,  which 
he  knew   could  not  be  executed,      ...      to   please   his 
father-in-law,  the  French  nation,  and  the  French  party  in 
Beleium,  and  the  national  sentiment  which  seeks  an  outlet 
for  the  excess  of  Belgian  prcxlucts."     Guizot  himself  de- 
clared later,  "I  am  strongly  tempted  to  believe  that  Met- 
ternich was  right,  and  that  King  Leopold  never  sincerely 
pursued  the  customs  union  project  nor  counted  on  its  suc- 
cess."'    The  importance  of  the  formation  of  customs  unions 
between  neighboring  states  has  been  decidedly  diminished 
by  the  introduction  into  modern  treaties  of  the  most  favored 
nation  clause. 

A  relationship  between  a  permanently  neutral  state  and 
one  of  its  neighbors  whereby  the  former  is  bound  to  defend 
the  latter  in  case  of  w^ar  being  absolutely  prohibited,  not  only 
are  ordinary  treaties  of  defensive  alliance  interdicted,  but 
also  the  assuming  of  protectorates,  and  the  establishment 
of  scattered  colonies  in  other  parts  of  the  world.     The  pe- 

1  Ibid..  VI,  293f. 
-'7&kZ..   294. 


J02  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

culiar  case  of  Belgium  and  the  Congo  State  is  an  apparent 
exception  to  this  rule,  but  here  the  circumstances  were  al- 
tered by  the  facts  that  the  territory  which  became  a  Bel- 
gian colony  was  already  enjoying  the  status  of  conventional 
permanent  neutrality,  and  was  already  joined  to  Belgium  in 
Personal  Union.  The  force  of  the  rule  becomes  clear  if  we 
suggest  the  permanent  neutralization  of  Holland.  From  its 
location  in  Europe  and  its  relations  as  a  European  state  it 
would  seem  to  merit  that  status  as  well  as  do  Switzerland, 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg.  But  what  would  l>e  the  status 
of  its  colonial  empire?  A  permanent  neutrality  for  the 
home  country  which  did  not  extend  to  the  colonies  would 
be  an  anomaly.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Powers  would  be 
loath  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  the  territories  over 
which  Dutch  sovereignty  has  been  extended,  scattered  as 
they  are  through  America  and  the  East  Indies.  A  perma- 
nently neutral  state  is  not  even  free  to  guarantee  the  neu- 
trality of  another,  for  this  obligation  might  eventually  in- 
volve it  in  hostilities,  should  the  state  to  whom  the  guaran- 
tee is  given  be  unjustly  attacked.  Thus  Belgium  was  ex- 
pressly relieved  from  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Lux- 
emburg; and.  at  the  Conference  of  Berlin  in  1885,  the  Bel- 
gian plenipotentiary  carefully  stated  that  his  accession  to 
the  treaty  which  created  the  Congo  Free  State  was  given 
with  such  reservations  as  might  be  necessary  to  safeguard 
Belgium's  position  as  a  permanent  neutral.  It  is  interest- 
ing to  note  that  Switzerland  entered  the  League  of  Nations 
in  1920  with  the  reservations  necessarily  involved  in  its 
permanent  neutrality. 

There  is,  however  some  variation  of  opinion  as  to  whether 
a  permanently  neutral  state  may  enter  a  limited  defensive 
alliance.  Pradier-Fodere,'  Despagnet."  Piccioni,^  Hagerup" 
and  Kleen^'  are  in  favor  of  the  absolute  interdiction  of  all 
defensive  alliances.     Other  authorities  do  not  hold  such  an 

1  Praier-Fodere,   II,    630.  i  Hagerup,   591. 

2  Despagnet,  180.  5  Kleen,  I,  89. 
sPiccioni,   104. 


INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS  i  ^ -, 

extreme  view.  l*or  instance,  we  find  Rivier  expressing  the 
opinion  that  the  permanenll}-  neutral  state  may  conclude  de- 
fensive alliances  which  do  not  ])lace  it  under  ohligation  to 
defend  its  ally,  but  which  will  obligate  the  ally  to  defend  it/ 
Nys  supports  this  hypothesis,"  as  also  does  W'heaton,^  who 
follows  Arendt*  very  closely  on  this  point.  Bonfils  w'ould 
permit  a  defensive  alliance  on  the  part  of  the  neutral,  but 
only  after  it  has  been  attacked.^  Surely  no  one  would  at- 
tack the  validity  of  such  an  agreement.  In  fact,  it  is  the 
positive  duty  of  the  permanently  neutral  state,  in  case  its 
neutrality  is  violated,  to  ally  itself  with  its  guarantors,  so 
far  as  they  will  come  to  its  assistance. 

In  these  days  of  rapid  mobilization,  to  deny  a  permanent 
neutral  the  right  of  defensive  alliance  until  after  an  attack 
has  been  made  upon  it,  is  the  equivalent  of  absolute  inter- 
diction of  the  right.  If  an  outside  power  comes  to  the  neu- 
tral's rescue  under  such  circumstances,  it  will  be  on  the 
general  grounds  of  humanity,  or  of  mutual  understandings 
previously  effected  between  them.  A  treaty  concluded  be- 
tween a  neutral  and  its  neighbor  after  the  attack  upon  the 
former  has  been  delivered  may  be  the  excuse  for.  but  it  will 
never  be  the  cause  of,  the  intervention. 

For  a  permanently  neutral  state  to  enter,  in  time  of  peace, 
into  a  formal  defensive  alliance  with  one  of  its  guarantors, 
would  be,  in  theory  at  least  utterly  useless,  since  the  guar- 
antors are  already  pledged  to  cause  the  neutrality  to  be  re- 
spected. Such  an  act  would  give  just  grounds  for  offense 
to  the  other  guarantors  of  the  neutrality. 

1  Rivier,  Princijjes,  II,  60. 

2  Nys,  Notes,  27f. 

3  Wheaton,  Dana's  edition,  516. 

4  Arendt,  Essai  sur  la  neutralitc  de  la  Belgique,   (Brussels,  1845), 

5  Bonfils,  215. 


THE  NEUTRALIZATIONS  OF  STATES 

In  dealing-  witli  tliis  i)r(>l)lem,  as  is  s(i  often  the  case  in 
internal ional  relations,  the  old  adai;e  that  "circumstances 
alter  cases"  applies  with  si)ccial  force.  As  Baron  Des- 
canips  says,  "There  are  some  perfect  arguments  in  theory 
which  do  not  have  the  same  value  to  practice.  Circum- 
stances of  a  certain  order  may  certainly  counsel  it  not  to 
adventure  on  a  way  which,  hranching  at  a  given  moment, 
mav  leave  the  little  state  the  choice  hetween  ruin  and  the 
.ahandonmcnt  of  its  independent  nationality."'  The  thesis 
of  Kleen  and  the  rigorist  school  is  hardly  reconcilahle  with 
the  duty  of  the  neutralized  state  to  pnn-ide  for  its  own  de- 
fense in  everv  way  compatible  with  its  international  status. 
However,  it  can  not  he  admitted  that  a  permanent  neutral 
may  under  any  circumstances,  send  its  forces  outside  of  its 
(wvn  territory  to  defend  an  ally.  It  will,  therefore  best  serve 
its  own  interests,  and  the  interests  of  the  famil}'  of  nations, 
hv  a\-oiding  all  grounds  ft.r  complaint.  As  Rolin-Jaeque- 
nniis,  one  of  Belgium's  wisest  publicists,  says,  "it  depends 
entirelv  on  the  tact  and  the  prudence  of  the  neutral  govern- 
ments to  use  this  right  only  in  the  measure  of  necessity, 
and  in  a  manner  not  to  arouse  any  legitimate  jealousy."' 

No  writer  has  given  more  careful  attention  to  this  subject 
than  has  Baron  Descamjis,  and.  in  oin*  opinion,  none  has  ar- 
rived at  more  accurate  and  practical  conclusions.  Denying, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  the  right  of  a  neutralized  state  to  form 
offensive  alliances,  to  make  agreements  whereby  a  part  of 
its  territorv  may  be  occupied  bv  another  power  in  case  of 
hostilities,  or  to  join  in  a  reci])r(.ca1  defensixe  alliance  by 
the  terms  of  which  it  would  be  re(|uired  to  defend  its  ally 
b}-  force  of  arms,''  he  adds,  "If  Belgium  may  not  assume  the 

>  Descamps,  Ed.,  389. 

-  Roliii-.Jaecnieniyns,    Lcs    allianccft    (iirnprrnnrs    nit    ])nlnt    rlc    vua 
clu  droit  i7itc)  national.  H.  D.  I.,  XX,   (18S8),  27. 
■•'  Descamps,   Ed.,  367f. 


/ 

/ 


INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS  ,  ^- 

<lefense  of  others  in  order  to  ol)tain,  in  retnrn,  a  better  de- 
fense for  itself,  if  a  reeiprocally  perfect  alliance  is  not  com- 
patible with  its  neutrality,  the  same  is  not  true  of  an  im- 
perfect defensive  alliance,  that  is,  such  as  will  assure  tlic 
proper  defense  of  the  country,  without  committing"  it  in 
return  to  tlie  defense  of  the  (Aher  by  arms.  IMccioni'  at- 
tempts to  show  that  no  state  would  enter  into  alliance  by 
which  it  was  bound  to  defend  another,  unless  the  agreement 
to  defend  were  reciprocal.  His  argument  is.  however,  easily 
refuted.  It  is  no  uncommon  thing  in  treaties  for  powers  to 
bargain  with  eacli  other,  offsetting  an  advantage  of  one 
kind  bv  one  in  another  field.  Commercial  interests  in  the 
neutralized  state  may  be  of  sufficient  value  to  one  of  its 
neighbors  to  fully  compensate  the  latter  for  granting  pro- 
tection in  time  of  war.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  relations 
of  Great  Britain  to  Belgium  have  always  been  a  very  inti- 
mate nature ;  more  intimate,  in  fact,  than  would  arise  from 
the  mere  fact  that  Great  Britain  is  one  of  the  guarantors  of 
Belgian  neutrality. 

A  concrete  problem  of  defensive  alliance  is  found  in  the 
proposed  agreement  l)etween  Belgium  and  Holland.  The 
entire  work  of  the  Conference  of  London  of  1831,  was  to  re- 
establish the  tranquillity  of  Europe,  which  for  a  decade  and 
a  half  had  rested  upon  the  union  of  the  Low  Countries  as 
one  of  its  bases.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  nothing  would 
be  more  in  accord  with  the  work  of  that  Conference  than 
an  alliance  of  the  two  states  founded  upon  mutual  goodwill, 
and  safeguarding  their  mutual  independence."  The  advan- 
tages which  would  accrue  to  the  states  themselves  are  not 
alone  of  a  military  nature.  Belgium  is  an  agricultin-al  and 
industrial  state,  but  lacks  ships,  and.  prior  to  its  exploitation 
of  the  Congo,  it  boasted  of  no  colonies.  On  the  other  hand, 
Holland  depends  largely  upon  its  fleet,  its  foreign  commerce, 
and  its  colonies,  as  sources  of  wealth.     Thus  a  customs  un- 

1  Piccioni,   101. 

2  Descamps,   Ed.,   371f. 


136 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


idii  wduld  seem  to  promise  much  for  ])oth  states;  and,  in  this 
case,  there  wonld  be  no  opportunity  for  objection  on  the 
ground  of  chsparily  in  size  or  strenoth  of  the  two  parties. 
The  oulstancHng  (hfhcuky  hiy  in  the  fact  that  the  Dutch 
were  ardent  free-traders,  while  the  Belgians  were  naturally 
protectionists.^  From  the  military  point  of  view,  the  alli- 
ance would  seem  even  more  adwuitageous  than  from  the 
economic.  The  situation  of  these  little  neighbors  is  such 
that  they  are  almost  equally  exposed  to  foreign  aggression, 
though  perhaps  Holland  enjoys  a  certain  advantage  from 
the  fact  that  it  lies  north  of  the  direct  path  between  Berlin 
and  Paris.  The  Scheldt  River,  so  lono-  a  source  of  conten- 
tion  and  bitterness,  has  become  a  great  bond  of  union  be- 
tween the  two  states.  Since  this  has  long  been  declared  an 
international  stream,  Holland  is  vitally  interested  in  the 
question  of  what  power  controls  its  upper  course.  In  time 
of  war  Holland  must  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  this  river. 
No  troops  nor  vessels  of  war  may  be  permitted  to  pass 
through  it,  except  in  the  single  instance  of  troops  passing 
through  to  defend  Belgium  from  outside  aggression."  More 
over,  in  case  Holland  is  involved  in  war,  no  blockade  may 
be  established  to  close  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt. 

No  one  can  believe  that  the  absorption  of  Belgium  by 
either  of  its  neighbors  would  long  precede  a  similar  fate  for 
Holland.  A  defensive  alliance  between  the  two  wotdd  ap- 
proximately double  the  fighting  strength  of  the  armv  which 
either  could  put  in  the  field,  and  thus  means  would  be  fur- 
nislicd  to  check  the  invader  until  interested  neig'hbors  misfht 
come  to  the  rescue;  if,  indeed,  the  united  forces  could  not 
furnish  resistance  sufficient  to  off-set  any  advantage  which 

1  Malo,  Chas.,  Vne  entente  militaire  liollando-beJge,  Journal  des 
drhats,  XIII.  part  2,  1222. 

2  Brialmont,  H.,  La  neutralitc  ct  la  defense  de  la  Belgique,  Revue 
Bleue,  5th  Ser.,  II.  545. 


INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS  j  :,j 

might  be  gained  by  an  attack  upon  them.  So  argued  many 
parties  (hiring  the  tirst  decade  of  the  present  century' 

In  1901  Beernaert  declared  that  in  his  opinion  the  pohti- 
cal  situations  of  the  two  countries  were  indissolublv  coiu- 
bined ;  that  there  could  not  be  a  free  Belgium  without  a  free 
Holland,  and  conversely."  The  defensive  alliance  was  ar- 
dently desired  by  the  French,  who  were  anxious  to  secure 
their  north-east  border  against  a  sudden  onslaught  by  the 
Germans.  They  made  short  work  of  any  legal  objections 
which  lay  in  the  way,  even  at  the  expense  of  logic. 

The  legal  right  of  Belgium  to  enter  into  a  defensive  alli- 
ance with  Holland  was  questioned  by  the  best  authorities 
on  international  law.  Even  so  ardent  a  patriot  as  Baron 
Descamps,  while  recognizing  the  benefits  which  would  nor- 
mally accrue  to  his  country  from  such  an  alliance,  held  that 
it  would  be  legal  only  if  it  did  not  require  Belgium  to  carry 
military  aid  to  her  ally;  or,  at  least,  to  do  so  only  upon  con- 
dition that  the  war  should  be  of  a  nature  to  engulf  both  states 
at  the  same  time.^  Despagnet  declared  that  the  conclusion 
of  a  miliary  entente  by  Belgium  would  be  illegal  under  any 
circumstances.*  Bonfils.  in  calling  attention  to  the  proposed 
alliance,  ventured  to  prophesy  that  it  would  meet  with  oppo- 
sition on  the  part  of  some  states.^  It  continued,  however, 
to  receive  much  encouragement  from  parties  in  both  France 
and  England,  for  the  dread  of  Pan-Germanism  and  lack  of 
confidence  in  German  sincerity  had  by  this  time  awakened 
across  the  channel.  A  series  of  articles,  written  under  the 
nom  de  pliiuic  "Y",  w-as  published  in  the  FortnigJitly  Review 
of  this  period,  in  which  the  author  urged  upon  Belgium  and 

1  Malo,  op.  cit.;  Brialmont,  op.  cit.;  afterward  enlarged  into  a  vol- 
ume, La  Belgique  et  la  Holland  devant  le  Pan-Germanisme ;  des 
Cressonieres,  M.  J.,  Le  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  et  la  droit  d'alliance, 
R.  D.  I.,  2  Ser.,  IX,   (1906). 

2  Descamps,  Ed.,  274. 
3 /bid.,  369f. 

*  Despagnet,  180. 
5  Bonfils,  215. 


138 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


Holland  the  importance  of  the  alliance,  and  of  military  prep- 
arations for  self-defense.^  Holding,  as  did  Bonfils,  that  a 
formal  alliance  would  he  incompatihle  with  Belgium's  status 
as  a  permanent  neutral,  "Y"  declared  that  all  that  could 
properly  he  done  was  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  prompt 
executit)!!  of  such  a  convention  when  the  hour  should  ar- 
rive; and  he  assured  the  Belgian  and  Dutch  governments 
that  such  military  cooperation  would  be  the  consummation 
of  England's  heartfelt  wishes.^ 

The  governments  of  both  Ijelgium  and  Holland  shrank 
from  engaging  in  a  military  entente,  but  a  Commercial  Com- 
mission was  appointed  in  1907  to  discuss  problems  of  an  eco- 
nomic nature,  and  to  effect,  if  possible,  an  economic  union. '' 
By  1910  this  Commission  was  considered  a  permanent  in- 
stituti('n,  and  the  relations  between  the  two  states  were  very 
cordial.*  An  increase  in  the  Belgian  army,  with  a  corre- 
sponding strengthening  of  tlie  Dutch  navy  and  coast  de- 
fenses, seemed  to  indicate  a  mutual  understanding  between 
them,  though  no  formal  announcement  might  be  made  un- 
der the  circumstances.''  Whatever  the  nature  of  the  under- 
standing as  it  existed  in  1910,  it  is  evident  from  the  course 
of  events  in  1914  that  the  union  was  not  sufficiently  strong 
to  bear  the  test  to  wliich  it  was  .subjected  during  that  trying 
time.  Belgium  defended  her  soil  as  best  she  could  without 
the  assistance  of  Holland,  and  the  latter  succeeded  in  play- 
ing the  hazardous  pari  of  a  neutral  during  the  entire  period 
of  the  Great  \\'ar. 

Numerous  attempts  ha\e  been  made  to  bring  about  the 
])erm,-mcnt  neutralization  of  (lie  three  Scandinavian  States. 

i  England  and  Belgium,  Fort.  Rev..  LXXIV,  (1900);  England, 
Brhjium.  and  Holland.  LXXXVI,  (1906);  The  Entente  between  Hol- 
land and  Belgium.  LXXXVII,  (1907);  An  Object  Lesson  in  German 
Plans,  XCIII,   (1910). 

■^Fort.  Rev.,  LXXXVI,   (1906),  275. 

•'!  Le  memorial  diplomatique,  XLV,  (1907),  711. 

*  LittelVs  Living  Age.  CCLXVII,  (1910),  819,  quoting  from  S::t. 
Rev. 

■^Ibid..  820. 


INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS  j  ^n 

The  course  proposed  to  accomplish  this  result  difYers  some- 
what from  that  by  which  the  existing  permanent  neutralities 
were  created.  It  is  known  as  "Federative  Neutrality.  "  since 
the  three  states  were  expectd  to  unite  in  guaranteeing  each 
other's  status,  and  then  to  join  in  requesting  the  formal  rec- 
ogniti(^n  of  their  permanent  neutrality  by  the  powers  of  Eur- 
ope. At  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Russia  and  Tur- 
key in  1853,  a  contest  which  later  developed  into  the  Crime- 
an War,  the  Scandinavian  governments  took  measures  to  act 
in  concert  to  defend  their  system  of  neutrality,^  and  these 
resolutions  were  remarkably  similar  to  the  rules  adopted 
by  the  Declaration  of  Paris  in  1856."  They  were  communi- 
cated bv  their  diplomatic  agents  to  twenty-three  govern- 
ments, and  were  accepted  as  satisfactory  by  the  belligerent 
powers.  In  order  to  insure  respect  for  this  neutrality  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  military  and  naval  precaution  was  taken,  the 
expenses  of  which  were  borne  jointly  by  the  three  states.^ 
The  success  of  this  experiment  led  to  an  attempt  to  formu- 
late from  it  a  permanent  policy,  and  to  establish  Scandi- 
navian Federative  Neutrality  as  a  part  of  the  public  law  of 
Europe.  The  movement  found  an  able  sponsor  in  Fredrik 
Bajer,  a  Danish  publicist,  who  outlined  the  scheme  at  a  ses- 
sion of  the  International  Peace  League,  at  Bern,  in  1883. 
In  1894  a  similar  plan  was  presented  to  the  Interparliamen- 
tary Conference  for  Arbitration  and  Peace,  in  session  at  The 
Hague,  but  the  Conference  adjourned  without  taking  up  the 
question.*  The  plan  reappeared  at  later  sessions  of  this 
body,  and  met  with  varying  degrees  of  favor.  At  the  same 
time  efforts  were  made  by  the  governments  of  the  Scan- 
divanian  countries  to  reach  a  mutual  understanding  on  the 
subject,  and  to  gain  the  sanction  of  the  Great  Powers  for  it. 

1  Bajer,  F.,  La  systeme  sandinave  de  neutrality  pendant  la  guerre 
de  Crimee  et  son  origine  histm'ique,  R  .H.  D..  XIV.   (1900),  260. 
^Ibid.,  288. 
3  Ibid.,  268f. 
*R.  D.  I.  P.,  I,   (1894),  498. 


I  .Q  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

However,  very  few  of  the  publicists  of  Europe  would  de- 
clare for  the  legality  of  the  plan,  for  ihey  realized  that  a 
unilateral  declaration  could  have  no  weight  in  law.  In  1903 
Martens  espoused  the  cause  of  neutralization  for  Denmark; 
and  gave  to  the  public  an  article  in  which  he  endeavored  to 
win  support  for  that  cause.  He  exi)ressed  the  hope  that  the 
neutralization  of  Denmark  would  be  followed  by  that  of  the 
other  Scandinavian  States.^  It  should  he  noted,  however, 
that  Martens  based  his  plea  for  a  general  declaration  upon 
purely  political  grounds,  and  denied  any  intention  to  give  it 
a  legal  foundation.  As  a  political  venture  the  neutralization 
of  the  Scandinavian  States  would,  undoubtedly  have  been 
acceptable  to  both  Germany  and  Russia.  The  British  and 
French  failed  to  encourage  the  ])lan. 

In  1904,  upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  the  Kingdoms  of  Denmark  and  Norway  and 
Sweden  proceeded  in  accord  to  lay  down  the  rules  of  their 
neutrality  during  the  impending  struggle ;  and  these  rules 
were  intended  to  apply  to  all  future  wars."  The  following 
year  the  differences  between  Norway  and  Sweden  forced 
the  severance  of  the  union  under  which  they  had  been  united 
since  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  The  bitter  feeling  between 
the  two  peoples  seemed  for  a  time  likely  to  lead  to  hostilities, 
but  happily  their  relations  soon  became  more  friendly.  The 
Great  Powers  used  all  their  influence  to  prevent  bloodshed. 
An  interdiction  was  ])laced  upon  the  building  of  fortifica- 
tions within  a  certain  distance  on  either  side  of  the  boundary 
between  the  states.  This  boundary  line  had  been  firmly  es- 
tablished for  centuries,  and  no  further  difficulties  arose  on 
this  point.  On  November  2,  1907,  the  governments  of 
Germany,  France,  Great  Britain  and  Russia  agreed  upon  a 
Convention  by  which  they  bound  themselves  to  respect  the 

1  Martenis,  F.  de,  La  neutralisation  du  Danemark.  R.  D.  M..  5  Ser., 
XVIII,    (1903),  316. 

2R.  D.  I.  P.,  XIII,   (1906),  92ff. 


INTERNATIONAL   RELATIONS  I4I 

integrity  of  Norway;  and  a  guarantee  to  that  effect  was 
given/ 

The  three  Northern  KingdvOms  succeeded  in  maintaining 
their  neutrahty  through  the  entire  course  of  the  Great  War; 
and  what  action  the  others  would  have  taken,  had  the  neu- 
trality of  one  been  violated,  can  only  he  a  matter  of  specula- 
tion. As  late  as  1909  the  Norwegian  Minister  of  Defense 
publicly  declared  that  Norway's  forces  must  always  be  pre- 
pared to  hurry  to  the  rescue  should  any  foreign  aggression 
befall  either  Sweden  or  Denmark."  But  as  for  a  genuine 
permanent  neutrality,  sanctioned  by  a  convention  of  the 
powers,  none  has  ever  been  established  for  these  states. 

One  of  the  most  delicate  and  complex  questions  of  the  in- 
ternational relations  of  permanent  neutrals  has  to  do  with 
the  enrollment  of  individuals,  or  the  formation  of  corps  of 
volunteers  upon  its  soil,  for  service  under  foreign  banners. 
That  a  neutral  may  not  permit  the  levy  of  bodies  of  men 
for  the  service  of  a  belligerent  is  fully  recognized.^  There 
is,  however,  no  general  prohibition  on  the  right  of  an  indi- 
vidual to  leave  his  own  country,  and  take  service  under  a 
foreign  flag.*  Such  an  act  does  not  release  from  its  inter- 
national responsibility  the  state  of  which  he  is  a  subject.  It 
does  not  even  involve  the  loss  of  his  nationality.  By  taking 
service  under  a  foreign  flag  an  individual  merely  loses  a 
part  of  the  protection  accorded  by  governments  to  their 
nationals  abroad. 

The  sending  of  troops  beyond  its  own  borders  by  a  perma- 
nently neutral  state  is  to  be  condemned.  It  is  thereby  rob- 
bing itself  of  one  of  its  legitimate  means  of  protection.  It 
would  be  manifestly  unfair  for  Belgium,  for  instance,  to  look 
to  its  guarantors  for  military  protection,  while  Belgian 
troops  were  scattered  throughout  the  world  on  any  pretext. 

1  State  Papers,  C,  536. 

-Schwan,  A.,  The    Defense    Prohlnn    of    Scandinavia,    Nineteenth 
Century,  LXVI,  900. 
3  Hall,  W.  E.,  592. 
*Ibi(l.,  593. 


I  ,,  THE  NEUTRAIJZATION  OF  STATES 

Yet  several  times  since  Belgium  was  created  a  permanently 
neutral  state  her  troops  have  fought  abroad.  In  1832.  and 
again  in  1834  Belgian  regiments  were  sent  to  Portugal,  to 
aid  the  Dona  Maria  in  her  strug^gle  to  maintain  her  rights 
to  the  throne  of  that  country  against  the  revolt  of  the 
Miguelist  party.'  The  object  of  this  expedition  having 
been  attained,  an  unsuccessful  attem])l  was  made  by  the  Bel- 
gian government  to  hire  the  legions  to  the  service  of  Queen 
Isabella  of  Spain. 

Still  less  excusable  were  the  relations  of  the  Belgian  gov- 
ernment with  the  ill-starred  Empire  of  Maxmilian  in  Mexi- 
co.^ This  Austrian  Prince,  in  1864.  established  himself  as 
the  head  of  the  government  of  our  Southern  neighbor.  The 
whole  movement  was  a  part  of  the  expansive  dreams  of 
Louis  Napoleon,  and  received  the  acti\e  suj)port  of  the 
French  army.  The  new^  Empire  received  the  recognition  of 
France,  S])ain.  Italy,  Austria  and  the  Netherlands,  while 
Great  Britain  declared  itself  ready  to  recognize  it  if  certain 
conditions  were  met.^  The  government  of  the  United 
States  protested  x'igorouslv  against  this  action  of  the  E,uro- 
pean  Powers,  and  supported  the  presidential  i)arty  in  Mex- 
ico, under  Juarez ;  but,  was  at  the  time  in  the  throes  of  its 
own  civil  war,  and  took  no  immediate  steps  to  intervene. 

When  France  prepared  to  send  a  legion  of  8,000  men  to 
support  the  new  Emperor,  a  moveiuent  was  set  on  fo(^t  to 
raise  a  contingent  of  v(5lunteers  in  Belgium  and  .\ustria; 
and  this  plan  received  the  consent  of  the  P)elgian  Minister 
of  War.  I'he  regiment,  which  was  known  as  the  "luiipress 
Charlotte,"  was  enrolled,  organized  and  drilled  on  Belgian 
soil.  Other  officials  hesitated  to  go  as  far  as  had  the  Min- 
ister of  War,  btit  leave  of  absence  was  given  to  officers  and 
men  by  royal  decree. 

1  Descamps,   Ed.,   4 8 Iff. 

-Ibid.,  483.     Descamps  endeavors  to  justify  the  interference. 

3  Ibid..  489. 


INTERNATIONAL   RELATIONS 


M3 


Baron  Descamps^  and  I'^Jrnest  Nys"  attempt  to  excuse  the 
acts  of  the  Belgian  government.  They  hold  that  there  was 
in  Mexico  a  government  recognized  by  Belgium  and  several 
other  European  Powers.  This  government  was  not,  at  the 
time,  engaged  in  war  with  any  civilized  state;  and  strict 
orders  were  given  that  if  the  United  States  should  intervene 
by  force  the  Belgians  should  immediately  withdraw,  or  for- 
feit their  citizenship.^  Such  war  as  was  going  on  in  Mex- 
ico was  purely  civil,  and  of  the  guerilla  type.  This  state 
of  affairs,,  it  is  held,  gave  grounds  to  justify,  in  principle, 
the  action,  or  rather  the  indifference  of  the  Belgian  govern- 
ment. But  Descamps  himself  seems  somewhat  skeptical  as 
to  the  applicability  of  his  own  conclusions.  He  frankly  ad- 
mits that  the  whole  transaction  was  out  of  harmony  with 
the  prophylaxic  or  preventive  purpose  of  Belgian  neutrality ; 
and,  consequently,  it  was  most  decidedly  not  a  politic  act, 
even  if  it  could  be  legally  justified. 

In  1 88 1,  when  England  and  France  were  threatened  with 
serious  disagreement  as  to  the  procedure  to  be  followed  in 
Egypt,  several  publicists  sought  to  effect  a  compromise  by 
placing  that  state  under  the  control,  of  Belgium.  It  was 
proposed  to  send  a  corps  of  the  Belgian  army  to  restore  or- 
der. The  impracticability  of  such  an  arrangement  was  too 
obvious,  and  Great  Britain  settled  the  question  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  "veiled  protectorate."  The  idea  of  employ- 
ing a  permanently  neutral  state  to  "fight  the  battles  of  civi- 
lization," in  order  to  avoid  the  seemingly  inevitable  clash 
which  must  take  place  when  the  forces  of  two  of  its  guar- 
antors came  in  contact,  was  indeed  ingenious;  but  it  fitted 
poorly  with  Belgium's  legal  status,  and  still  worse  with 
the  preventive  purpose  back  of  the  establishment  of  the  neu- 
trality. 

In   1900,  when  the  Boxer  uprising  broke  out   in  China. 

1  Descamps,  Ed.,  489. 

2  Nys,  Notes.  33f. 

"■  Descamps,  Ed.,  489. 


I  I  ,  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

the  members  of  the  Belgian  legation,  as  well  as  other  Bel- 
gian nationals  in  tiic  l'jn])ire  shared  the  jeopardy  in  which  all 
foreigners  were  placed,  and  the  Belgian  government  took 
hasty  steps,  in  union  with  the  cjther  powers,  to  hasten  relief 
to  those  in  danger.'  The  Allied  Powers  of  America,  Eur- 
ope and  Asia  agreed  upon  joint  action  in  the  matter,  and 
Belgium  planned  iu  participate.  The  forces  of  the  Mari- 
time Powers  were  soon  at  the  scene  of  the  disturbance,  and 
the  danger  was  averted.  The  Belgian  Relief  Corps  was 
never  sent  out.  Since  Belgium  was  acting  in  union  wnth  all 
of  its  guarantors,  no  condemnation  can  rest  on  it  for  the 
part  taken  in  this  incident. 

Inhere  remains  one  cjuestion  of  great  interest  before  leav- 
ing the  field  of  the  international  relations  of  ]jermanent  neu- 
trals. Has  a  ])ermanently  neutral  state  a  right  to  acquire  a 
colony?  The  (juestion  is  of  but  academic  interest  so  far  as 
Switzerland  and  Lu.xemburg  are  concerned.  But  with  Bel- 
gium the  case  is  entirely  different.  Not  only  has  Belgium 
access  to  the  sea  coast,  but,  through  the  development  of  its 
industries  and  the  rapid  increase  of  its  population,  it  has 
fostered  an  ambition  out  of  proportion  to  its  size.  The  quiet 
lot  of  a  genuine  perntanent  neutrality  has  become  more  and 
more  distasteful,  and  there  has  developed  no  small  desire  to 
play  a  virile  part  in  the  great  international  game.  It  is  this 
ambition  which  brought  about  the  undoing  of  the  work  of 
the  Conference  of  Berlin,  at  the  same  time  adding  to  the 
Belgian  realm  a  colony  many  times  the  size  of  the  original 
state. 

We  have  seen  how  the  Congo  State  was  formed:  how  it 
was  received  into  the  I'amily  of  nations  in  1885;  and  how 
King  Leopold  of  Belgium  was  chosen  for  the  first  sovereign. 
Having  secured  the  proper  consent  from  both  branches  of 
the  IJelgi.-m  Legislature,  the  King  notified  the  various  gov- 
ernments that  he  had  organized  his  government,  and  declared 

1  Descamps,  Ed.,  493. 


INTERXATIONAL   RELATIONS  ,  ,- 

the  Congo  a  permanently  neutral  state/  The  union  of  the 
Congo  and  Belgium  was  to  be  strictly  personal.  The  new 
government  was  to  consist  of  five  administrators  of  depart- 
ments, and  Stanley  was  made  governor."  The  interest  of 
Belgium  immediately  began  to  increase.  Private  companies 
were  formed  to  exploit  the  resources  of  the  Congo,''  and 
thus  the  two  states  became  bound  together  by  powerful  eco- 
nomic ties.  When  the  King,  who  had  furnished  the  capi- 
tal for  the  earlier  ventures,  was  no  longer  able  to  supply 
w^hat  was  needed  for  the  development  of  trade,  the  Belgian 
government  was  authorized  to  become  a  shareholder.*  The 
finances  of  the  Congo  State  were  kept  in  a  precarious  condi- 
tion, owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Conference  of  Berlin  had 
declared  for  free  trade.  In  fact,  the  state  had  been  able  to 
maintain  itself  only  bv  loans.  In  1890  the  General  Act  of 
the  Brussels  Anti-Slavery  Conference  carried  with  it  a  sup- 
plementary declaration  by  which  the  prohibition  of  import 
duties  was  removed,''  and  by  a  decree  of  April  9,  1892,  a 
financial  schedule  of  such  duties  was  published. 

On  August  2,  1889,  King  Leopold  drew  up  his  famous 
will  in  which  he  declared  his  wish  to  "bequeath  and  trans- 
mit, after  his  death,  to  Belgium  all  his  sovereign  rights  in 
tlie  Independent  State  of  the  Congo,  such  as  they  were  rec- 
ognized bv  the  decrees,  conventions  and  treaties  made  since 
1884  among  the  foreign  powers  on  one  hand  and  the  Inter- 
national xAssociation  of  the  Congo  and  the  Congo  Free 
State  of  the  other,  as  well  as  all  benefits,  right  and  advan- 
tages attached  to  his  sovereignty.'"' 

The  project  of  annexation  now  began  to  be  discussed  open- 

^  Archives  Dii)lomatiques.  2  Ser.,  XXIX,  20;  State  Papers.  LXXVI, 
210. 

2  Arch.  Dip.  2  Ser..  XIV,  345. 

3  Fauchille,  P.,  L  annexion  du  Congo  a  Ic  Belgique  et  le  droit  in- 
ternafional  R.  D.  I.  P..  II,   (1895).  406. 

*Arch.  Dip..  XXXI,  303'f. 
5  Clercq,  XVIII,  523ff. 
^  Arch,  Dip..  LIII,  110. 


J  ,5  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

ly  in  the  Belgian  Chambers.'  Shortly  after  this  King  Leopold 
informed  the  Belgian  Minister  that  if,  without  waiting  the 
time  of  his  death,  it  should  be  convenient  for  the  country  to 
contract  closer  bonds  with  his  i)OSsessions  in  the  Congo, 
he  would  not  hesitate  to  put  them  at  the  disposal  of  Bel- 
gium." On  July  3  of  the  following  year  a  Convention  was 
entered  into  by  the  Belgian  government  and  the  Congo 
Free  State  whereby  the  former  advanced  a  loan  of  25,000,- 
000  francs,  and  reserved  to  itself  the  right  after  the  expira- 
tion of  a  period  of  ten  years  and  six  months  to  annex  the 
Congo  State  with  all  the  benefits,  rights  and  advantages  at- 
tached to  its  sovereignty.^  There  developed,  however,  in 
the  Belgian  Chambers  a  considerable  party  of  anti-annexa- 
tionists,  composed,  for  the  most  part  of  socialists;  and  nu- 
merous ([uestions  arose  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  the 
agreement,  as  w^ell  as  to  the  advisabilitv  of  the  annexation 
from  a  political  point  of  view.  The  efforts  of  the  govern- 
ment were  now  directed  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  annex- 
tion,  and  they  were  rewarded  w'ith  success  when,  in  1893. 
the  revised  constitution  provided  for  special  laws  to  govern 
the  colonies,  over-sea  possessions,  or  protectorates  which 
might  be  acquired. 

Since  the  formal  annexation  of  the  Congo  as  a  Belgian 
colony  involved  the  undoing  of  the  work  of  the  Conference 
of  Berlin,  negotiations  were  opened  with  several  of  the 
Signatory  Powers  with  the  intention  of  gaining  their  assent 
to  the  transaction.  By  a  Convention  of  May  12,  1894,  Great 
Britain  admitted  the  possilibity  of  the  annexation.*  The 
French  government  was  also  approached  on  the  subject,  the 
(juestion  being  extremely  delicate,  owing  to  the  French  right 
of  preemption,  as  it  was  called,  for  it  will  be  remembered 

1  Fauchille,  409. 

2Arc/i.  Dip.,  LIV,   111. 

sibid..  lac.  cit;  State  Papers.  LXXXII,  1013;   R.  O.  I.  P..   (1894), 

■i  Stale  Paptrs.  LXZXF/,  19ff. 


INTERXA  TIOXA  L    RELA  TI0X8 


'47 


that  the  International  Association  had  agreed  to  give  the 
preference  to  France,  if  under  unforeseen  circumstances,  it 
should  ever  he  brought  to  sell  its  possessions/  When, 
therefore,  January  9,  1895,  the  Belgian  government  effect- 
ed a  treatv  with  the  Congo  State,  whereby  the  latter  again 
agreed  to  give  up  all  of  its  sovereign  rights. '■  llanatoux, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  instructed  the  French  Min- 
ister at  Brussels  to  enter  a  protest  against  the  proposed  act."^ 
l)ut  an  understanding  w^as  soon  brought  about  between  the 
two  go\-ernments.  By  an  agreement  concluded  at  Paris,  on 
February  5.  1895.  France  gave  its  consent  to  the  transfer  of 
the  possessions  of  the  Congo  Free  State  to  Belgium.  The 
Belgian  government  recognized  a  right  of  preference  for 
France,  should  it.  in  turn,  ever  decide  to  give  the  territory 
up.*  No  others  of  the  Signatory  Powers  were  consulted, 
and  as  noue  of  them  saw  fit  to  enter  a  protest  against  the 
annexation,  the  Belgians  interpreted  their  silence  as  giving 
consent.^ 

By  the  terms  of  the  Belgian  constitution  all  treaties  with 
foreign  powers  which  are  concluded  by  the  government 
must  be  submitted  to  the  Chambers.  When  the  treaty  of 
January  9  was,  accordingly,  placed  before  them,  it  was  ve- 
hemently opposed,  not  only  by  the  socialists,  but  also  by  some 
of  the  conservative  members,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  poor 
policy  to  attempt  to  shorten  the  term  of  years  agreed  to  in 
1890."  The  question  was  kept  in  constant  agitation,  yet 
even  when,  in  February.  1901.  the  date  set  by  the  Convention 
of  1890  arrived,  the  opposition  was  so  strong  that  a  formal 
act  of  annexation  was  adjourned  to  an  indefinite  date.' 

The  bonds  between  the  two  states  were,  however,  con- 
stantly growing  stronger.  In  1902.  Joseph  Delpech.  after 
carefully  reviewing  the  situation,  declared  that  the  annexa- 

1  V.  supra.  58.  =  Arch.  Dip..  LIV.  108. 

■^Arch.  Dip..  LIII,  173.  '' /?.  D.  I.  P..  IX,   (1902),  470. 

■ilbid..  149.  -  Ihid..  471. 

-t/'j'f?..  153f;   Clercq,  XX,  213. 


148 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


tion  of  the  Cong-o  by  Belgium  if  not  yet  consummated  in 
law  was  realized  in  fact.^  liie  time  came,  in  1907,  when  it 
was  possible  to  recognize  the  annexation  as  a  fait  accompli. 
The  step,  was  encouraged  In-  the  fact  that  several  of  the  lead- 
ing authorities  on  international  law  had  become  champions 
of  the  legality  of  the  annexation.  Consequently,  on  No- 
vember 28,  a  new  treaty  was  concluded  between  Belgium 
and  the  Congo  Free  State,  whereby  King  Leopold  ceded  to 
Belgium  the  sovereignty  of  the  Congo  with  all  the  rights 
and  duties  pertaining  thereto."  By  Article  IV  of  this 
treaty  the  date  upon  which  Belgium  should  assume  the  ex- 
ercise of  its  new  sovereigntv  should  lie  fixed  by  a  Royal 
Decree.  The  step  having  been  approved  bv  the  Chambers, 
the  law  providing  for  the  annexation  was  promulgated  by 
the  King,  on  October  18,  igoS,''  and  on  the  30th  of  the  same 
month  provision  was  made  for  the  creation  of  an  office  of 
Colonial  Minister.^  On  November  4  King  Leopold,  by  vir- 
tue of  the  Act  of  November  28  of  the  preceding  year,  issued 
a  Royal  Decree,  by  which  he  appointed  November  15  as  the 
day  on  which  Belgium  should  assume  the  exercise  of  its  sov- 
ereignty over  the  territories  constituting  the  Congo  Free 
State.' 

Mr.  Henry  Lane  Wilson,  the  United  States  Minister  at 
Brussels,  on  April  7,  1908,  conveyed  the  approval  of  his 
government  for  the  intended  step ;''  and  shortly  afterward 
the  British  Minister  did  the  same.' 

Tims  the  annexation  of  the  Congo  was  efifected.  The 
change  had  l)een  so  gradual  that  this  final  act  created  no  dis- 
turbance of  the  e(|uilibrium  of  the  powers.  The  Congo  had 
been  a  colony  in  all  but  name  for  nearly  two  decades,  and 
even  the  government  itself  underwent  very  little  change  as 
a  result  of  the  action  taken  in  1908. 

1  Ibid..  479.  -^  Ibid..  349. 

■^Arch.  Dip..  CVII,  294f.                              ^^  Ibid..  CVIII,  222f. 

■•'-Ibid..  293.  -Ibid..  77. 

*Ibid.,  337. 


INTERNA  TIONA  L    HE  LA  TIONS 


iVJ 


In  order  to  study  the  leg^al  (|uestions  involved  in  the  trans- 
action it  is  necessary  to  refer  once  more  to  the  General  Act 
of  the  Berlin  Conference  of  1885.  W'c  ha\e  seen  how  Bis- 
marck, at  the  final  session  of  that  body,  announced  that  a 
new  state  had  come  into  existence.  The  powers  acce])ted 
the  statement,  at  the  time,  without  question,  since  they  liad 
practically  all  previously  entered  into  treaty  relations  with 
the  Association,  and  there  seemed  nothino^  incong^ruous  in 
the  transformation  of  this  organization  into  a  state.  But 
as  soon  as  King  Leopold  undertook  to  organize  a  govern- 
ment for  the  Congo,  it  became  evident  that  an  international 
anamolv  had  been  created.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  it  is 
exceedinglv  difficult  for  white  men  to  live  for  any  length  of 
time  in  this  equatorial  region,  the  seat  of  the  new  govern- 
ment was  located  at  Brussels.  The  administrative  officials 
were  all  Belgian  subjects,  residing  at  Brussels,  and  subject 
to  Belgian  law.  The  High  Court  of  Cassation  was  com- 
posed of  six  jurists,  three  of  whom  were  Belgians.  No 
constitution  was  ever  proclaimed  for  the  new  state,  hence 
Leopold  was  an  absolute  monarch.  It  is  doubtful  if  the 
oro-anization  really  deserved  the  name  of  state,  although  Nvs 
bv  a  carefully  worked-out,  theoretical  exposition,  sought  to 
show  that  title  to  be  applicable.^  An  international  organi- 
zation with  its  seat  of  government  in  Europe  and  its  terri- 
tory in  Africa,  while  its  executive  and  judicial  officers  were 
all  subjects  of  other  countries,  was  surely  an  exceptional 
form  of  a  state. 

The  proposal  of  annexation  raised  serious  legal  questions. 
In  the  first  place,  it  was  held  that  the  regime  of  permanent 
neutrality  w^ould  not  permit  Belgium  to  hold  a  colony.  The 
London  Conference  on  February  19.  1831.  had  declared  that 
views  of  conquest  were  incompatible  with  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  r  and  this  could  very  easily  be  interpreted  to  in- 

1  Nys,  L'etat  independant  du   Conoo  et  Ic  droit   interuaHonal.   R. 
D.  /..  2  Ser..  V.  17. 
2Clercq,  IV,  17. 


j:^0  "^^^^^   XICl'TRALIZATIOX  OF  STATES 

elude  peaceful  conquests  as  wcll.^  Such  an  act  as  the  ])ro- 
posed  annexation  could  only  l)e  legalized  by  action  of  the 
Powers  which  had  created  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  as  w  ell 
as  that  of  the  Congcj."  l-'urtliermore.  Belgium's  neutrality 
\\as  guaranteed  only  within  tlic  limits  indicated  by  the 
Treaty  of  London,  wliile  the  Congo  had  been  established 
and  recognized  as  a  free  and  independent  state.  It  was 
obvious  that  annexation  would  in\-olve  a  change  of  status 
for  both  of  the  neutralized  states.  Both  wcjuld  thereby  ex- 
pose themselves  to  C(^nditi(^ns  which  would  threaten  the  nIo- 
lation  of  this  neutrality.'' 

In  reply  the  annexationists  declared  that  cohniization  is  a 
natural  function  of  civilized  peoples,  especially  if  they  live 
in  densely  populated  districts;*  that  it  is  but  a  legitimate 
right  of  every  independent  state,  and  hence  may  not  Ije  de- 
nied to  permanent  neutrals.'  If  a  neutralized  state  ought 
not  to  acquire  colonies  because  such  an  act  might  excite  con- 
tests and  rivalries,  it  could,  on  the  same  grounds,  be  inter- 
dicted from  manv  other  functions  of  independence."  As  to 
the  London  Treaty,  Baron  Descamps  declared  that  the 
"limits"  referred  to  were  those  established  upon  the  division 
of  the  old  Kingdom  of  the  Low  Countries  into  Holland  and 
Belgium,  and  had  no  reference  whatever  to  future  acquisi- 
tions which  might  be  made  by  either."  The  annexationits  de- 
nied that  either  Belgium  or  the  Congo  were  creations  of 
Conventions,  since  both  were  free  before  the  meeting  of 
tlie  Conferences,  and  had  entered  into  treaty  relations  with 
certain  jxiwers. 

"It  is  not  true  to  say  that  Belgium  owes  its  existence  to 
the  (Ireat  Powers  of  Knro])e.  Its  freed(-m  it  owes  to  itself 
and  to  itself  alone.    It  had  declared  itself  sovereign  and  free 

1  Fauchille,  427;   Despagnet.  L'ctat  <hi  Coiujo  it  hi  BrU/iqiic.  Rei'n<' 
Bleuc.  4  Ser..  I.    (1894),  780. 

-Fauchille,  417;  Piccioni,  96;   Despagnet,  op.  cit.,  779. 
aPaucthille,  427. 

^Descamps,    Ed.,    508.  ''Ibid..  .510. 

■'Ibid..  509.  -Ibid..  513. 


INTERNATIONAL    RELATIONS  151 

before  any  foreign  intervention  took  place,  and  the  Confer- 
ence of  London  could  merely  recognize  an  accomplished  fact 
which  it  was  impossible  to  suppress,  and  which  shall  not  be 
suppressed  now.  It  is  not  true  to  say  that  Belgium  is  only 
an  artificial  creation  of  the  diplomacy  of  183 1,  and  remains 
subjected  to  the  Avill  to  Europe.  Europe  did  not  create  it, 
and  Europe  cannt^t  destroy  it."'  So  ran  the  impassioned  ad- 
dress of  Pierre  Graux  before  the  Belgian  Chambers. 

The  annexationists  held  that,  far  from  being  inimical, 
the  neutralities  of  Belgium  and  the  Congo  would  combine 
for  the  mutual  strengthening  of  both."  Their  opponents 
declared  that  the  union  of  the  two  neutralities  was  impossi- 
ble, inasmuch  as  that  of  Belgium  was  guaranteed  while  that 
of  the  Congo  w^as  merely  recognized.^  Baron  Descamps 
countered  with  the  argument  that  the  purpose  of  the  neutral- 
ization of  the  Congo  was  to  keep  that  region  from  becoming 
embroiled  in  European  wars,  and  that  this  could  best  be  ac- 
complished by  placing  it  in  the  hands  of  a  power  which  was 
itself  legally  removed  from  participation  in  them.* 

The  fait  accompli  put  an  end  to  the  discussions.  We  have 
seen  that  the  accjuiescence  of  at  least  three  of  the  parties  of 
the  Berlin  Convention  was  given  before  the  final  act  of  an- 
nexation was  promulgated.  It  is  certain  that  the  growing 
jealously  of  British  aggressions  early  led  France  to  yield  its 
rights  of  preemption  in  favor  of  Belgium;  but  after  1904 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  forced  into  the  E'ntente  Cor- 
dial by  a  mutual  fear  of  Pan-Germanism,  and  a  studied  court- 
ing of  good  feeling  in  Belgium  became  a  part  of  their  policy. "" 
Thus  every  practical  obstacle  to  annexation  was  removed, 
and  it  may  be  said  that,  on  the  whole,  this  was  the  natural 
solution  of  the  problem. 

1  Graux,  P.,  La  neutralitc  cle  la  Belgiqur  et  I'annexion  du  Congo. 
R.  D.  I.,  2  Ser.,  VII,   (1906),  48. 
~  Descamps,    Ed..    512. 
3  Fauchille,  429;    Despagnet,  781. 
*  Descamps,  Ed.,  527. 
5  "Y,"  Fort.   Rev..  LXXXVI,   275. 


CHAPTER  XI 

TTIK  r.rARAXTKK  TX  TIIKORV  AXD  PRACTICE 

Few  questions  of  international  law  have  given  rise  to  more 
heated  arguments,  or  resulted  in  greater  confusion  of  opin- 
ion than  has  that  of  the  nature  of  an. international  euaran- 
tee.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  frequent  unwillingness  of 
states  to  fulfil  their  treaty  obligations.  This  has  led  to  a 
general  distrust  among  governments,  and  an  attempt  to  se- 
cure something  more  reliable  than  a  mere  treaty-promise. 
"He  that  sweareth  to  his  own  hurt  and  changeth  not,"  is  as 
scarce  among  nations  as  the  psalmist  implied  liim  to  be 
among  individuals. 

Se\eral  reservations  may  be  made  in  principle  before  tak- 
ing up  a  definite  study  of  the  guarantees  given  in  the  four 
treaties  of  permanent  neutrality.  In  the  first  place,  as  in 
any  contract,  the  consent  of  all  the  contractants  is  necessary 
for  the  validity  of  the  agreement.  No  state  may  place  it- 
self, or  any  of  its  agreements,  under  the  protection  of  an- 
otlicr  power  without  the  consent  of  the  latter;  nor  can  two 
states  enter,  on  their  (Avn  initiative,  into  an  agreement  which 
concerns  the  action  of  a  third  party  unless  this  party  agrees 
to  the  plan.'  Again,  before  a  nation  can  ];e  justified  in  call- 
ing on  its  guarantors  for  assistance,  it  must  lie  ( obvious  that 
the  task  for  which  it  is  asking  help  cannot  be  performed 
without  licl]).  F.\cn  in  the  case  of  guarantors,  no  nation  is 
obliged  to  do  for  anotlier  what  the  latter  can  do  for  itself. 
Thirdly,  tlie  guarantor  must,  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  agree- 
ment, conform  itself  to  the  general  principles  of  internation- 
al law;  it  cannot  be  held  to  fulfill  treatv  engaocments  whicli 
in\-olve  a  violation  of  international  law.  or  of  earlier  ene-ao-p- 

1  Bluntscihli,  Lardy's  translation.  250. 
152 


GUARANTEE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  t-? 

ments/  Lastly,  the  guarantee  may  be  modified  and  sub- 
jected to  all  manner  of  conditions  by  the  terms  of  the  con- 
vention which  creates  it.  In  each  individual  case  the  inten- 
tion of  the  contracting  parties  should  be  discovered  and 
applied." 

In  early  times  security  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  terms  of 
a  treaty  was  made  sure  by  the  exchange  of  hostages ;  and, 
with  the  other  spoils  of  war.  there  often  went  with  the  vic- 
tor the  dearest  and  nearest  of  kin  of  the  vanquished,  as  a 
guarantee  that  the  promises  made  by  the  latter,  or  the  de- 
mands made  upon  him  would  be  met  in  full.  Later,  under 
the  feudal  regime,  the  powerful  vassals  gave  their  guarantee 
to  the  treaties  concluded  by  their  lords.  Finally  there  de- 
veloped formal  treaties  of  guarantee ;  but  these  are  apt  to 
perpetuate  the  very  faults  which  they  are  intended  to  cor- 
rect.^ A  party  may  refuse  to  act  in  good  faith  as  a  guaran- 
tor, as  well  as  a  signer,  of  any  kind  of  a  treaty,  and  in  in- 
ternational affairs  there  is  no  court  to  enforce  such  obli- 
gations. 

For  our  studv  of  the  guarantees  given  by  the  Powers 
for  the  permanent  neutralities,  it  may  be  w^ell  to  refer  once 
more  to  the  treaties  by  which  these  neutralities  were  created. 
The  Declaration  of  the  Powers,  of  March  20.  181 5.  on 
Swiss  Affairs,  promised  that,  as  soon  as  the  Helvetic  Diet 
should  accede  to  the  arrangements  made  by  the  Congress, 
an  act  should  be  passed  recognizing  and  guaranteeing,  on  the 
part  of  all  the  powers,  the  permanent  neutrality  of  Swit- 
zerland, and  on  May  27,  the  Diet  expressed  the  eternal  grati- 
tude of  the  Swiss  nation  for  the  promise  of  this  guarantee. 
On  Xovember  20  an  act  of  the  Five  Powers  fulfilled  the 
promise.  Since  there  has  never  been  a  serious  threat  of  vio- 
lation of  Swiss  neutrality,  the  nature  of  this  guarantee  has 
aroused  little  interest. 

1  Ibid..  252. 

2  Milovanowitch,   7. 
^Ibid..  8. 


,-,  THE   XErTRAIAZATIOX   OF  STATES 

The  guarantee  of  the  neutrahty  of  Belgium  is  found  in 
the  treaties  of  April  19.  1839.  The  first  of  these,  between 
Belgium  and  Holland,  declares,  by  Article  \^II,  the  indepen- 
dence and  permanent  neutrality  of  the  former;  the  second, 
between  Belgium  and  the  h'ive  Powers,  declares  that  the 
arrangements  of  the  first  treaty  are  placed  under  the  guar- 
antee of  the  sovereigns  of  the  Signatory  Powers.  Article 
IT  of  the  Treaty  of  London  of  March  11..  1867,  places  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemluu'g  under  the  sanction  of  the  collective 
guarantee  of  the  Signatory  Powers,  with  the  exceptic^n  of 
Belgium.  Bv  the  F'inal  Act  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  of 
1885,  the  powers  engaged  mutually  to  respect  the  neutral- 
itv  of  the  Congo  Basin,  but  in  no  case  did  they  agree  to 
cause  this  neutrality  to  be  respected. 

Upon  comparison  of  the  engagements  entered  into  by  the 
])owers  witli  regard  to  Belgium  and  Puxemburg,  it  will  be 
seen  that,  although  the  thought  of  some  of  the  leaders  of  the 
movement  for  neutralization  in  1867  was  to  place  Luxem- 
burg in  a  situation  identical  with  that  of  Belgium  in  its  re- 
lations with  Europe,^  in  reality  there  is  a  technical  differ- 
ence in  the  status  of  the  two.  The  guarantee  of  Belgian 
neutrality  is  simple,  or  joint  a)id  sci'cral  f  that  is,  the  neutral- 
ity is  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  each  of  the  pow/ers 
separately,  and  at  the  same  time  under  the  guarantee  of  them 
all.  Belgium  may  appeal  to  any  one  of  its  guarantors,  or, 
at  its  discretion,  to  a  conference  of  them  all.  Should  the 
threat  of  violation  come  from  one  of  the  guarantors,  or 
should,  for  any  reason,  one  of  them  refuse  to  fulfil  its  treaty 
obligations  when  appealed  to  by  the  neutral  state,  the  others 
are  in  no  wise  released  from  their  ol)ligations  to  come  to  its 
rescue.  Each  one  of  the  guarantors  has  the  right  to  enter 
into  negotiations  with  the  co-guarantors  in  case  the  neutral 
shall  call  on  it  for  aid;  or  it  may  even  go  so  far  as  to  take 

1  Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil,  XVIII,  432f. 

2  Pradier-Fodere,  II,  632. 


GUARAXTEi:  JX  THEORY  AM)  PRACTICE  ,  -- 

'  .1.") 

the  initiative  in  order  to  protect  the  neutrality  which  is  <;iuir- 
anteed. 

The  guarantee  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg-  is.  on  the 
other  hand,  expressly  stipulated  as  collective;  that  is.  the 
principle  of  neutrality  is  placed  under  the  common  guaran- 
tee of  the  Signatory  Powers.  Such  a  guarantee  implies 
that  there  should  be  joint  action  on  the  part  of  all  the  guar- 
antors, if  this  be  possible,  in  order  to  defend  the  neutrality. 
The  neutral,  or  one  of  the  guarantors,  may  call  a  conference 
to  discuss  the  proper  course  to  be  pursued  under  the  cir- 
cumstances ;  and,  so  long  as  there  is  a  majority  in  favor  of 
a  certain  course,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  all  to  abide  by  this 
decision. 

The  Treaty  of  London,  of  1867,  was  hardly  signed  when 
the  British  Cabinet  was  put  on  the  defensive  to  explain  the 
nature  of  the  obligations  to  which  it  had  bound  the  nation 
in  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  a  state  in  which  England 
could  have  no  immediate  interest.  Lord  Stanley,  who,  as 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  presided  over  the 
Conference,  admitted,  on  June  14,  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, that  he  had  hesitated  before  signing  the  agreement, 
and  that  he  had  finally  given  his  consent  only  to  avoid  war 
between  France  and  Prussia ;  a  war  in  which  England  would 
probably  be  involved,  through  an  invasion  of  Belgium  by- 
one  or  both  belligerents/  On  being  questioned  more  close- 
ly, Stanley  continued  his  explanation  : 

"The  guarantee  now  given  is  collective  only.  That  is  an  impor- 
tant distinction;  it  means  this,  that  in  the  event  of  a  violation  of 
the  neutrality  all  the  powers  which  have  signed  the  treaty  may  be 
called  upon  for  collective  action.  No  one  of  these  powers  is  liable 
to  be  called  upon  to  act  singly  or  separately.  It  is  a  case,  so  to 
speak,  of  ilimited  liability.  We  are  bound  in  honor,  you  can  not 
place  a  legal  construction  upon  it,  to  see  in  concert  with  others 
that  these  arrangements  are  maintained.  ...  If  they  refuse 
to  join   us,    we   are  not  bound  single  handed   to  make   up   the  de- 

1  Hansard,  3  Ser.,  CLXXXVII,  col.  1910f. 


1S6 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


ficiences  of  the  rest.  Such  a  guarantee  has  obviously  rather  the 
cliaracter  of  a  moral  sanction  to  the  arrangements  which  it  de- 
fends, 'than  that  of  a  contingent  liaibility  to  make  war,  but  it 
would    not   necessarily   imply   the  obligation." 

To  Lord  Stanley's  father.  Lord  Derby,  who  was  then  Prime 
Minister,  fell  the  task  of  defending  the  treaty  in  the  House 
of  Lords.     On  May  13,  he  declared  : 

"The  guarantee  of  Luxemburg  is  not  a  joint  and  several  guaran- 
tee, but  is  a  collective  guarantee,  and  does  not  impose  upon  this 
country  any  special  duty  of  enforcing  its  provisions.  It  is  a  collec- 
tive guarantee  of  all  the  powers  of  Europe."^ 

On  June  20  he  continued  : 

"The  only  two  Powers  by  which  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  is 
likely  to  be  infringed  are  two  cf  the  parties  to  the  collective  guar- 
antee; and  therefore  if  either  of  them  violates  the  neutrality  the 
obligation  on  all  the  others  would  not  accrue. "2 

Tn  tliis  opinion  he  was  supported  l)y  Lord  Clarendon. 

"No  one  of  the  powers  can  be  called  upon  to  take  single  action, 
even  in  the  improbable  case  of  difficulty  arising.  I  can  not  help 
regarding  this  guarantee  as  a  moral  guarantee,  a  point  of  honor, 
as  an  arrangement  which  can  not  be  violated  without  dishonor  by 
any  of  the  Signatory  Powers;  and  I  ibelieve  an  agreement  of  that 
nature  may  be  more  binding  than  the  precise  terms  in  which  a 
treaty  is  couched,  for  it  is  a  characteristic  of  these  terms  that 
when  t)he  formal  treaties  are  found  inconvenient,  they  are  disre- 
garded."3 

On  July  4  Lord  Derljy  made  his  most  famous  speech  on  the 
finest  ion  : 

"Whatever  the  interpretation  wlhich  I  may  put  on  particular  words 
of  the  treaty,  or  whatever  the  interpretation  which  Her  Majesty's 
government  may  put  on  it,  such  an  interpretation  can  not  affect 
the  international  law  by  which   the  terms  of  all  treaties  are  con- 

1  Hansard,  CLXXXVH,  379. 
^  Ibid.,   151. 
3  Ibid.,  152f. 


GVARAXTEE  IX  THEORY  AXD  PRACTICE 


157 


strued.  I  am  not  much  schooled  in  the  ways  of  diplomats,  but  I 
believe  that  if  there  be  one  thing  more  clear  than  another  it  is  the 
distinction  between  a  co'Uective  and  a  separate  and  several  guaran- 
tee. A  several  guarantee  binds  each  of  the  parties  to  do  its  utmost 
individually  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the  guarantee.  A  collec- 
tive guarantee  is  binding  on  all  of  the  parties  collectively;  but  If 
any  difference  of  opinion  should  arise,  no  one  of  them  can  be  called 
upon  to  take  upon  itself  the  task  of  vindication  by  force  of  arms. 
The  guarantee  is  collective,  and  depends  upon  the  union  of  all  the 
■parties  signing  it;  and  no  one  of  these  parties  is  bound  to  take 
upon  itself  the  duty  of  enforcing  the  fulfilment  of  the  guarantee. 
As  far  as  the  honor  of  England  is  concerned,  she  will  be  bound  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg;  .  .  .  but  she  is  not 
bound  to  take  upon  herself  the  Quixotic  duty,  in  the  case  of  a  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  by  one  of  the  other  Powers, 
of  interfering  to  .prevent  its  violation  because  we  have  only  under- 
taken to  guarantee  it  in  common  with  all  the  other  Great  Powers  of 
Europe.  If  the  neutrality  should  be  violated  by  any  of  them,  then 
I  say  it  is  not  a  case  of  obligation,  but  a  case  of  discretion,  with 
each  of  the  Signatory  Powers,  as  to  tow  far  they  should  singly  or 
collectively  take  upon  themselves  to  vindicate  the  neutrality  guar- 
anteed."! 

This  so-called  Derby  doctrine  has  met  with  little  accept- 
ance among  leading  publicists.  Pradier-Fodere.-  Funck- 
Brentano  and  Sorel,^  Calvo/  and  Sir  Frederick  Smith'  ac- 
cept it  to  some  extent.  On  the  other  hand.  Xys  calls  Stan- 
ley's "a  strange  interpretation,"*^  and  says  that  to  advocate 
such  an  interpretation  "is  to  declare  the  epithet  collective 
destructive  of  the  guarantee  itself;"  that  its  sponsor  forgot 
"that  states  do  not  conclude  treaties  in  order  to  establish 
agreements    of    honor."'      Bonfils.'     Milovanowitch.''     Ed- 

1  Hansard,  CLXXXVIII,  968. 

2  Pradier-Fodere,  II,  33. 

3  Funck-Brentano  and  Sorel,  354ff. 
4Calvo,  IV,  499. 

5  Smith,  Sir  F.,  5th  edition  by  C.  Phillipson,  144. 

6  Nys,  Notes.  40. 
■'Ibid..  42. 

^^  Bonfils,   492f. 

»  Milovanowitch,  5ff. 


158 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


ouavd  Descamps.\  Piccioni,"  and  Servais'  are  of  tlic  same 
opinion.  I\i\ier'  and  Despagnef  declare  that  if  nn  agree- 
ment t(.r  commnnitN'  of  action  can  be  reached  Ijy  a  confer- 
ence, each  guarantor  is  l;onnd  to  fulhl  the  obhgation.  Bhml- 
schh  declares  to  the  same  effect,''  and  is  (jnoted  by  Hall,'  who 
goes  on  to  say  : 

"Such  a  guarantee  would  be  meaningless  if  it  did  no  more  than 
provide  for  common  action  under  circumstances  in  whicb  the  guar- 
anteeing powers  would  act  together.  ...  It  would  be  well  to 
abstain  from  concluding  agreements  in  terms  wliich  may  surely  mis- 
lead some  of  the  parties  to  them,  and  to  avoid  making  agreements 
at  all  which  some  of  the  contracting  parties  may  intend  from  the 
beginning  to  be   illusory." 

Oppenheim  says  of  the  Derby  doctrine,  "I  do  not  know  of 
any  publicist  who  would  or  could  ai)prove  of  it."^  Alartens 
condemns  the  doctrine,  merely  making  the  reservation  that 
no  guarantor  is  bound  to  sacrifice  its  own  existence  to  sa\e 
the  guaranteed  state." 

Opposition  has  fre(|uently  been  voiced  in  Parliament  it- 
self.    On  June  20,  1867,  the  Earl  of  Granville  declared, 

"If  Her  Majesty's  Government  instead  of  increasing  our  liabili- 
ties, have  actually  diminished  them,  it  appears  to  me  that  there 
has  been  the  most  complete  mystification  of  some  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguisihed  diplomats  of  Europe  ever  heard  of  ...  In  spite  of 
these  fanciful  interpretations  as  to  how  far  we  are  bound  by  treat- 
ies, it  is  possible  that  we  may  have  rendered  ourselves  liable  at  some 
future  time  to  practical  inconvenience,  or  the  risk  of  being  consid- 
ered unfatTiful  to  our  agreements. "10 

The  same  speaker,  three  years  later,  referred  bitterlv  to 
the  Derby  doctrine  sa\-ing. 


1  Descamps,  Ed.,  541ff. 

2  Piccioni,  ISf. 

3  Servais,  56ff. 

•»  Rivier,   II,   104ff. 
•■■'  Despagnet,   144. 


c  Bluntschli,  253. 

7  Hall,  6th  edition,  337f. 

*  Oippenheim,   I,   575. 

!'  Martens,  I,  5.'i4. 

10  Hansard,  CLXXXVIII,  153. 


GUARANTEE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  j-g 

"We  are  now  in  a  position  like  that  described  by  a  Conservative 
government  when  we  joined  in  a  treaty  guaranteeing  Luxemburg, 
and  when,  almost  before  t)he  ink  with  which  it  was  signed  was  dry, 
the  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Minister  of  this  country  announced, 
to  the  surprise  of  France  and  the  indignation  of  Prussia,  that  we 
had  signed  as  a  collective  guarantor,  and  as  the  cooperation  of  the 
other  Powers  was  the  only  case  in  which  the  guaramtee  could  prob- 
ably be  brought  into  question,  England  'had  brought  herself  under 
no  new  obligation  at  aM."i 

Indeed,  murmurs  had  already  arisen  on  the  Continent  that  it 
was  no  longer  of  any  use  to  make  treaties  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, since  she  would  not  keep  them  when  made." 

Nevertheless,  when,  on  August  2,  19 14,  German  troops 
entered  the  Grand  Ducal  territory,  the  British  government 
stood  squarely  upon  the  Derby  Doctrine.  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
upon  being  asked  by  M.  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador 
at  London,  to  define  his  governments  attitude  toward  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg,  "told  him  the  doctrine  on  that 
point  as  laid  down  by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon  in 
1867.""  and  reminded  him  that  "the  conx-ention  of  1867  re- 
lating to  Luxemburg  differed  from  the  treaty  relative  to 
E>elgium  in  this  sense,  that  England  was  bound  to  uphold 
this  latter  agreement  without  the  support  of  the  Guarantee- 
ing Powers,  while,  for  Luxembin-g,  all  the  Guaranteeing 
Powers  must  act  in  concert."^  Thus  England  persisted  in 
holding  a  position  which  is  untenable  from  a  legal  point  of 
view,  and  one  that  had  been  condemned  by  the  best  author- 
ities among  her  own,  as  well  as  foreign  publicists.  It  is  im- 
possible to  see  why  a  guarantor  should  be  any  more  bound  in 
the  case  of  Belgium  that  in  that  of  Luxemburg;  yet  the  Brit- 
ish government  has  repeatedly  let  it  be  known  that  it  would 
regard  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  as  a  serious 

iJ&id.,   CCIII,   1756. 

2  See  the  speech  of  Lord  Russell,  Hansard,  CLXXXVIH,  975. 

3  British  Blue  Book,  Document  148. 
*  French  Yellow  Book,  137. 


j(5o  THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

matter,  and  one  which  might  he  interpreted  as  a  casus  bcUi.^ 
To  an  impartial  observer  it  wonld  seem  tliat  a  collective 
guarantee,  in  international  as  well  as  in  pri\ate  law.  is  in- 
tended to  be  strcjnger  than  a  simple  guarantee:  and  that  En- 
gland's partiality  for  Belgium  is  the  outgrowth  of  circum- 
stances in  which  its  treaty  obligations  and  its  political  and 
commercial  interests  coincide,  if  by  the  treaty  of  1867 
Great  Britain  bound  itself  only  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Luxemburg,  the  nuson  d'etre  of  the  treaty  is  hard  to  iind ; 
for  the  situation  of  the  (irand  Duchy  is  such  that  only  under 
very  uncommon  circumstances  could  British  troops  gain  ac- 
cess to  its  territory.  The  greatest  of  English  authorities  on 
international  law  utters  a  timely  warning  in  this  regard. 

"Modern  writers  are  more  struck  by  the  impossibility  of  looking 
at  international  contracts  as  (perpetually  binding,  than  by  the  neces- 
sity of  insisting  upon  that  good  faith  between  states  without  which 
the  world  has  only  before  it  the  alternatives  of  armed  suspense  or 
open  war;  and  they  too  often  lay  down  canons  of  such  perilous 
looseness  that  if  their  declaration  is  to  ;be  accepted  an  unscrupulous 
state  need  never  be  in  want  of  a  plausible  excuse  for  repudiating  an 
inconvenient  obligation,  and  fhis  unfortunately  occurs  at  a  time 
wihen  the  growing  laxity  which  is  apparent  in  the  conduct  of  many 
governments  and  the  curious  tolerance  with  which  gross  violations 
of  faith  are  regarded  by  public  opinion  render  it  more  necessary 
than  ever  that  jurists  should  see  with  greater  than  ordinary  care 
such  small  influence  as  they  have  to  check  wrong  and  to  point  out 
wihat  is  right. "2 

The  powers  guaranteeing  a  permanent  neutrality  have 
never  acted  in  accordance  with  uniform  rules  in  fulfilling 
their  guarantees.  Thus  when  in  1)^46  Cracow  was  absorbed 
b}'  Austria.  Russia  and  I'russia  were  accessories  to  the  deed, 
while  Great  Britain  and  France,  who,  as  signers  of  the  binal 
Act  of  the  Congress  of  X'ienna,  had  become,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent at  least,  guarantors  of  its  pro\'isions.  offered  only  ])la- 

1  See  the  Article  entitled  England.  Belgium  and  Holland,  by  "Y", 
in  Fort.  Rev..  LXXXVI,  267ff. 
-Hall,  W.   E.,   342. 


I 


GUARANTEE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  i5i 

tonic  protests.  Russia  and  Austria,  being  far  removed  from 
the  neighborhood  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg,  have  never 
manifested  the  sHghtest  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  their 
neutrahty,  although  lx)th  legally  share  in  the  responsibility 
of  the  guarantees.  Upon  Great  Britain  has  devolved  the 
task  of  fulfilling  the  guarantee  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
and  though  altruism  may  have  played  but  a  small  part  in 
directing  its  conduct,  still  it  may  be  said  to  Britain's  credit 
that  it  has  never  hesitated  in  the  performance  of  its  interna- 
tional duty  in  this  regard.  Luxemburg,  through  its  close 
commercial  affiliation  with  Germany,  has  found  itself  drawn 
to  that  power,  and  was,  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Great 
^^'ar,  little  more  than  a  German  appanage.  This  was  un- 
doubtedly the  reason  why  the  German  government  seemed 
to  give  so  little  thought  to  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
the  Grand  Duchv. 

We  have  seen  how,  in  1870,  Great  Britain  concluded  iden- 
tical treaties  with  France  and  Prussia,  seeking  a  renew^ed 
safeguard  against  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.  This 
act  on  the  part  of  the  British  government  has  been  construed 
as  proving  that  the  treaties  of  183 1  and  1839  were  no  longer 
valid ;  but  this  construction  can  not  be  maintained.  The 
treaties  of  1870  expressly  stated  that  the  former  treaties 
were  still  in  force,  and  that,  after  a  period  of  one  year  from 
the  ratification  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  the  international  status 
of  Belgium  should  be  governed  by  the  terms  of  the  earlier 
treaties.^  The  real  purpose  of  the  treaties  of  1870  was 
carefully  explained  by  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  was  Prime  Min- 
ister at  the  time.'  Bismarck  had  seized  this  opportunity  to 
win  support  for  the  German  cause,  by  making  public  certain 
negotiations  which  had  recently  been  entered  into  by  Louis 
Napoleon  and  himself  with  regard  to  the  incorporation  of 
Belgium  with  France.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  seemed 
not  improbable  that  the  latter  power  would  come  out  of  the 

iHertslet.  Ill,  1086ff. 

2  Morley,  J.,   The  Life  of  W.  E.   Gladstone,    (3   void.   London   and 
New  York,  1903),  II,  340ff. 


1 52  T'HE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 

Struggle  \ictorioiis.  and  in  such  an  event  it  was  not  unlikely 
that  the  right  to  annex  Belgium  would  be  one  of  the  rewards 
of  the  victor.  It  was  to  guard  against  such  an  outcome  that 
Gladstone  thought  it  wise  to  negotiate  new  and  auxiliary 
treaties  with  the  belligerents.  It  seems  today  little  short 
of  miraculous  that  the  neutrality  of  both  Belgium  and  Lux- 
emburg was  respected  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War.^ 
Indeed  it  was  early  felt  that,  in  the  event  of  another  war  be- 
tween the  same  parties,  the  status  of  the  permanent  neutrals 
would  not  be  respected,  although  German  officials  constant- 
ly repeated  assurances  that  their  government  would  live  up 
to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  its  treaty  obligations." 

At  the  same  time  the  British  government  prepared  to  ful- 
fil, whenever  occasion  might  arise,  the  engagements  which 
it  had  contracted  toward  Belgium.  In  1875.  ^vhen  Germany 
threatened  a  second  attack  upon  France,  a  military  commis- 
sion was  sent  from  London  to  Brussels  to  concert  measures 
of  defense.^  In  1906,  when  feeling  among  the  powers  once 
again  grew  acute,  a  military  agreement  was  entered  into  be- 
tween certain  officials  of  the  armies  of  Belgium  and  En- 
gland, whereby  the  latter  pledged  itself  to  furnish  help  in 
case  of  need,  and  definite  arrangements  w^ere  made  for  land- 
ing and  using  British  soldiers  on  Belgian  soil.^  It  was  the 
discovery  of  this  agreement  in  the  archives  at  Brussels, 
which  led  the  German  government  to  attempt  to  justify  its 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  on  grounds  of  collusion  be- 
tween Belgium  and  (ireat  Britain,  but  the  German  statement 
omitted  to  stress  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  had  expressly 
pledged  itself  not  to  place  a  single  soldier  on  Belgian  soil 
until  after  a  violation  l)y  Germany  had  actually  taken  place. 
Furthermore,  the  rape  of  Belgium  took  place  before  this 

'  See  the  note  of  King  Charles  of  Roumania  to  King  Albert  of  Bel- 
gium, 1912,  given  in  Waxweiler.  20. 
-  Belgian  Grey  Book.  12. 
3"Y".   Fort.  Rev..  XXXXVI,   268. 
■IB.  B.  B.,  Appendix,  4;   B.  G.  B.,  2,  part  II,  X. 


1 


GUARANTEE  IX  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  j^^ 

evidence  was  discovered,  hence  it  played  no  ])art  in  the  earlier 
plans  of  the  German  government. 

When,  dnring-  the  last  days  of  Jnly.  1914.  it  became  evi- 
dent that  a  European  conflict  was  alxjut  to  break  out.  Bel- 
gium took  steps  to  assure  its  guarantors  of  its  determina- 
tion to  enforce  its  neutrality.^  and  immediately  placed  its 
army  on  a  "strengthened  peace  standing."^  From  the  first 
the  French  authorities  assured  the  Belgian  government  that 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would  l)e  respected  by  their  forces, 
as  long  as  it  was  not  violated  by  their  foes.^  On  July  31, 
the  British  government  requested  from  France  and  Ger- 
many statements  of  their  respective  attitudes  tow-ard  Belgian 
neutrality.*  The  French  promptly  returned  a  favorable  re- 
ply,'' while  the  Imperial  Minister  at  Berlin  refused  to  com- 
mit his  government.*'  On  the  evening  of  August  2.  the  verv 
day  that  the  German  forces,  under  pretense  of  protecting  the 
railroads  which  were  under  German  control,^  invaded  the 
territory  of  Luxemburg,  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels 
handed  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  the  famous 
"very  confidential"  note,  to  which  an  answer  was  to  be  re- 
turned within  twelve  hours. ^  In  this  note  the  German  gov- 
ernment declared  that  in  order  to  forestall  a  French  advance 
through  Belgian  territory,  it  had  been  forced  to  plan  send- 
ing its  own  troops  through.  So  long  as  Belgium  remained 
friendly  to  the  Imperial  government,  the  latter  would  guar- 
antee the  possessions  and  the  independence  of  the  Belgian 
kingdom,  would  evacuate  all  Belgian  territory  upon  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  and  would  pay  for  all  supplies,  and  make 
good  all  damages  caused  directly  by  its  troops ;  but  in  the 
event  of  opposition  to  the  German  troops  by  the  Belgian  gov- 
ernment, the  latter  would  of  necessity  be  regarded  as  an  en- 

iB.  G.  B.,  2.  ^Ibid..  11. 

^Ibid.,  8.  5  Ibid.,  15. 

3  Ibid..  9.  ^Ibid..  14. 

-F.  Y.  B..   133. 

^  B.  G.  B.,  20;   Times  Documentary  History  of  the  War,  II,  357. 


1 64 


THE  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  STATES 


emy,  and  the  eventual  adjustment  of  the  relations  between 
the  two  states  must  be  left  to  the  decision  of  arms. 

As  a  permanent  neutral  it  was  impossible  for  Belgium  to 
accede  to  this  request.  Germany,  one  of  the  guaranators 
of  that  neutrality,  was  exceeding  its  rights  by  seeking  to  in- 
duce the  guaranteed  state  to  abandon  its  neutrality.  We 
have  already  shown  the  difference  in  the  international  obliga- 
tions of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg,  for  the  latter,  having  un- 
dergone a  process  of  "radical  neutralization,"  was  powerless 
to  defend  itself,  while  the  former  was  under  obligation  to 
its  guarantors  to  defend  itself  to  the  utmost  of  its  ability. 
Certain  acts  of  the  German  government  go  to  show  that  it 
realized  that  the  thing  asked  of  Belgium  was  incompatible 
with  national  honor.  Switzerland,  the  only  state  of  Europe 
whose  international  status  was  similar  to  that  of  Belgium, 
was  congratulated  by  the  German  government  upon  its  de- 
termination to  defend  its  neutrality  against  all  would-be  ag- 
gressors. On  August  4,  the  German  Secretary  of  State, 
von  Jagow,  admitted  his  country's  guilt  during  an  audience 
granted  to  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin.  He  said,  "Be- 
lieve me,  it  is  with  acute  grief  that  Germany  decides  to  vio- 
late the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  .  •  .  .  Germany  has 
nothing  with  which  to  reproach  Belgium,  and  the  attitude 
of  Belgium  has  always  been  perfectly  correct.'  The 
Chancellor,  Bethmann-Hollweg,  was  still  more  blunt  in  his 
admissions  before  the  Reichstag  on  the  same  day.  "Our 
troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg  and  have  perhaps  already 
entered  Belgian  territory.  That  is  a  breach  of  interna- 
tional law.  .  .  .  Thus  we  ha\'e  been  forced  to  ignore 
the  rightful  ])rotest  of  the  governments  of  Luxemburg  and 
Belgium.  The  wrong — I  speak  openly — the  wrong  we 
therel)y  commit  we  will  try  to  make  good  as  soon  as  our 
military  aims  have  been  attained.  He  who  is  menaced  as 
we  are  and  is  fighting  f(^r  his  highest  possession,  can  onlv 
consider  h(nv  he  is  to  hack  his  wav  through. "- 

1  B.  G.  B.,  51.  Ubid..  35. 


GUARANTEE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  j^r 

On  the  morning  of  August  3.  the  Belgian  government  re- 
pHed  to  the  "very  confidential"  note  with  a  refusal  to  ac- 
cede to  the  request/  and  immediately  notified  its  representa- 
tives abroad  of  its  action.-  The  French  Minister  assured  the 
Belgian  government  that  his  nation  as  a  guarantor  stood 
ready  to  respond  to  an  appeal  for  help,  but  was  informed  that 
Belgium  did  not,  as  yet,  feel  that  such  an  appeal  would  be 
warranted.'^  Early  the  following  morning,  however,  the 
German  troops  crossed  the  Belgian  border  at  Gemmenich.* 
That  evening  an  appeal  was  made  by  the  Belgian  govern- 
ment to  the  courts  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  for 
cooperation  in  defense  of  its  territory. '"^  France  and  Russia 
replied  favorably.'"'  Since  they  were  already  involved  in  the 
war  their  reply  was  a  foregone  conclusion ;  and  the  attitude 
of  Great  Britain  was,  from  the  first,  a  matter  of  certainty. 
\MiiIe  using  every  effort  to  maintain  peace,  that  power  had 
already  let  it  be  understood,  both  at  Brussels  and  Berlin, 
that  under  certain  circumstances  it  might  not  be  possible 
for  it  to  remain  neutral  in  the  approaching  struggle."  Upon 
receipt  of  the  Belgian  appeal.  Sir  Edward  Grey  addressed 
the  House  of  Commons,  declaring  that  diplomatic  interven- 
tion had  already  taken  place,  apparently  to  no  avail,  and 
that  it  was  now  necessary  for  the  British  government  to  for- 
mulate a  definite  policy  to  be  pursued.  He  based  his  chief 
appeal  for  support,  not  on  national  honor,  and  the  obliga- 
tion which  rested  on  England  to  fulfil  the  guarantee,  but 
rather  on  British  interests,  which  would  be  jeopardized 
should  Germany  gain  control  of  the  Belgian  and  French 
coasts  on  the  Xorth  Sea."  It  was  only  after  quoting  from 
Gladstone  that  he  placed  his  appeal  on  the  higher  plane  of 

1  Ibid.,    22.  *Il)id..  30. 

2  Ibid.,  23.  ■                         5  iMd..  40. 

3  Ibid.,  24.  <^Ibid.,  52. 
7B.  B.  B.,  99  and   101. 

s  Stowell,  E.  C,  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  !!>!',.   (New  York.  1915). 
353ff;   original  speech  of  Gladstone,  Hansard,  CCIII,  1787. 


iCj5  'J'he  neutralization  of  stated 

moral  obligation.  That  statesman  had  declared  that  Great 
Britain  had  an  interest  in  tlie  independence  of  Belgium  wider 
than  that  which  it  might  ha\e  in  the  literal  operation  of  the 
guarantee.  "It  is  found  in  the  answer  to  the  ([uestion 
whether,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  this  country, 
endowed  as  it  is  with  influence  and  power,  would  (juietly 
stand  by  and  witness  the  perpetration  of  the  greatest  crime 
tliat  ever  stained  the  pages  of  history,  and  thus  become  a 
participator  in  the  sin." 

After  consultation  with  the  Cabinet  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
announced  to  the. Belgian  Minister  that  if  Belgian  neutrality 
were  violated  war  with  Germany  would  result,^  and,  on 
August  4,  he  sent  to  Berlin  a  telegram  protesting  against 
the  action  of  the  German  government,  and  again  request- 
ing a  pledge  that  Belgian  neutrality  should  be  respected." 
The  reply  was  that  the  German  government  had  been  com- 
pelled to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality,  it  having  been  for  her 
a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French  advance:  but 
that  it  would,  under  no  pretext  whatever,  annex  Belgian 
territory.^  In  reply  the  British  government  asked  immedi- 
ate assurance  that  Germany  would  respect  Belgian  neutral- 
ity; and  declared  that  if  this  assurance  were  forthcom- 
ing His  Majesty's  government  would  feel  bound  to  take  all 
steps  in  their  powder  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and 
the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as  much 
a  party  as  England.* 

That  afternoon  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  called 
upon  the  Secretary  of  State  and  inquired  whether  his  gov- 
ernment would  respect  Belgian  neutrality;  but  was  informed 
that  Belgian  neutrality  had  already  been  violated.^  Later 
in  the  evening  he  called  on  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  and  the 
oft-quoted  conversation  furnished  one  of  the  by- words  of 

1  B.   G.   B.,    26.  4  ibkL^   159. 

2B.  B.  B..  153.  ■         ^^Ibid-,  160. 

3/bifZ.,  157. 


GUARANTEE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  lf,7 

llie  war.  We  quote  from  the  official  report  of  Sir  Edward 
(joschen.  "I  found  the  Chacellor  very  agitated.  His  F,x- 
cellence  at  once  began  a  harangue  which  lasted  for  about 
twenty  minutes.  He  said  that  the  step  taken  by  His  Maj- 
esty's government  was  terriljle  to  a  degree;  just  for  a  word 
— 'neutralitv,'  a  word  whicli  in  war  time  had  so  often  been 
disregarded,  just  for  a  scrap  of  paper,  Great  Britain  was 
eroine  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  which  desired  noth- 
inp-  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  .  .  .  What 
we  had  done  was  unthinkable ;  it  was  like  striking  a  man 
from  behind  while  he  was  fighting  for  his  life  against  two 
assailants.  He  held  Great  Britain  responsible  for  all  the 
terrible  events  which  might  happen." 

The  British  Ambassador  declared  that  Great  Britain  made 
the  Cjuestion  one  of  national  honor,  and  when  reminded  of 
the  consequences  which  might  follow,  informed  the  infuri- 
ated Chancellor  that  fear  of  consequences  could  hardly  be  re- 
garded as  an  excuse  for  breaking  solemn  engagements. 
Here,  at  last.  Great  Britain  appeared  l)efore  the  world  as  the 
champion  of  the  sacredness  of  treaty  obligations,  and  surely, 
no  one  w'ould  deny  that  her  case  was  made  stronger  by  the 
step.  It  is  significant  that  when,  on  August  6,  Mr.  Asquith. 
the  Prime  Minister,  addressed  the  House  of  Commons  on 
the  war  which  was  by  this  time  a  certainty,  he  based  his  ap- 
peal for  support  aljsolutely  upon  moral  grounds.  "If  I  am 
asked  what  we  are  fighting  for,  I  reply  in  two  sentences. 
In  the  first  place,  to  fulfil  a  solemn  international  obligation. 
Secondly,  to  vindicate  a  principle;  in  these  days 
when  force,  material  force,  sometimes  seems  to  be  the  domi- 
nant influence  and  factor  in  the  development  of  mankind, 
we  are  fighting  to  vindicate  the  principle  that  small  national- 
ities are  not  to  be  crushed,  in  defiance  of  international  good 
faith,  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  a  strong  and  overmastering 
power.  The  maintenance  of  this  principle  is  vital  to  the 
ci\'ilization  of  the  world. "^ 

1  Times  Hist.,  II.  428. 


CHAPTER  XII 


CONCLUSION 


Whether  or  not  permanent  neutrality  is  to  continue  as 
one  of  the  institutions  of  Europe  can  not  now  l)e  said.  The 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany  of  191 9  expressly  states. 
(Article  XXXI).  that  "the  Treaties  of  April  19.  1839. 
which  established  the  status  of  Belgium  before  the  war  no 
longer  conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  situation;"  and 
Germany  consented  to  their  abrogation  and  undertook  to 
recognize  and  observe  whatever  conventions  mights  be  en- 
tered into  by  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
to  replace  those  Treaties.  By  Article  XL  Germany  made 
similar  stipulations  with  regard  to  Luxemburg,  renouncing 
her  rights  to  the  exploitation  of  the  railways,  and  accepting 
the  termination  of  the  regime  of  neutrality  of  the  Grand 
Duchy.  Hence  it  would  seem  that  the  only  permanent  neu- 
trality to  survive  the  World  War  is  that  of  Switzerland. 
and  even  in  this  case  the  Allies  are  not  a\'erse  to  admitting 
the  Swiss  pretension  that  this  neutrality  is  recognized,  InU 
not  guaranteed. 

However,  the  Constitution  of  the  League  of  X^ations 
seems  to  imply  the  desire  on  the  part  of  the  powers  to  guar- 
antee the  integrity  and  ])olitical  independence  of  all  its  mem- 
bers. Article  X  states  that  "the  Members  of  the  League 
undertake  to  respect  and  to  preserve  as  against  external  ag- 
gression the  territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  inde- 
pendence of  all  Members  of  the  League."  and  empowers 
the  Council  to  advise  on  the  means  necessarv  for  fulfilling 
this  obligation  in  case  of  aggression  or  threat  thereof.  Since 
any  violation  of  tlie  neutrality  of  a  state  would  constitute 
an  act  of  external  aggression,  it  would  seem  diat  member- 
168 


CONCLUSION 


169 


ship  in  the  League  gives  to  any  state  a  gnaraiUee  (;f  protec- 
tion, which  would  make  permanent  neutraHty  imnecessarv. 
This  was  apparently  the  "international  arrangements"  which 
the  makers  of  the  Peace  Treaty  had  in  mind,  which  were 
referred  to  in  Articles  XXXI  and  XL,  and  for  which  they 
demanded  the  consent  of  the  German  government.  This 
was  undoubtedly  the  interpretation  given  Article  X  in  Amer- 
ica, and  it  furnished  a  foundation  for  the  stubliorn  oppo- 
sition to  the  Treaty  which  developed  in  this  country,  for 
the  general  sentiment  in  America  revolted  against  the  task 
of  standing  guard  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  Europe. 
The  very  recent  interpretation  of  the  terms  of  Article  X, 
(Dec,  1920),  which  has  been  given  out  by  the  Assembly 
of  the  League  of  X'^ation?  at  Geneva,  is  probably  an  attempt 
to  compromise  with  this  growing  opposition.  It  certainly 
is  far  from  the  original  understanding  of  the  plans  and  pur- 
pose of  the  League.  Onlv  a  skilful  diplomat  could  point 
otit  an  actual  difference  of  meaning  between  the  pledge  "to 
respect  and  preserve  against  external  aggression"  of  Article 
X  of  the  recent  Treaty,  and  the  pledge  "to  respect  and  cause 
to  be  respected"  of  the  Treaties  which  created  the  perma- 
nent neutralities.  Furthermore,  should  an  injured  member 
appeal  to  the  League  for  protection  or  redress  the  Members 
are,  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  bound  to  assist  the  injured 
party  as  directed  by  the  Council.      (Article  XVI.) 

What  the  outcome  of  the  present  attempt  at  World  Or- 
ganization will  be  only  the  future  can  tell ;  and  the  continua- 
tion of  the  institution  of  permanent  neutrality,  as  well  as  of 
many  other  international  institutions,  depends  largely  on 
this  outcome. 

We  have  seen,  in  this  study,  how  the  neutralization  of 
disputed  territories  was  frequently  suggested  as  early  as 
the  1 6th  century,  but  was  never  put  into  successful  opera- 
tion until  181 5,  when  the  wishes  of  the  Swiss  people  were 
recognized  as  being  in  harmony  with  the  best  interests  of 


j-0  5"i?£  NEUTRALIZATION  OF  iiTATES 

Europe.  We  have  outlined  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  permanent  neutrahty  of  Belgium  was  created  in  1831, 
and  that  of  Luxemburg-  in  1867;  and  have  followed  the  for- 
tunes of  these  states  to  the  present.  We  have  seen  how  the 
neutralities  of  Cracow,  of  the  Congo,  and  of  Samoa,  were 
created,  but  failed  to  stand  the  test  of  time. 

We:  have  gone  into  a  technical  study  of  the  rights  and 
duties  of  permanent  neutrals,  giving  at  the  same  time,  a  his- 
torical exposition  of  the  instances  when  these  rights  and 
duties  have  created  concrete  international  problems  for  so- 
lution. In  so  doing  we  have  followed  the  history  of  one 
phase  of  European  Diplomacy  for  over  a  century.  It  is  not 
our  purpose  to  estimate  the  value  of  the  institution.  In 
order  to  do  this  it  would  be  necessary  to  say  what  the  his- 
tory of  the  century  would  have  been,  had  the  permanent  neu- 
tralities not  been  created.  This  would  take  us  into  the  field 
of  speculation,  and  this  field  lies  outside  of  the  realml  of 
historical  researcli.  We  may  add  in  closing  that  the  neu- 
trality of  Switzerland  has  been  preserved  for  one  hundred 
and  five  years ;  that  of  Belgium  was  respected  for  eighty- 
three  years,  and  upon  its  violation  in  1914  aroused  the  con- 
demnation of  the  world  for  German  perfidy ;  that  of  Luxem- 
burg was  respected  for  forty-seven  years ;  and  that  of  the 
Congo,  while  but  a  hybrid  arrangement,  served  to  harmon- 
ize European  interests  in  Central  Africa  so  that  no  serious 
threat  of  international  conflict  has  arisen  in  that  part  of  the 
world. 


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GENF.kAI,  IXIM-X 


(See  Table  of  Contents  for  Topical  Index.) 


Aberdeen,  Lord,   131.  ! 

Absolutist   Theory   of   sovereign-  ! 

ty,  98.  100,   102,  104. 
Adolph  of  Nassau,  120- 
Aix-la-Chapelle,     Conference     of,  j 

40.  111.  j 

Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  29,  68-70. 
Alsace-Lorraine,  92.  i 

Alvensleben,  Baron  von,  79. 
Amiens,  Treaty  of,  13,  16,  17,  26, 

31. 
Anarchists,  122. 

Apia.  Harbor  of.  77,  78.  80,  82. 
Arntz,  Professor,  57. 
Arthur,    Chester    A.,    President. 

60. 
Asquith.  H.  H.,   167. 
Assyria,  10. 

Asylum,  Privilege  of,  70,  71,  121. 
Australia.  74. 
Austin,  John,  98,  99. 
Austria,    13,    18,    20,    36.    38,    39, 

43-45,  49,  50,  52,  68-74.  94,  116, 

118,  121,  124,  131,  142,  160, 
161. 

Austro-Italian   War,    121. 

Balance  of  Power,  45,  127. 

Barbary  States,  18- 

Barrier    System,    39,    45,    46,    53, 

69,  111. 
Bavard,  T.  F.,  78,  79. 
Belgium,  14,  32,  36-52,  55,  56,  65, 

86-89,   91,    92,    94,    111-115,    118, 

119,  121,  125,  130,  132,  134-138, 
141-151,  154,  156,  159-166,  168, 
170. 

Berlin,  Conference  of,  on  Afri- 
can Affairs,  (1885),  57,  61-63, 
65,  66,  79,  84,  132,  144-146,  149, 
151. 

Berlin,  Conference  of,  on  Samo- 
an  Affairs,    (1889),  79-82. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,    164, 166,  169. 

Beust,  Count,  50. 

Bismarck,  Count  Herbert  von, 
80. 


Bismarck,  Prince  Otto  von.  49- 
51.  53.  61,  62,  67,  79.  100,  109, 
116,  125,  149,   161. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  11,  15,  17, 
18,  24,  25,  28,  30,  39,  85. 

Bourbons,  22,  110. 

Boxer  Uprising,  143. 

Brazza,  M.  de,  57. 

"Buccaneers",   11. 

Billow,  Bernhard  von,   124. 

Campio-Formio,   Treaty  of,  15. 

Castlereagh,  39,  69. 

Catharine  H,  of  Russia,   12-14. 

Charlemagne,  37. 

Charles  V,  Emperor,  16,  37,  38. 

Charles  the  Bald,  37. 

Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  28. 

China,  143. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  156,  159. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  President,  67, 

80,  81. 
Coalitions    against     Napoleon    I, 

25,  109. 
College  of  Free  Cities,  13.  15,  26. 
Concert  of  Europe,  51. 
Confederation  of  North  German 

States,  see  Germany. 
Congo   Basin,   54-66,   89,   94,    120, 

132,  144-150.  170. 
Congo    Free    State,     see     Congo 

Basin. 
Consolato  del  Mare,  11. 
Continental   System.   11. 
Courcel,  Baron  de,  64. 
Cracow,   Republic   of,   19.  27,  €8- 

71,  87,  94,  117,  121,  160,  170. 
Cracow,  University  of,  71. 
Crimean  War,  139. 
Customs  Union,  128,.  130. 

Danube  River,  61- 
Defensional,  Swiss.  23. 
Denmark,   12.  49,  93,   139-141. 
Derby  Doctrine,  157-159. 
Derby,  Lord,  53,  156.  159. 
Da-   Rothe   Teufel.    122. 

177 


178 


/ 


GENERAL  IXDEX 


Diego  Cam,  55. 
Droz,   M.,   123,  124. 
Dutch,  see  Holland. 

Egypt,  10,  431. 

"Empress   Charlotte"    Regiment, 

142. 
England.  12,   16-19.  39,  42-45.  51. 

52,  55.  57-61,  66.  68,  69.  71.  73. 

74.   77-80.   82.   86.    91.    107.   114. 

116.    118,    130,     135.     138.     140, 

142.    143.     146.     148.    151.    157. 

159-161.  163.  165-167,  169,  170. 
Entente  Cordial,  151. 
Expulsion  of  Aliens,  123. 

Family  Compact,   (Nassau),  120. 

France,  12,  15-18,  21.  23,  24,  29, 
31,  36-40.  42-46.  49-53,  57,  58, 
61,  66,  68,  71-73,  86,  87,  91,  92, 
109,  111,  113,  116-118,  121,  125, 
126,  130-  137.  140.  142.  143. 
146,  147,  151,  156,  157-163,  165. 
166. 

Francis  II.  of  Austria,   14. 

Franco-Prussian    War,    109,    114, 

116,  125.  162. 

French  Directory.  24. 

French    Revolution,    14.    24.    38, 

119. 

German  Confederation,  see  Ger- 
many. 

German    Empire,  see   Germany. 

Germany,  15,  16,  37,  40,  46-49. 
52,  58,  61,  65.  66.  68.  74.  77-80, 
82,  83,  87,  91.  92.  100.  109,  113, 
122,  123,  125.  128-130,  137,  140, 
159,  162-166.  168.  See  also 
Prussia. 

Gladstone,   W.   E..   161,   162,    165. 

Godeffroy  and  Son,  76. 

Gortchakoff,  50. 

Goschen,  Sir  E.,  167. 

Grant.  Ulysses  S.,  President,  75. 

Granville,  Earl,  158. 

Great  Britain,  see  England- 

Great  War  of  1914-1919.  83.  92. 
138.  141,  168. 

Greece,  73,  74,  89,  92. 

Grey,  Sir  E.,  159,  165,  166. 

Guarantee,  general,  10,  14.  16.  19, 
84.  94,  107.  127,  152. 
of  Belgium,  41,  43,  154. 
collective.  155.  157. 


of  Luxemburg.  50-52.  154,  156. 

of  Malta,  17.  18. 

o;  Poland.  13.  14. 

simple  or  joint  and   several, 

154. 
Switzerland,    26,    28,    30.    33. 

34.   153. 
Guizot.    118.   122,    130.   131. 

Habsburgs,  13,  20.  37,  38. 
Hague  Peace  Conferences.  92,  94. 

110. 
Haiti,  101. 

Hanseatic  League,  11. 
Hanatoux,  G.,  147. 
Hardenberg,  6. 

Harrison,    Benjamin,    President, 
Helvetic        Confederation,       see 

Switzerland. 
Hohenzollerns,   110. 
Holland,   18,   30-41.   43-46.   48.   49, 

58.    88,    93.    111.    112,    120.    132, 

135-138,   142,   150. 
Holy  Roman   Empire,  13,  15.  16, 

23,  37.  39. 
Hundred  Days.  25.  108. 

International  African  Associa- 
tion, 55-58.  60-63,  66.  89.  145. 
147.   149. 

International  Peace  League,  139. 

International  servitude  on  Lux- 
emburg, 115. 

Interparliamentary  Conference 
for  Arbitration  and  Peace,  139. 

Internment  of  military  refugees, 
120. 

Institute  of  International  Law. 
59. 

Ionian  Islands,  73. 

Isabella,  of  Spain,   142. 

Jagow.   von.   164.   166. 

Japan,   140- 

Jesuits,   126. 

Joint     Commission     in     Samoa, 

82,  83. 
Jomini,   General,    109. 
Juarez,  142. 
Judea,  10. 

Kasson,  John  A.,  62-65.  79. 
Knights    of    St.    John.    (Knights 

of  Malta),  16-18. 
Kulturkampf.  125. 


GENERAL  INDEX 


I7'J 


Laws  of  War  on  Land,  110. 

League  of  Nations.  132,  168,  169. 

Leopold  II,  of  Austria,  13,  14,  26. 

Leopold  I,  of  Belgium,  42,  43, 
119,  131. 

Leopold  II,  of  Belgium,  55,  56. 
66.   144-146,   148,  149. 

Leuchtenberg,  Duke  of,  42. 

Liberia,  61. 

Limburg,  47-49. 

Livingstone,  David,  55. 

Loftus,  Lord.  51. 

London  Conference  on  Belgian 
Affairs,  41,  44,  84,  111,  113. 
119,  135,  149-151,  168. 

London  Conference  on  the  Af- 
fairs of  Luxemburg,  50,  51,  84, 
88,  115,  119,  126,  130.  155. 

Lothair,  37. 

Louis  XIV,  of  France,  23. 

Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  see 
Napoleon   III. 

Louis  Philippe,  King  of  the 
French,   42.    118. 

Low  Countries,  Kingdom  of,  see 
Holland;    Belgium. 

Luneville,  Treaty  of,  15. 

Luxemburg,  14,  32.  39,  40,  44, 
46-52.  65.  87,  92,  94,  111,  113, 
115-117,  120,  126,  128-130.  132. 
144,   154-157,   159-164,  170. 

Malet,  Sir  E.,  63,  80. 

Malietoa  Laupepa,  77-81. 

Malietoa  Talevou,  77. 

Malietoa,  Tanu.  81. 

Malta,  see  Amiens. 

Mamea,  76. 

Mandatory,  83. 

Maria  Dona,  of  Portugal,  142. 

Mary  of  Burgundy,  37. 

Mary  of  Hungary.  37. 

Vlataafa,  79-81. 

Maxim  of  State.  118. 

Maximilian,  Emperor  of  Mexi- 
co, see  Mexico. 

Mazarin.  38,  86. 

McKinley.  William,  President, 
81. 

Mercenaries,  21,  23,  30. 

Metternich,   69.    131. 

Mexico,   142,   143- 

Missionaries,  55. 

Morgan,  John  T.,  60. 

Moustier,   Marquis  de,   53. 


Moynier,  M.,  59. 

Munster,    Treaty     of,   see     West- 
phalia. 

Naples,  17. 

Napoleon   I.  see  Bonaparte. 

Napoleon  III,  49.  50,  72,  125.  142. 

161. 
Napoleonic  Wars,  11,  87. 
Nemours,  Duke  de,  42. 
Netherlands,    see    Holland;     Bel- 
gium. 
Neuchatel  Affair,  110. 
Neutrality, 
armed.  12. 
Federative,  139. 
permanent,  9,  12,   14,  27.  31. 
84,  89,  95.  96,  103.  106,  127. 
.'^imple.   9-12.   19. 
"radical,"  116,  152,  164,  168- 
170. 
New  Zealand,  75,  83. 
Nice,  72. 

Niger  River,  61,  63. 
Norwav  and   Sweden,  79,  83,  93, 
139-141. 

Orange,   Prince   of,  see    William 

1,  King  of  Holland. 
OIney,   Richard,   81. 

Pago-Pago,  Bay  of.  75-77,  82. 

Panama.  75. 

Pan-Germanism,    137.    151. 

Paris,  Congress  of,  125,  139. 

Paris,  Treaty  of,  19,  28,  34,  117. 

Paul  I,  of  Russia,  18. 

Philip  II.  of  Spain,  38. 

Pictet   de   Rochemont,   28. 

Pius  IX.  Pope,  22. 

Poland.   13.  14,  24,  68-71,   120. 

Portugal,  54,  57-61,  64,  66.  142. 

Posen,  70. 

Pragmatist  Theory  of  Sover- 
eignty, 98. 

Prophvlaxie,  142. 

Prussia.  12,  13.  18,  29,  40,  44-47. 
49-52  68-71.  73,  74,  94,  109-111, 
118,  120,  129-131,  156,  159-161. 

Rastadt,  Congress  of.  15. 
Recess     of     the     Imperial     Diet, 

1803.  13.  15. 
Red   Cross  Association.  59. 
Reifenbach.   Convention    of,   40. 


i8o 


GENERAL  IXDEX 


Revolution  of  1830,  40. 

Revolution  of  1848,  48. 

Richelieu,   38,   39,   95. 

Romanoffs,  68. 

Rome,  10. 

Russell,  Lord,  73,  114. 

Russia,  12,   14,   15,  17,   18,  43,  45, 

52,  68-71,   73,  94.  120,  131,   139, 

140,   160,   161,   165. 

Salic  Law,  120. 
Saluafata,  Harbor  of,  77. 
Samoa,  54,   74-83,   170. 
San  Domingo,  101. 
Sanforrl,  Henry   S.,  55,  62. 
Sardinia,  72,   73,  88,   117. 
Savoy,  32,  72,  111,  117. 
Scandinavian     States,    see    Nor- 
way;   Denmark. 
Scheldt  River,  38,   40,  41,   136. 
Self-defense,   106,   112. 
Slave  Trade,  55,  56. 
Sonderbund  War,  118. 
Sovereignty.    10,    34,    43,    73,    96, 

97,  99,   101,   103,   106,   112,   pp7, 

145,   148. 
Sozial   Deniokrat,    122. 
Spain,  18,  36,  38,  142. 
Spanish   Succession,  War  of,  38. 
Stanley.  Henry   M.,  55-58,  61,  62, 

64,  67. 
Stanley,   Lord,   51,   53,   155,   157. 
Steinberger,   75,   76. 
Strauch,  Colonel,  66. 
Sweden,  see   Norway. 
Switzerland,  18-33,  72,  73,  85,  86, 

88,  91,  93,  94,  97,   108-110,   112, 

117,  118,  120,  122,  123-126,  132, 

137,  144,  153.  164.  169. 
Swiss  Affairs,  Committee  on,  29, 

31. 

Tallyrand,  29. 
Tamasese,  77-80. 
Thirty  Years'  War,  22. 
Treaties,   duration  of,  71,   72. 


^  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany, 
1919,   165,   169. 

Treaties  with  native  tribes,  vali- 
dity of,  57. 

Turin,  Treaty  of,  72. 

Turkey,    28,    73,    139. 

Tutulia,  see  Pago-Pago. 

Twiss,  Sir  Travers,  57,  59,  67. 

Two  Sicilies,  Kingdom  of,  see 
Naples. 

Unilateral  Declaratio.i  of  Neu- 
trality,   16,   93,    138. 

United  States,  12,  54,  55,  57,  60- 
62,  74-82,  105,   107,  142. 

Universal  Military  Training,  107. 

Utrecht,  Treaty  of,  38. 

Verdun,  Treaty   of,  21,   22. 
"Very    Confidential"    Note,    163, 

165. 
Vienna,   Congress   of,   13,   19,   25, 

27,  30,  33,  34,  40,  55,  61,  67-72, 

84,   93,   111,   113,   117,   118,   120, 

140,  153,  160. 

Walewski,  Count,  125. 
Warsaw,  Duchy  of,  70. 
Warsaw,  Treaty  of,  69. 
Washington,    Conference    on    Sa- 

moan  Affairs,  78,  79. 
West,  Sir  Lionel,  79. 
Westphalia,    Treaties   of,   23,    38, 

40.  67. 
Wilhelniina.  of  Holland,  120. 
William  I,  of  Holland.  39.  41,  43- 

47. 
William  TIT.  of  Holland.  50.   120. 
Wilson,  Henry   Lane,   148. 
Wohlgemuth  Affair,  123-125. 

XVITI  Articles,  Treaty  of  42,  119. 
XVTIT  Articles.  Treaty  of,  42,  119. 
47,   49,  51,  52. 

Zambezi.  64.  66 
Zollverein,  48,  52,  129,  130. 


VITA 

The  author  of  this  study  was  born  at  Sherman,  Wayne  County, 
Pa.,  on  October  25,  1887.  He  was  graduated  from  the  Lanesboro, 
Pa.,  High  School  in  1907,  and  from  the  Mansfield,  Pa.,  State  Nor- 
mal School  in  1909.  He  then  served  for  four  years  as  Principal  of 
the  High  Schools  located  at  Le  Raysville,  Pa.,  and  Rush,  Pa.  In 
1913  he  entered  the  ministry  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church, 
received  the  Degree  of  Bachelor  of  Arts  at  Syracuse  University  in 
June,  1916,  and  acted  for  the  following  two  years  as  Teaching  Fel- 
low in  History  in  that  institution.  While  there  he  took  Graduate 
Courses  with  Professors  Flick,  Sperry,  Lauber,  Tanner,  Peritz  and 
Parsons.  In  1918  he  was  appointed  to  a  Carnegie  Endowm-ent  Fel- 
lowship in  International  Law,  and  chose  to  attend  Columbia  Uni- 
versity. He  was  reappointed  to  the  Fellowship  in  1919.  While  at 
Columbia  he  attended  courses  under  Professors  John  Bassett  Moore 
and  Munroe  Smith,  and  Messrs.  Henry  Eraser  Munro  and  Godoy. 
Upon  leaving  Columbia  he  was  elected  Instructor  in  European  His- 
tory and  International  Law  in  Allegheny  College.  His  service 
there  is  to  be  continued  for  the  College  Year  1921-22,  with  the  rank 
of  Assistant  Professor. 


181 


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